Vision-Impaired Vets Seek Federal Funding

April 7, 2009 – Washington, DC — It took nearly 10 months before doctors thought to give Glenn Minney an MRI after he lost his vision as a result of a blast wound suffered at Haditha Dam, Iraq.

Minney and other blind veterans hope it won’t take that long to get $5 million of federal money to keep other veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan from suffering a similar fate.

In federal funding, $5 million isn’t much. That’s why U.S. Rep. David Hobson, R-Springfield, is mystified that a line in last year’s Defense Authorization bill creating a resource center for blind veterans was taken out right before the bill passed. Hobson and his staff are studying how to secure the funding.

Minney, of Frankfort, was injured in April 2005, when he was standing on Haditha Dam as it took a mortar round. At first he felt fine. But the next day, his eyes were scratchy and red. His eyesight gradually got worse, but at first doctors couldn’t find anything, so they treated him — twice — for pinkeye.

Then he started to lose his sight. They shipped him to Germany, then to Washington D.C. At first they told him he was healing. But by September, he had lost his sight.

One day, Minney was told that he had to lay flat and face down for one to three months. The next day, he was told to report for duty.

Then there was inevitable confusion over whether he should be treated by Veterans Affairs Medical Centers or under active duty care.

Meanwhile, no one could figure out why Minney had lost his sight. That finally changed in February 2006, when he received an MRI at Camp Lejeune. That’s when they discovered he had a loss of brain tissue in the occipital lobe, which works the eyes, as well as the parietal lobe.

Minney is by no means the only Iraq war veteran whose war injuries include devastating eye injuries. Tom Zampieri of the Blinded Veterans Association said 1,162 evacuated from Iraq or Afghanistan between March 19, 2003, and Sept. 17, 2007, had sustained direct eye trauma. That doesn’t count people like Minney, who’ve lost sight because of traumatic brain injury.

Zampieri cites the case of a 32-year-old veteran who lost his sight and, finding that his friends no longer visited him and he couldn’t drive, committed suicide.

“When you have eye trauma, there are no pills that are going to fix that,” he said.

Zampieri hopes that this year, he’ll be successful in securing the $5 million in federal funds, which would create a “Military Eye Trauma Center of Excellence” that could become a resource for doctors. To Minney, $5 million is a small price for the government to pay.

“I never said it was too costly,” he said. “So why should these agencies say the same thing to me?”

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Apr. 7, VCS Editorial: High Praise for Public Service Performed by Professors Stiglitz and Bilmes

April 7, 2008 – Columbia University Professor Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, and his colleague, Harvard University Professor Linda Bilmes, deserve our gratitude for informing Americans about the human and financial costs of the Iraq War in their new book, “The Three Trillion Dollar War.”

Their outstanding book, with dozens of pages of detailed footnotes and sources, is the epitome of public service in a time of war.

The facts are clear and overwhelming: The Bush Administration has failed our military service members and our veterans who fought in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.  The tip of the iceberg was the outrageous and unconscionable Walter Reed Army Medical Center scandal.

The situation for veterans and their families worsened when Americans learned that suicidal Iraq War veterans were improperly turned away from emergency medical care.

The statistics pried from the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) by Veterans for Common Sense (VCS) using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) during the past two years provides strong and convincing evidence that the Bush Administration intentionally concealed the staggering and growing human and financial costs of the two wars from the public, from Congress, and from journalists.

For example, VCS obtained official DoD documents confirming 73,000 battlefield casualties from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.  In another example, VCS obtained official VA documents confirming 300,000 Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans already treated at VA hospitals, including 120,000 for mental health conditions.

Using the documents VCS obtained under FOIA, and combining it with publicly available cost information, Professors Stiglitz and Bilmes conservatively estimate more than 700,000 total walking wounded casualties costing U.S. taxpayers up to $700 billion over the next 40 years.  The total cost of the Iraq War alone is $3 trillion, and most likely higher.  The longer the wars last, then the higher the number of battlefield casualties and unexpected veteran patients flooding into VA.

Veterans for Common Sense salutes Professors Stiglitz and Bilmes for performing an enormous public service on behalf of all 300 million Americans by fully documenting the human and financial costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

VCS wants our veterans to know about VA, for our veterans to want to use VA, and for VA to be ready, willing, and able to assist veterans with prompt and high-quality healthcare and benefits when they arrive – They earned it. 

With the reliable and salient information from the book, “The Three Trillion Dollar War,” the public and Congress can make better policies for our service members and veterans in an effort to prevent more Walter Reed Army Medical Center scandals and to prevent more suicides.

We ask, when will we learn the lessons from the past and see these headlines in the news: “VA Announces Plan to End Waiting for Healthcare and Claims for All Veterans,” “VA Scaps 26-Page Claim Form, Allows Veterans to Hire Attorneys to Streamline Claims,” “Veterans Applaud VA and Military Effort to Examine All Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans for TBI and PTSD,” and “Number of Homeless Veterans Drops to Nearly Zero.”

Never again will our Nation abandon or neglect our veterans, as happened to many veterans after the Vietnam War and Gulf War.  Yes, America, in the next few years we can do it right for all veterans and the newest generation of veterans.  And thanks goes to Professors Bilmes and Stiglitz for shining so many bright academic, media, and legislative spot lights on this issue. 

Paul Sullivan
Executive Director
Veterans for Common Sense
Post Office Box 15514
Washington, DC 20003
(202) 558-4553 
www.VeteransForCommonSense.org

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Hidden Wounds of War

April 4, 2008 – At the five-year anniversary of the war in Iraq, the federal government remains unprepared to address one of the most pressing needs of the men and women who have served in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Departments of Defense (DoD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) have an obligation to provide our soldiers and veterans the best care anywhere but are falling short of the mark on screening and treatment of traumatic brain injury (TBI).

Some 1.6 million Americans have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than 31,000 have been wounded in action and many more have sustained noncombat injuries or illness. TBI has been called the “signature injury” of this war, and the improvised explosive device (IED) is the leading cause of fatalities and brain injuries among U.S. servicemembers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These powerful devices inflict severe damage and blast shock waves through the body, including sudden and violent impact to the skull causing damage to brain tissue. The resulting TBI can be fatal, or require immediate hospitalization.

But more often the result of exposure is a less obvious concussion. Current estimates are that 10 percent to 20 percent of all U.S. military personnel in Iraq suffer concussion. Army studies show less than half of those exposed to IED blasts receive any evaluation.

Concussion or “mild” TBI may or may not involve a loss of consciousness. Its mildest form may result only in cognitive and functional symptoms rather than visible, easily recognized injuries. TBI symptoms may not appear until days or weeks following the injury. Confusion, a stunned stare, slowness in following instructions or distractibility are common but subtle changes in consciousness after exposure to TBI.

In the environment of war, such symptoms can go unnoticed and unreported. Experience from sports and other noncombat injuries has shown that if an injured individual sustains a second concussion before resolving symptoms from a previous injury, a “second impact syndrome” can occur with dire, even life-threatening consequences. Repeated concussions cause cumulative damage and slow recovery.

The bad news is that there is no current consensus among specialists in this field on how many concussions in an individual would be “too many.” The good news is that simple computerized screening tools are available to identify those with concussions and mild TBI, to prevent more serious and persistent problems.

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Iraq War Undermining Afghan Efforts

April 3, 2008 – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, says, “What immediately comes to mind is additional forces for Afghanistan.”

“I’ve said that Afghanistan is an economy-of-force campaign. And there are force requirements there that we can’t currently meet,” the top US commander said.

In his NATO speech in Bucharest, US President George W. Bush pressed White House allies to send more troops to Afghanistan.

Washington has recently dispatched 3,500 additional Marines to the war-hit country, increasing the number of the US forces to some 30,000.

Despite the US plan to send more troops to Afghanistan, battlefield commanders still say they lack sufficient forces to fight Taliban.

NATO’s unwillingness to reinforce military forces in Afghanistan has poured cold water on the US ambitions in Afghanistan in fight against Taliban in the chaotic south.

France and Germany have recently on a joint venture sent 5,000 troops to Afghanistan in safe areas, dashing the US dreams to replace the US troops in the volatile south.

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General William Odom Tells Senate Rapid Withdrawal is Only Solution

April 2, 2008 – TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON IRAQ

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007, when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has worked. Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather, I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim, political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success.

I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the president claims.

Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant in
several other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar Province.

More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political
solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic.

No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish realities.

Also disturbing is Turkey’s military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK groups in the border region. That confronted the US government with a choice: either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey.

Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be. Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to cooperate with US forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are their motives? First, anger at al Qaeda operatives and second, their financial plight.

Their break with al Qaeda should give us little comfort. The
Sunnis welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans,
including al Qaeda. The concern we hear the president and his aides
express about a residual base left for al Qaeda if we withdraw is utter
nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al Qaeda if we leave Iraq.
The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites,
like the Iranians, detest al Qaeda. To understand why, one need only
take note of the al Qaeda public diplomacy campaign over the past
year or so on internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb
and invade Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime.
As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our vice president
and some members of the Senate are aligned with al Qaeda on
spreading the war to Iran.

Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being
paid for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that
the cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per
day. And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are
increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals
forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and
they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people.
We merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment.
At the same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the
government’s troops and police, hardly a sign of political
reconciliation.

Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals
with the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among
themselves. Some remain with al Qaeda. Many who break and join
our forces are beholden to no one. Thus the decline in violence
reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strong men who
distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves.
Thus the basic military situation is far worse because of the
proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a
proliferating number of political bosses.

This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less
progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that
needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At
the same time, Prime Minister Maliki’s military actions in Basra and
Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. We
are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the
Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being
asked by the president to believe that this shift of so much power and
finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political
centralization. He describes the process as building the state from
the bottom up.

I challenge you to press the administration’s witnesses this week to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical
case where power has been aggregated successfully from local
strong men to a central government except through bloody violence
leading to a single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of
feudal Europe’s transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is
the story of the American colonization of the west and our Civil War.
It took England 800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo.

How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as
effective state building? More accurately described, it has placed the
United States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to
consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the US expense.

To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an
over extended army. When the administration’s witnesses appear
before you, you should make them clarify how long the army and
marines can sustain this band-aid strategy.

The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order. Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping US
strategy in the region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional
stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that
goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the president merely
renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt
Iran to lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran
detests the Taliban and supports them only because they will kill
more Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a US attack
on Iran. Iran’s policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them has its limits.

No quick reconciliation between the US and Iran is likely, but
US steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable
than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The president’s
policy has reinforced Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear
weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.

Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the
region. It must include a realignment and reassertion of US forces
and diplomacy that give us a better chance to achieve our aim.

A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely. I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a cat. Let try again me explain why they don’t make
sense.

First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training
element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense
at all. The idea that US military trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe
and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior officers I
have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover, training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is not short on military skills.

Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We
heard that argument as the “domino theory” in Vietnam. Even so, the
path to political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we
withdraw or not. The idea that the United States has a moral
responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to
blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it.
American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are
misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it.
The real moral question is whether to risk the lives of more
Americans. Unlike preventing chaos, we have the physical means to
stop sending more troops where many will be killed or wounded. That
is the moral responsibility to our country which no American leaders
seems willing to assume.

Third, nay sayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional instability. This confuses cause with effect. Our forces in Iraq and our threat to change Iran’s regime are making the region unstable. Those who link instability with a US withdrawal have it exactly backwards. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the sands of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies’ interest.

I implore you to reject these fallacious excuses for prolonging the commitment of US forces to war in Iraq.

Thanks for this opportunity to testify today.

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Government Plans to Cut Army War Tours

April 4, 2008 – Washington, DC — The Bush administration plans to announce next week that U.S. soldiers’ combat tours will be reduced from 15 months to 12 months in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning later this summer, The Associated Press has learned.

The decision, expected to get final, formal approval in the days ahead, comes as Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, prepares to deliver a progress report to Congress next week on the improved security situation there. He is also expected to make recommendations for future troop levels.

A senior administration official said Friday that plans are to deploy soldiers for 12 months, then give them 12 months rest time at home. Exactly which units would be affected is not yet clear. The official spoke on condition of anonymity ahead of the announcement.

The move to shorter deployments has been pushed by Gen. George Casey, Army chief of staff, as a way to reduce the strain on troops battered by long and repeated tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. But that goal has been hindered by the ongoing security demands in Iraq.

Officials have been publicly tightlipped in recent days about the move to reduce the tours. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Friday he expected a decision by President Bush “fairly soon” on the Army’s proposal. But he also cautioned that cutting troops’ time on the battlefront will impose limits on what the military can do in the future.

“So I think the bottom line is, we’re all still looking at that. But I think we’ll have a better idea of what we think we can do, what we ought to do, in the fairly near future,” Gates told reporters Friday.

What the future holds for troops in Iraq will become clearer when Petraeus goes before congressional committees Tuesday.

Petraeus is expected to lay out his proposal for a pause in troop cuts after July when the last of the five additional brigades ordered to Iraq last year have come home. And he will likely tell lawmakers how many more troops could be withdrawn this year, as long as conditions in Iraq remained stable.

His presentation will include statistics reflecting the reduction in violence over the past seven months, but it will also note the latest spike in fighting in Basra, as Iraqi security forces took on Shiite militias, and the attacks that stretched out into Baghdad.

Petraeus and Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador to Iraq, are expected to tout political advancements by the Iraqis, although they will note that much more needs to be done.

Officials said Friday that the Army proposal to reduce tours is on track. Top military leaders made it clear to Bush in a closed-door meeting late last month that they are worried about the war’s growing strain on troops and their families.

Gates made the decision to extend deployments to 15 months last year, because that was the only way the Army could provide enough troops for the Bush-ordered military buildup aimed at quelling the violence in Baghdad.

Ever since, Gates, Casey and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have said they want to go back to 12 months tours as soon as possible.

There are now 158,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, including 18 combat brigades — down from a peak of 20 brigades for much of the past year. By the end of July, military leaders have said those numbers would fall to 140,000 troops, including 15 combat brigades.

Casey has said he could reduce combat tours if the demands on the Army were cut back to a total of 15 brigades in the war zone. At the end of July there would be 13 in Iraq — along with two Marine units — and two Army brigades in Afghanistan.

In a related move Friday, Democrats signaled that they don’t see much hope in ending the Iraq war this year so long as Bush insists U.S. troops remain committed there in large numbers.

Still, party leaders wrote to Bush on Friday to tell him it’s not too late to change course and plead with him not to leave the war for the next president to handle.

“We are deeply concerned that you and the congressional Republican leadership are intent on staying the current course throughout your administration and then handing the Iraq war off to future presidents,” the Democrats wrote.

Others said they hope to see continued efforts to force troop withdrawals, but they acknowledged they were unlikely to succeed.

“I expect most of our troops to still be there” come the end of the year, said Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

“Until there’s either a big enough majority in the Senate or a change in the president’s (approach), I don’t see a significant improvement situation improvement in Iraq,” Levin said in a conference call with reporters.

Sen. Joe Biden, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, predicted in the same conference call that the situation in Iraq will grow considerably worse by September “because the administration seems to have no political game plan.”

Since Democrats lack a veto-proof majority, they have repeatedly failed to force Bush to accept any anti-war legislation, including one measure supported by many Republicans that would have required that troops spend more time at home between combat tours.

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The Politics of Bullets

April 3, 2008- Five years after the fall of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, the new Iraqi political system created by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003 and then revised by the United Nations in 2004, is still trapped within the boundaries of sectarianism, ethnicity and lack of security. Iraqis themselves who had been subject to all forms of oppression and atrocities by the old regime have become victims to new dictators brought in by the occupying forces.

The first of them was Paul Bremer, the American governor of occupied Iraq who took over after Saddam, and who, for the first time in Iraq, established a political system based on ethnic and sectarian quota representation. Five years on, Iraq is in political chaos with no hope in sight that the country can soon become a real democracy as the American leadership promised before invading Iraq. During his term in Iraq, Paul Bremer enjoyed the right to veto decisions by the Governing Council that he himself appointed. Bremer also used an army of advisers in all Iraqi departments, who were the real ministers and decision-makers in the Iraqi administration.

The fierce political confrontation that erupted between Bremer and the UN Special Representative of the secretary-general in Iraq, the late Sergio de Mello, that ended in the death of de Mello in the Canal Hotel explosion in August 2003, left Bremer as the sole political master in Iraq. It will be recorded in the history of Iraq that the American governor, Paul Bremer, was the one who established sectarianism in Iraqi politics, laid down the foundations of a quota political system, and promoted either directly or by proxy the surge of violence in Iraq by permitting armed militias to cross the borders from Iran into Iraq and by turning a blind eye to the formation and arming of other militias inside Iraq.

US policy towards Iraq in the last 25 years swung from one extreme to the other. During the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the US supported Iraq militarily, financially and diplomatically, and pushed its allies in the Arab world to back the Iraqi dictator. The war ended in a no-win situation and cost the Iraqis dearly.

In 1990 US policy towards Iraq went swiftly to the opposite extreme — total siege and isolation of the war-ravaged country. As the US and its allies were preparing for a military push to eject Saddam’s forces from Kuwait, the US State Department started a dialogue with Iraqi opposition leaders in exile. The idea was to prepare a political alternative for the ailing regime.

However, in March 1991 an opportunity to remove the Iraqi leader was wasted when the US and Saudi Arabia agreed to allow him to use his air force against the popular uprising in Iraq.

The US State Department was meanwhile busy in forging close ties with Iraqi “liberals”, encouraging them to mobilise other political opposition forces against Saddam. The creation of a new political group called the Free Iraq Council in early 1991 by Saad Salih Jabr, Sadiq Al-Attia and Hazem Al-Shaalan was a landmark action as many Iraqi opposition figures joined the new group that seemed to have the backing of the US, UK and Saudi Arabia.

The Free Iraq Council was not the only active political group against Saddam at the time. Other political forces also established their own political forums in exile. Arab nationalists, Baathists loyal to Syria, other breakaway factions, communists and Kurds found refuge in Damascus. Islamic factions found support in Tehran, while the so-called democrats carried out their activities in European capitals such as London, Vienna, Stockholm and Geneva.

Between 1990 and 1998 the Iraqi opposition was seen as a political mix, composed of four main political currents in addition to the main parties representing Iraqi Kurds, Arab nationalists, liberals, social democrats, communists and religious groups. Tehran was of course the main political base for the religious current, but there were also a number of religious groups that set up shop in London such as Al-Khoie Foundation, headed by Majeed Al-Khoie, and Ahlul Bait Foundation, headed by Mohamed Bahr Al-Uloum.

After the 1991 war, Iran developed better relations with the Arab world. New offices were opened in Damascus for the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (SCIRI) and the Daawa Party with the help of the Syrian government.

As Iraqi opposition groups were busy gathering support for their future plans in Iraq, meetings and conferences were held, mainly in London and Vienna, to bring all Iraqi political opposition groups closer to a harmonised vision for post-Saddam Iraq. Ayad Allawi, Saad Salih Jabr, Ahmed Chalabi, Salah Omar Al-Ali, Mohamed Baqir Al-Hakim, Muwaffaq Al-Rubaie and many other political figures helped bring these groups together.

There was a broad agreement that the new Iraq should be democratic, pluralistic and at peace with its neighbours. The idea to establish a federal region for the Kurds was floated by Kurdish leaders (Talbani, Barzani, Fouad Maasoum and Mahmoud Othman), discussed thoroughly in London, Vienna, Geneva and Stockholm, and was broadly accepted. But there was no mention at all of a political quota system in Iraq that would give the Iraqi Shia 60 per cent of the seats in any future governing bodies, including the parliament and government.

In 1998 when the US Congress passed “Free Iraq Act”, only SCIRI and the Daawa Party supported by Tehran demanded a quota representation that would give them a decisive role in shaping the future of Iraq. From that time onward political representation on a quota basis was promoted by the American administration and supported by thinktank groups such as the American Enterprise Institute. Political opposition leaders from now on would be classified as Shia, Sunni and Kurd not as liberal, nationalist, social democrat and religious, a fine piece of political deception engineered by the US administration.

The fall of Saddam in April 2003 and the destruction of all Iraqi state entities resulted in an overall vacuum of power in Iraq. The Badr Brigade, the armed wing of SCIRI, was allowed by the Americans to cross the border from Iran into Iraq even before the fall of Saddam. Hizbullah of Iraq was helped by Iran to take up a strong position in the south, moving north and west from Al-Ahwar. The Muslim Ulama Association declared jihad. Muqtada Al-Sadr also declared jihad and started forming the Mahdi Army. Altogether there was an explosion in the number of militia organisations, with altercations daily taking place in the streets of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and other Iraqi cities.

The trend to militarise Iraqi political and religious groups was essential for self- defence in the state of chaos that resulted from the occupation and Bremer’s decision to dismantle Iraqi institutions. That trend was helped by the fact that tons of ammunitions and arms were available everywhere in Iraq in deserted army camps and in locations known to the locals or to Baath party officials who then sold them on the market.

Within a few months after the occupation, all political parties and religious groups in Iraq had acquired their own military capabilities. Gangs and armed groups with no connection to political factions also appeared in the streets of Baghdad and many Iraqi cities, small towns and the countryside. Endless supply lines of men, arms, ammunitions and funds flowed through the borders from Iran providing armed militia with a secure lifeline enabling them to spread their influence.

These militia groups have become the powerhouse for violence and instability in Iraq. No political progress or reconstruction can be achieved without disarming these groups and eliminating their influence. The rivalry between political parties, especially the Shia ones, provides leaders of these parties with the justification to use arms in order to settle political differences and gain influence in the country.

The ongoing wave of violence in southern provinces and in Baghdad between the Iraqi government and American troops on one hand, and the Mahdi Army on the other, is one ugly feature of this political rivalry. The recent battle that started quietly in February and escalated to an almost all-out war reveals the deep political rift between two Shia political forces — the Mahdi Army fighting for the integrity of Iraq and its Arab identity and the alliance of SCIRI and the Daawa Party supported by Iran and US troops, that want a federal region in the south of Iraq parallel to the federal region of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Nuri Al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, who is exercising his authority as the high commander of the Iraqi Armed Forces, has targeted his opponents, telling them to “surrender or die”. Muqtada Al-Sadr, perhaps realising his strategic disadvantage in the fight, is calling for a political solution in order to spare the blood of his own people. The political landscape of occupied Iraq has been reduced to bullets in this tragic showdown.

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US Ambassador to Baghdad Tells Al-Hayat the Story of Her Famous Meeting with Saddam Hussein

March 15, 5008 – Al Hayat:  When Saddam Hussein asked you to meet with him, didn’t you suspect something was getting prepared since he never met with ambassadors?
April Glaspie:  He met occasionally with ambassadors; I had met him once before he brought over a group of ambassadors. I had not met with him singly, for he never even accepted credentials himself, so he did not receive any new ambassador presenting his credentials.  As for my meeting with him, a week before he invaded Kuwait in 1990, the foreign ministry called me.  I assumed they called me to tell me to come to talk in the Foreign Ministry to Nizar Hamdoun who was deputy to Tarek Aziz and possibly talk to Tarek himself.  They just asked me to come without telling me who I was to meet.  Then once I arrived to the Foreign Ministry they put me in a car I had never seen with a driver I have never met. They told him to take me somewhere and I wanted to know before where I was heading to in this car. They said you are going to the Presidency.  On my way I still did not think I was going see Saddam, I thought somebody else because he did not call anybody to meet with.  When I realized that it was he that I was going to see, I thought that it was not impossible that the very strong warnings that had been given to the Iraqis by me through Nizar Hamdoun and also and specially to the Iraqi ambassador in Washington by our Deputy Assistant Secretary might not have been reported to him because everybody was so terrified of him.  So I said it was a good opportunity for me to repeat my instructions which were do not invade Kuwait, keep your hands off this country. When the Iraqi ambassador to Washington was summoned by the State Department, he was told not to invade Kuwait and was urged to inform Bagdad of this instruction immediately. Everybody in the Arab world was concerned, knowing the man is unpredictable.  So as soon as this meeting in Washington was finished the one with   the Iraqi ambassador I repeated them to Nizar Hamdoun in Bagdad and told him my President( Georges Bush)  is very concerned that your President be informed immediately about the warning not to invade Kuwait . Of course, it was then useless to ask to see Saddam because he always said no. You could not see anybody in Bagdad. Michel Aflaq lived in Bagdad but no foreigner was permitted to call on him even though in Iraqi protocol at the time you would be interested to know he outranked the President of the Republic.
Al Hayat:  When you saw Saddam what was your conversation with him? Were you aware of the Iraqi troops massing along the border with Kuwait?  Did the satellite monitor that?
A.G:  Not only satellites but everybody in Iraq could see troops going to the south, trains for instance, we did not know exactly the number but we saw enough to understand as well as the Kuwaitis and everybody became deeply concerned. So Yes we all knew he was preparing for this. We had a visit from the Arab League Secretary General, an Egyptian envoy, many Arab envoys some of them came quietly; we did not know of them, everybody was concerned.
Al Hayat: Was He alone when he summoned you and you saw him?
A.G:  No Tarek Aziz was there and two or three of his aides to take notes.
Al Hayat: Did he start talking directly to you?
A.G: Not quite direct, he started by telling me how very badly behaved the Kuwaitis were, referring also on the meetings in Jeddah that were held he was saying that they are unreasonable and blaming them.  His whole accusation of the Kuwaitis made me concerned that the next thing he was going to say was going to take us backward 20 years when a previous Iraqi President said that Kuwait was a part of the southern wilayat of Iraq.  It came to my mind that he was going to say so. So, although he had much more to say when he paused, I delivered my message.
Al Hayat:  Bagdad then gave a version of your meeting with him saying you told him that the US government does not interfere in border disputes bewteen two Arab countries which he took as a green light form the Americans to attack Kuwait.
A.G:  This version was invented by Tarek Aziz.  After all Tarek was a master of words as a previous Minister of Information and editor of a newspaper.  Obviously I did not give Saddam any such idea that we would not interfere in a border dispute what I did tell him was he must not interfere in Kuwait or anywhere else. Then we were interrupted and he  got up politely; somebody came in and he said excuse me I have an important phone call.  So we all sat there and waited for him to come back.. He came back and told us Egyptian President Husni Mubarak called him and said that he told Mobarak not to worry, that there will be no problem and that he will deal with it without making problems; that it will be ok. Then I said to him I take great pleasure telling my President you have assured me that there will be no problem and that was basically it.
Al Hayat:  Did you tell him you were going on vacation?
A.G:  He already knew of course I was going. For any foreign diplomat to leave Bagdad you had to inform the Foreign Ministry to get permission for Arab and foreign diplomats. When the Jordanian ambassador to Bagdad wanted to drive home he had to take permission from the Ministry.  Saddam knew I was leaving and I was fully planning not to leave when all this concentration of troops started.
Al Hayat:  What made you change and leave on vacation?
A.G:  Foolish! I thought if he told me and told Mobarak and I Made sure he told mobarak what he said to us, I checked with our ambassador in Cairo on this, I thought he would not be foolish enough to do it the day he told the most powerful person in the Arab world and the Western world that he was not going to do it.  I Thought I could take my mother who was ill at home and turn around and come back within five days. When saying good bye to  Saddam, he said something I cannot remember precisely but it was something like you can go now, relax and have a nice vacation but you must tell your President about the problems the Kuwaitis are making.
I might add that Tarek Aziz was responsible for very cleverly advising Saddam when I got out of town, because the British ambassador and the Russian ambassador had already departed on vacation so there were no senior diplomats of a major power in Bagdad. It was interesting that we all were out of Iraq when he invaded Kuwait.
Al Hayat:  Some sources in the State Department had mentioned that you had not received instruction and guidance from your government or from Secretary of State James Baker then?
A.G:  No, that is not true.  I received instruction that I carried out.  I would say that the meeting in Washington of the Iraqi ambassador at the State   Department was a week before I left and my instructions came from that meeting.  I went to the Foreign Ministry I think five times and repeated the instruction not to do anything against Kuwait.  About leaving I had asked a few weeks before if Icould leave, then when the situation became very threatening I thought as Saddam said to me and to President Mubarak that there would be no war that it would be a good chance to take my mother who was ill home and to consult with the Secretary of State and we had an important congressional visitor due to arrive and I thought I would be back in Bagdad within five days in time to be with this congressional visitor in the hope that Saddam would see him and he then could say it is not just the US government asking you not to invade Kuwait but also Congress, the American people were against him attacking Kuwait.
Al Hayat:  But Saddam terrified people when you were with him in this meeting were you very diplomatic or harsh with him?
A.G:  I was the representative of the President of the United States.  Of course I was not afraid of Saddam Hussein. What I was afraid of was that he would do a very serious mistake and miscalculate as he did; the determination of a great many people in the world not to let him take Kuwait. I think he misunderstood a lot of Arabs, he had for an instance an idea that the Saudis would allow staging areas in their country and Gulf States as well; and I certainly think he misunderstood the backbone of the American government.  Somebody had said to me once that they heard him talk about how Vietnam had weakened the resolution of the American people and the American government; he thought that we did not have the guts to do anything. The other thing about him was that he was unbelievably ignorant altghough certainly not a stupid man.  He designed that Baas uniform to look like a military uniform; we know that he never spent one minute fighting, he was never in an army, he knew nothing about armies. But just like the shah the more power he got the more he thought he knew. He suddenly became Iraqi expert on military supplies, on agrarian reform, on culture, on everything, when you get somebody with that state of mind who also thinks l’etat c’est moi, you are dealing with a very dangerous parameter.
Al Hayat: Was he totally autistic or you think he misread what you told him?

A.G:  It is just what i said.  I think he listened, he never got as stupid not to listen even briefly but he thought he knew that I was talking through my head, that my government did not have any guts, that we would not fight and certainly not for that little tale of desert that was Kuwait for him.
Al Hayat: Did you have the impression that for him what he claimed oil theft by Kuwait was the issue?  Or he was just megalomaniac?
A.G:  Yes he was megalomaniac.
Al Hayat:  Was he really backed by some Arab allies like King Hussein of Jordan as rumours spread?
A.G:  No never, King Hussein knew this is too dangerous; you are dealing with a megalomaniac who may go after you next. I think his whole political career derived from overcoming the humiliation of his past .He came from nowhere, he was a selfmade man , he understood the power of the pen .When you went to the so called museum of revolution in Bagdad you might have thought you would see Saddam’s shirt but you would see the typewriter he used to persuade those who followed him. He grew up at a time when Iraqis believed understandably they were worthy of the leadership of the Arab world just as Egyptians are , decades when we heard about unity; ,unity and even the Baas split and he was there.  Nobody paying attention to him at all except those people whose lives he ruled. He must have known a good deal of the ideology of the Baas when he was younger.  So it was not the party and what Michel Aflaq wanted, it was his own sense of becoming the leader of the Arab world, after all in his own thinking, I who stood against the ancient enemy and beat them back (his war with Iran) the pillar of “Al Ourouba” he used to say during his war with Iran.
Al Hayat:  Did he tell you after that famous meeting “go on vacation, don’t worry, I will not attack”?
A.G:  Yes he said go and please while you are there tell your president not to worry but it is a serious situation here. So I said I am going but I’ll be right back.
Al Hayat: Why all this blame from Baker and Washington on you, was it not unfair to you?
A.G:  President Bush was superb, he asked me to go and see him, it must be difficult for Presidents of countries who have too many things to think of to have been able to do so much thinking  and having a conversation with him on the Middle East made me think like I was talking to any important personality I could think of in the Middle East.  He was extremely thoughtful, extremely knowledgeable, extremely worried as he should have been. But it is over. Nobody wants to take the blame. I am quite happy to take the blame. Perhaps i was not able to make saddam believe that we would do what we said we would do but  in all honesty i don t think anybody in the world could have persuaded him .And don t forget that eventhough i persuaded some people around him that we meant what we said,who would dare tell him that his political calculations about  the arab world and the western world were incorrect ,that his military calculations were absolutely correct and his calculations about the state of his own country were wrong because the shiites were not as frightened of him as he thought they were .
Al Hayat:  What instructions Washington wanted you to do and they believed you did not implement?
A.G:  Absolutely nothing that i did not implement everything is written down, we had all these meetings in the foreign ministry before i saw Saddam, they knew I have done what i was told to do.
Al Hayat: But was there a mistake somewhere from somebody? Why this judgment of you as if something went wrong?
A.G:  I think because everybody thought we had some breathing space. President Mubarak made a statement saying he had spoken to saddam and that nohing will happen, so I think we all were wrong every single one of us was wrong. I am not Arab, but I would point out that even the Arabs were wrong.  Everybody relaxed a little bit and thought he would not do it right away, particularly Arab officials working behind the scenes, in my personal opinion, looking back whatever saadoun hamadi reported to Saddam after that jeddah meeting must have made him decide he was not going to let this little country in his view kuwait interfere anymore with what was due to him and to Iraq.  Don’t forget that he was very fond of saying and started to believe that in standing up against Iran he has saved those little countries down there and they owed him money and respect, this is how he was thinking in my opinion.
Al Hayat:  Did he tell you that?
A.G:  No but this is what I think.
Al Hayat: What about the Kuwaiti leadership, what was happening then did you talk to them?
A.G:  What more could they have done?  I lived in Kuwait and extremely fond of this country and its people entreprising hard headed commercial people, Beirutis should understand above all the Kuwaitis who are smart business people and lived in the shadow of the big brother at the time and that is not fun. At the time, they have done their very very best to maintain their own sovereignty and fend off this wolf who wanted to get them.
Al Hayat:  Do you think saddam s invasion of Kuwait was the beginning of the end for him?
A.G:  It certainly rained him in but it did awake a more active resentment in Karbala and Najaf amongst the Shiites because at the end of the Iraq/ Iran war remember what happened , but he had always shown he could stamp on descent effectively and he was doing it again.  A very distinguished Iraqi Sunni professor at Bagdad University who was tortured by Saddam but got out of Iraq years before the war once said to me something which is perfectly obvious, but sometimes we tend to forget very obvious things.  He said there is only one thing in the world that would make the general Sunni population ever get behind Saddam, because for every reason that we know they have been terrorized by him and that is if they though there was a real possibility of the Shiites taking control in Bagdad.  That is perfectly obvious but for a diplomat it is important to remember.
Al Hayat:  But the Shiites in the war were not with Iran, they backed Saddam?
A.G:  They did not seem to be but he had to always worry that they would be that is why he stepped on them even harder.
Al Hayat:  Since you left what did you think of what happened in Iraq?  What did you think of the trial of Saddam and the killing of Oudei and Qusai?
A.G:  Well, you know past is past either we learn from it or we don’t, but the British had an extraordinary weapon, the Gatlin gun and they could not quell Iraq 100 years old but in the end they could not do it.  We tried to do it.  What happened to Saddam was obviously an Iraqi decision.  I certainly think it must have been a difficult one, as long as he was alive he must have been perceived by many Iraqis likely to reappear and they would have been afraid of him obviously to make a martyr is the other side of the argument.  I cannot pass my judgment it is an Iraqi issue not an American one.
Al Hayat:  But what did you think of the trial and developments?
A.G:  I don t know, all I read is the newspapers I simply cannot comment on trial.
Al Hayat:  Do you think that the American war in Iraq was a good thing?
A.G:  As I said, the British with extraordinary technology of their time tried very hard, spoke more Arabic than the current coalition forces, were working within their old former mandate, they had all the maps they knew every place in Iraq from north to south and they could not do it. I think that the reasons that they could not do it are there for anybody to read and the same difficulties have emerged now.  And as I said the only thing to get the Sunnis to pull together behind Takrit with Saddam gone is the fear that they were going to be ruled by the Shiites, which is obvious to us all.

Al Hayat:  Do you think Iraq will be for a long time under occupation?  Will it be possible for any new US President to withdraw from Iraq?

A.G:  I suppose all kinds of things are possible and most of them are probably unwise but to me, there is only one thing that needs to happen and that is creative, active courageous diplomacy.  And I think there has to be from the West there has to be really deeper understanding than I have seen of the profundity of the animosities in Iraq, it is very easy to make speeches saying the Kurds are very different from the Arabs and the Shiites Arabs are very different from the Sunnis, it is a very profound and complex ancient difficulty, that has to be understood much better.  I was once reprimanded for saying that I truly believe that despite things that were said at the time that there were a new axis of crisis it was not Palestine.

Al-Hayat:  Who reprimanded you?

A.G:  My boss, I truly believe that if there is only one key to get things going positively in the Middle East remains Palestine because it affects the whole area.  Again some people in the west do not understand how profoundly it affects the whole area , not only neighbors but the very fact this extreme Islam is a new kind of colonialism that wants to impose upon the Arab world an idea  which does not leave free to the Arab people the ability to find their own way with tolerance and respect of everybody else . So, if something could get going on the Israeli Arab side, people like Oussama Ben Laden would be unable simply to snap their fingers and say we must go blow Arab civilians in the name of Palestine because the Palestinians would not want it anymore, to say nothing of the stability that would creep north to your country and in the Arab world.  I think we need a very courageous diplomacy, we need people to lead, we need the kind of meeting that the Baker Hamilton committee suggested, but not one meeting, you need to go meet for example one senior Iranian and talk to him, we need everybody drawn in not excluding the Turks to deal with this issue of Iraq not excluding the Israeli Arab problem.  I have been impressed by very courageous knowledgeable voices amongst the Palestinians and certainly among the Israelis, we need these people to step forward.  During my whole world in the Arab world wherever I went slogans “Wouhda Hurriya Ishtirakiya” and to me even more now that then it is the Hurriya that seems to me in every sense of the word was and should me the most important.  After Suez the Egyptians rejoiced not just because the colonialists were defeated but they felt they have gained the freedom to develop themselves, their State.  After Suez the Americans were heroes because anti colonialists but also because this thirst for Hurriya the most important for them, of course not the way Oussama Ben Laden wishes us to develop because there has to be tolerance and respect or you’ll never have political settlement and no stability for future generation.

Al Hayat:  Going back to Iraq and Kuwait how big was the issue of oil in Saddam’s war?

A.G:  I can only speculate, I do not think it was oil per say, the importance of oil wells as much as finance. His thinking was we Iraqis bleed for you, we had hundreds and hundreds and thousand s of casualties with the war on Iran and you did not fight with us, we did this for you, for the whole world, you must help us we need more money .

Al Hayat:  There is still a question that you did not answer clearly, why did the state department blame you?

A.G:  The President did not, the press spokesman did not blame me, my colleagues did not blame me, and so if one man blamed me you have to ask him. Perhaps if I were to blame he was not to be blamed I suppose.

Al Hayat:  But James Baker’s blame on you was so unfair that people ask the questions?

A.G:  President Kennedy told us life is unfair. I do not know the man, I have never even met him before the war, I have never met Baker in my life before the war, the first time I ever talked to him is when President Bush asked me to go over and see him and Baker was at that meeting, that was the first time I ever met him.

AL Hayat:  When you met him how was it?

A.G:  I don t know I was talking to the President.  It was the President’s meeting.  I saw him a few times later. The meeting with the President was very satisfactory.
 
Al Hayat:  Baker did not make any comment during meeting?

A.G:  I cannot remember, during this meeting Colin Powel was there, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff that was before the American attack to get him out of Kuwait.

Al Hayat: Why did you see the President?
 
A.G:  The President wanted to discuss what to do in Iraq; he invited his staff and asked me also to be in.

Al Hayat:  The President then did not invite you to the meeting to reprimand you.

A.G:  Absolutely not, he said now what we do.

Al Hayat:  So he did not reprimand you?

A.G: Quite  the contrary.
 
Al Hayat:  Did he read your cables on Iraq?

A.G:  I assume he read summaries of them, in our government cables from overseas are summarized every morning for the president.
 
Al Hayat:  When President Bush was discussing what to do now in Kuwait,
Were you an encouraging voice for him to attack and get Saddam out of Kuwait?

A.G:  I am not going to discuss what I said to the President but obviously we all thought the Iraqis must get out of Kuwait immediately. We talked about what could be done.

Al Hayat: You knew President Hafez Assad, what about his personality compared to that of Saddam whom he hated?

A.G:  I served in Bagdad as of 1988, from 85 to 88 I was in Washington; I was responsible in the State Department for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.  I left Damascus in 1985 where I was number two in the US embassy with Bill Eagleton and before it was Ambassador Paganelli.  I used to work with a lot of Lebanese in Damascus.  I spent my whole time looking across the border at the chaos that was in Lebanon. That is how I know Walid Joumblat and Marwan Hamade, I was living in Damascus and I used to see them there.

Al Hayat: When did you start your mission in Iraq?

A.G:  In 1988 I Left Washington to Bagdad.

Al Hayat:  Between 85 and 88 you were doing a mission in Lebanon?

A.G:  Between 85 and 88 I was shuttling between Abdel Halim Khaddam and Beirut where Amin Gemayel was President.

Al Hayat:  How did you find Khaddam when negotiating with him?

A.G:  He was a very difficult man to know, he had quite a mask, I could only judge him by what we knew about his history.  Do you remember when he pushed the Maronites so hard that we had an Intifada.  I was going back and forth trying to do what our Algerian friend Lakhdar Ibrahimi, wonderful diplomat achieved in Taef, but people were asking me to do things that I thought were impossible.  Khaddam was a very tough negotiator, getting him to compromise on any issue took a very long time.  We started from a very difficult position such as suggestion that I write a constitution for Lebanon and my answer was  I could not write a Constitution for my own country, I am not going to write a Constitution for Lebanon, I have never heard something as ridiculous in my life and said that what the Lebanese must do if they wished to have a written Constitution.  So you started from very strong positions and of course what we ended up doing trying to put heads of agreement, general ideas that could be negotiated and I remember at some point Khaddam telling me:  You sell that to Amin Gemayel.  I said to him, look, Amin Gemayel has to be the judge of whether or not he can sell that to his own people and said to him I think you made that mistake once, Khaddam said yes, occasionally he could be quite amusing.  So it was a classic negotiation what Kofi Anan is doing in Nairobi, trying to get two parties profoundly distrusting each other to compromise.
 
Al Hayat:  What did you think of Amin Gemayel at the time?

A.G:  I think he was a serious negotiator; he was concerned about his country, absolutely.  I never felt he was promoting himself, he had advisors whose judgment I assumed he trusted or they would not have been his advisors like Ghassan Tueini, useful to be listened to.  Amin Gemayel  was trying to do the very best he could for his country knowing that any serious change in the Constitution for example the commander of the army was going to be very difficult to sell to the community or if  you were going to change the powers of Prime Minister and give him more of the powers of the President these principles were very difficult at the time for the  community concerned to give up.

Al Hayat: Had you met then Michel Aoun?

A.G:  I had never met him, I had no desire to meet him, I did not think Michel Aoun was the person for me to be speaking to, people in Lebanon were represented by their Prime Minister and their President and those were the two people I met with.

Al Hayat:  But Amin Gemayel appointed him prime minister.

A.G:  I left not long before Taef Lakhdar Ibrahimi took over, he did extremely well, he got them all to come to Taef with the great assistance of the Saudis and he got it done.

AL Hayat: Were you aware at that time of Rafic Hariri’s Role?

A.G:  Rafic Hariri was of course in and out of Damascus very often and he always called on my ambassador, and I was always there.  He was behind the scenes, he wanted to help, it was his country too, I am sure he felt that he had obvious assets he could bring, his connections around the Arab world, but the trick was to find some kind of a political concept which was acceptable to all the Lebanese and which all of us thought could do the job. We were working towards Taef without knowing that we were going towards Taef.  And a lot of work was done.

Al Hayat:  Did you feel that the Syrian leadership hated Hariri then?

A.G: I have no idea, he came in and out to Damascus and never asked him who he was seeing and he never volunteered it.  One of the reasons also he would come there was also to talk to the Lebanese.

Al Hayat: Have you ever met Samir Geagea?

A.G:  No, I never met him, of course when I was in Lebanon I met people but when I was in Damascus and left to Washington and asked to help and I was shuttling between Damascus and Beirut; it was  proper only to meet with the President and Prime Minister.

Al Hayat:  Everybody thought at that time that the US administration handed over Lebanon to Syria.

A.G:  Quite the opposite, the Americans had stepped aside for a very long time; we had done nothing during the long civil war.
 
Al Hayat:  When Syria invaded again Lebanon?

A.G:  I don t know, you asked me about the time I was there, we got permission to see what we could do, to see if there is some kind of arrangement that could be made between Syria and Lebanon that would help. Sitting in Damascus, I thought that we’d better hurry up.  Let me tell you an interesting story, one of my pals in Damascus was called up for his reserve duty in the military, for his sixth or eighth week of duty he was sent to the Bekaa (He was Christian) and when he came back I saw him at a dinner party he told me can we speak alone a bit?  He told me you people better do something, he said what is happening in the Bekaa is frightening to me and my friends who were there.  We did not realize that the Iranians were basically setting up a department of social services in the Bekaa as of 1984, if you were sick or old they took care of the people in the Bekaa, from that time. The Iranian embassy was next to the British embassy in Damascus, suddenly the Iranians sent the ambassador who was crippled and minister of dirty tricks in Teheran, the joke was that he’d opened his own letter bomb by mistake, and after he arrived we used to see all these cars with Lebanese plates like Nasrallah and others, he was really creating Hezbollah out there under our noses, we could see it. I remember at a State dinner that President Hafez Assad had for Greek Prime Minister, the Pakistani ambassador was very amusing, he came up to me and said there is somebody I’d like you to meet, he took me by the arm and turned me round and I am face to face with the Iranian ambassador who stepped back and turned around and backed away, he felt I was unclean.

Al Hayat:  Did President Hafez Assad talk to you about Lebanon?

A.G:  President Assad did not talk to me; I was number two in the embassy.  I met him so many times I was with my ambassador or with a Senator or Secretary of State.

Al Hayat: How was his thinking about Lebanon was it that Lebanon is a province of Syria?

A.G:  Hafez Assad was so smart in many ways I remember him once saying: “Do no think I am foolish enough to believe that I can create an air force (I think he chose air force because it would be the part of military he knew most since he came from it) that can compete with the Israelis within a generation.  Why?  Because it is not sophisticated fast planes that made good air forces, it is pilots who had the advantage of having a splendid education from the time they were children.  Not just brief technical education, he was right wasn’t he?  But I wish I could have asked him a question I never understood by doing  the Iranians the favor of allowing them to export their revolution to Lebanon from the Iranian embassy in Damascus, it seemed to me and to anybody who was watching that what was going on in the Bekaa and in the South the weaponry that must have been going in, the independence of a  group of people that in the end would be very difficult to control and which you could not control by cutting off their grenade because they had already so many buried that they could fight for years, seemed to me a very dangerous thing for Syria , it was an Islamic revolution and remember what happened to Syria when the “Ikhwan” tried to take over in the North . I could never understand why he could be so certain that this could not turn around and bite Syria on the heel because he cannot control Hezbollah.

Al Hayat: Was he convinced that Lebanon is part of Syria or he needed Lebanon for his agenda in the region?

A.G:  He was much too clever to give us such an insight. He would never say this.  It would be the kind of thing Saddam and Iraqis would say about Kuwait that it was part of Iraq historically.  Assad was much too subtle to say or imply anything like that.

AL Hayat; But he refused embassies between both countries?

A.G:  Absolutely, but I just don’t know what he thought.  If you were very old fashioned you could argue about whether or not he believed in Baas ideology, if he did there should not be any Syrian embassy anywhere.

Al Hayat: How would you compare Saddam and his people and aides to Hafez Assad and his aides?

A.G:  Completely different, everybody around President Assad respected his power.  Assad was much too subtle and smart to want people to say yes to him all the time.

Al Hayat:  What about the “Moukhabarat” system in both countries? How do you compare?

A.G:  A little more subtle in Damascus.  For example my life as a diplomat in Syria was as free as it would have been in Beirut, no doubt people were watching us and knew where we were but no Syrian would think twice about inviting me to their house; I was surrounded by people who had been to AUB.In  Bagdad, no Iraqi was allowed to invite a foreign diplomat to his house.  And if a foreign including Arab diplomat wanted to invite any Iraqi, any, to their house you had to make a formal request to the Foreign Ministry including the invitation card and the Foreign Ministry would decide any invitation card  would be sent.  I never entered an Iraqi house except once and that was for a cultural event.

Al Hayat: You attended meetings as number two with Assad and with Saddam two Baas leaders who hated each other  what would you say of both?

A.G:  Assad was the Eastern Mediterranean, a Levantine; he could be extremely charming which is interesting coming from a very disadvantaged background as he was in every way.  He had a great deal of self confidence, he was charming, he could have been a Beirut hostess, he could be genuinely amusing, he always spoke Arabic although I knew from his pilot training he must know some English.  We once had Senator Tower visiting him in his office. There was President Assad and Senator Tower and me only in his office; Senator Tower smoked, there was a big bowl of cigarettes and the Senator ran out of cigarettes.  Assad pushed the bowl towards him and they were all Syrian cigarettes and of course the Senator did not know, so Assad said suddenly in English a very complex sentence with lots of subordinate clauses:  “I am sorry I do not have any American or English cigarettes which I know you would have preferred”.  Had I known you smoke I certainly would have, and my jaw dropped so surprised I was although I was supposed to keep a straight face, he looked at me and laughed out loud and said in Arabic: “Senator she dropped her pencil so I shocked her”.  He really laughed and we did as well.  Saddam when you were with him there was this huge tension in the air because everybody in the room from his own staff was afraid of him and I never heard him make a joke but if he would have, everybody would have laughed.  It was a completely different aura.  In Iraq, it was much more frightening for example:  It never occurred to me for example if I were in the North of Syria that I should avoid getting out of my car to buy some plums.  The Syrians could not care less.  I did that in Kurdistan once, it was very foolish of me because we all knew that you could not talk to any Iraqi, they got taken away and interrogated but I was in a little Kurdish village.
I put my head out of the window of my car and asked if there was any honey because Kurds are very famous for their white honey.  He said no there isn’t, I drove away and I looked back.  They were following me with a car.
                                                                                                            
Al Hayat: After Irak what did you do?
 
A.G:  I went to University of California to teach one year and then ambassador Ed Perkins to the UN in New York asked for me; which was very nice of him.  There was a big conference on the environment.  Then Madeleine Albright became Secretary of State and she asked that I be replaced.  I never met her before I don t know the reason, she never told me.  She was the new ambassador in New York and I went back to Washington and I was asked by the African Bureau if I would work with them because they were concerned about Sudan at the time.  I must say that was very interesting that was long before Darfur.  We were trying to put north and south together.  So I did some work on that between Washington and New York.  Then I was asked to run the  office of Southern African Affairs a year before elections that brought Mandela in South Africa, the year before first democratic in Mozambique and a year before peace treaty in Angola , so there was three big issues to deal with. They were all done.  I went briefly to Somalia, it was really awful, the UN sent a Turkish general to run  the military and an American to run the civilian side, I went for two to three months to help him. It was a very sad scene.

Al Hayat:  And now what are you doing?

A.G:  Completely retired.

Al Hayat:  I heard rumors about an American publisher who asked you to write a book on Iraq and you refused and they blackmailed you and they paid you money for a book and you refused.

A.G:  No publisher has ever spoken to me about a book whatsoever or asked me to write a book or advanced money or never had I asked a publisher if he would publish a book.

Al Hayat:  Nobody asked you to speak about your experience with Saddam even in the press?

A.G:  Nobody asked me to write a book, nobody asked me to write an article of any kind about anything in the United States.  You are the only person I have talked to; in the US they were writing books, they wanted to interview me for their books.

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Another KBR Rape Case

April 3, 2008 – Houston, TX — It was an early January morning in 2008 when 42-year-old Lisa Smith*, a paramedic for a defense contractor in southern Iraq, woke up to find her entire room shaking. The shipping container that served as her living quarters was reverberating from nearby rocket attacks, and she was jolted awake to discover an awful reality. “Right then my whole life was turned upside down,” she says.

What follows is the story she told me in a lengthy, painful on-the-record interview, conducted in a lawyer’s office in Houston, Texas, while she was back from Iraq on a brief leave.

That dawn, naked, covered in blood and feces, bleeding from her anus, she found a US soldier she did not know lying naked in the bed next to her: his gun lay on the floor beside the bed, she could not rouse him and all she could remember of the night before was screaming and screaming as the soldier anally penetrated her while a colleague who worked for defense contractor KBR held her hand–but instead of helping her, as she had hoped, he jammed his penis in her mouth.

Over the next few weeks Smith would be told to keep quiet about the incident by a KBR supervisor. The camp’s military liaison officer also told her not to speak about what had happened, she says. And she would follow these instructions. “Because then, all of a sudden, if you’ve done exactly what you’ve been instructed not to do–tell somebody–then you’re in danger,” Smith says.

As a brand-new arrival at Camp Harper, she had not yet forged many connections and was working in a red zone under regular rocket fire alongside the very men who had participated in the attack. (At one point, as the sole medical provider, she was even forced to treat one of her alleged assailants for a minor injury.) She waited two and a half weeks, until she returned to a much larger facility, to report the incident. “It’s very easy for bad things to happen down there and not have it be even slightly suspicious.”

Over the next month and a half, she says, she faced a series of hurdles. She would be discouraged from reporting the incident by several KBR employees, she says. She would be confused by the lack of any written medical protocol for sexual assault (as the only medical person on site, she treated herself with doxycycline). She would wander through a tangled maze of interviews with KBR and Army investigators about the incident without any clear explanation of her rights. She would be asked to sign several documents agreeing not to publicly discuss the incident, she says. She describes having her computer–which she saw as her lifeline, her main access to the outside world–confiscated by KBR staff as “evidence” within hours of receiving her first e-mail from a stateside lawyer she had reached out to for help.

And eventually she would find herself temporarily assigned to sleeping quarters between two Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) officials, who, she says, assured her that it was for her own safety, since her alleged assailants were at the same camp for questioning; they roamed freely. When she wanted to move about the camp to get meals etc., she was escorted.

Smith felt very alone. But she was not.

In fact, a growing number of women employees working for US defense contractors in the Middle East are coming forward with complaints of violence directed at them. As the Iraq War drags on, and as stories of US security contractors who seem to operate with impunity continue to emerge (like Blackwater and its deadly attack against Iraqi civilians on September 16, 2007), a rash of new sexual assault and sexual harassment complaints are being lodged against overseas contractors–by their own employees. Todd Kelly, a lawyer in Houston, says his firm alone has fifteen clients with sexual assault, sexual harassment and retaliation complaints (for reporting assault and/or harassment) against Halliburton and its former subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC (KBR), as well as Cayman Island-based Service Employees International Inc., a KBR shell company. (While Smith is technically an SEII employee, she is supervised by KBR staff as a KBR employee.)

Jamie Leigh Jones, whose story made the news in December–when she alleged that her 2005 gang rape by Halliburton/KBR co-workers in Iraq was being covered up by the company and the US government–also initially believed hers was an isolated incident. But today, Jones reports that she has formed a nonprofit to support the many other women with similar stories. Currently, she has forty US contractor employees in her database who have contacted her alleging a variety of sexual assault or sexual harassment incidents–and claim that Halliburton, KBR and SEII have either failed to help them or outright obstructed them.

Most of these complaints never see the light of day, thanks to the fine print in employee contracts that compels employees into binding arbitration instead of allowing their complaints to be tried in a public courtroom. Criminal prosecutions are practically nonexistent, as the US Justice Department has turned a blind eye to these cases.

Jones’s case was the subject of a House Judiciary hearing in December. Right now, Jones’s lawyers are awaiting a decision on whether she will get her day in court or be forced to submit to binding arbitration, which KBR is insisting on. Likewise, the company is pressuring Lisa Smith into pursuing her claims against the company through its Dispute Resolution Program based on the contract she signed before she went to Iraq. Critics argue that the company’s arbitration system allows it to minimize bad publicity and lets assailants off the hook.

Smith, who retained a lawyer only two weeks ago, is weighing her options.

KBR attorney Celia Ballí, responding to a letter from Smith’s lawyer, wrote in a letter dated March 17, “The Company takes Ms. Smith’s allegations very seriously and has and will continue to cooperate with the proper law enforcement authorities in the investigation of her allegations to the extent possible.” Ballí noted that the matter has been turned over to the CID and said that Smith has been “afforded with counseling and referral services through the Company’s Employee Assistance Program.” Ballí wrote in the letter that there are “inaccuracies” in the description Smith has put forward regarding her treatment after the alleged sexual assault. “Therefore, the Company requests that you fully investigate all the facts alleged by Ms. [Smith] as the Company intends to pursue all available remedies should false statements be publicized.”

Such “investigation” may prove difficult for her attorney. In the next sentence, the company says it is “not in a position to release any personnel or investigative records regarding Ms. [Smith’s] allegations at this time.” In response to a request for comment on this story, a company spokesperson wrote in an e-mail that Smith’s “allegations are currently under investigation by the appropriate law enforcement authorities. Therefore, KBR cannot comment on the specifics of the allegations or investigation.” The spokesperson added, “Any allegation of sexual harassment or assault is taken seriously and investigated thoroughly.” It remains unclear, however, what law enforcement investigation is examining the KBR employee’s role in the alleged assault, since Army CID is charged with investigating only cases that involve US military personnel.

For her part, Smith can’t quite call herself a victim yet. In the course of several conversations over several days, she never once says the word “victim” out loud. Let alone “rape.” Let alone “gang rape.”

She simply describes what happened, moving through the course of events as if this had happened to someone else, as if the recitation of details were an act of contrition she was compelled to perform.

Like many rape survivors, she feels guilty. In this case, Smith confesses that she broke company policy the evening of the incident by having a drink (alcohol is expressly forbidden). She had landed at Camp Harper only a week earlier, when she returned from a stateside R&R with her family. Since arriving in Iraq six months earlier, she had been at a larger facility, Camp Cedar. But her new posting at Camp Harper put her in a smaller outpost of sixty people: part US military, part KBR employees, part SEII workers. When some KBR colleagues invited her to join them for a drink after work, she did.

Smith says she had only one drink–and she asked someone to hold it after a few sips while she went outside for a smoke. Smith’s attorney, Daniel Ross, speculates that someone slipped the date-rape drug Rohypnol in her drink.

Smith’s memory of the evening is fuzzy, and the only thing she remembers clearly about the events surrounding her assault is the aforementioned moment of oral and anal penetration. She also remembers screaming.

The morning after the incident, Smith says, she was called into the office of her supervisor, who was Camp Harper’s KBR manager; he appeared to know–at least in part–what had happened. She would later learn from an Army investigator that her supervisor had been in the room where the drinking and alleged rape had taken place at least twice that evening. Smith, who appears to have blacked out, has no direct knowledge of his participation–or indeed of who else among the crowd initially gathered in the room may have been involved. “He was one of the people involved in saying, ‘Don’t say anything,'” Smith says of her conversation with the KBR camp manager the morning following the incident. “Then he said, ‘This will never happen again.'”

Smith offered to pack up and go home. But he sent her back to work. First, though, he responded to Smith’s plea to get the soldier she still had not been able to rouse out of her bed by contacting the military’s Special Forces liaison at Camp Harper. The liaison, whom Smith knew only by his nickname, DJ, was direct. “He told me not to speak of this to anyone and that he would take care of it,” Smith says.

Smith sat tight for a few days but then contacted a friend at Camp Cedar, where her permanent assignment was, and asked if the Employee Assistance person for KBR was back from her R&R yet. She was not. Smith was worried about even discussing the incident, since she knew that none of her conversations were confidential. “Camp Harper has only three phones,” she says. “One is in the camp manager’s office. One is in the Operations Office. And one is in a hallway.” She wavered. A few days later, when she knew that the Employee Assistance person for KBR would be back, Smith called her on the phone. The Employee Assistance woman was a friend of hers and, without getting too specific about the details of the incident, Smith sought her advice. “We had worked other situations together in the past, and I talked to her and she was like, ‘I don’t know if I’d report that. You know what happens when you report things.’ And I did. I’d seen it.”

Despite Smith’s silence, rumors were circulating at the camp. Two and a half weeks after the incident, she was questioned by someone from the KBR Employee Relations office, who appeared to be investigating a series of improprieties at the camp, Smith says. Fearful, she denied knowledge of any wrongdoing at the camp.

When Smith returned to her original posting at Camp Cedar, a larger facility with a human resources person and more friends she could approach for advice, she recontacted the man from Employee Relations who had been investigating “improprieties” and told him her story.

This set the wheels in motion for a series of interviews, most of which concluded with Smith being asked to sign a nondisclosure statement by representatives of the company, she says.

Eventually, shortly before she was slated to return to the United States for R&R, one of the investigators for KBR suggested that Smith get tested for STDs, hepatitis, HIV, etc. and took her to the nearby military Combat Support Hospital. “The doctor took me into her office, and we talked a long time before she did an exam,” Smith says. “We talked about the assault and the details and she was actually very, very kind and encouraged me to report it to the military. She tried convincing me that it wasn’t my fault [for having a drink]. She was just a really kind lady–and that was the first time I had given any of the whole details of all that had happened.”

In fact, military protocol compelled the doctor to report the incident; Smith was immediately contacted by the Army Criminal Investigation Division and questioned.

A few days later, shortly after contacting an attorney in the United States to advise her on her rights, the attorney sent her a draft letter he was sending to KBR on her behalf, notifying the company that he was representing her and briefly summarizing her accusations. KBR came to her office within hours, she alleges, and confiscated her computer as “evidence,” effectively limiting her access to the outside world. The CID did not respond to requests for comment.

Many victims of sexual assault find themselves without meaningful recourse when they work for US defense contractors that are powerful companies on foreign soil. “It’s one big battle over where to fight the battle,” said Smith’s attorney Ross, who is considering if and how and against whom to file charges on behalf of his client.

Take Jamie Leigh Jones’s case, for example.

Since Jones alleged she was gang raped in 2005, while KBR was still a Halliburton subsidiary, her case is covered by an extralegal Halliburton dispute-resolution program implemented under then-CEO Dick Cheney in 1997. The program has all the hallmarks of the Cheney White House’s penchant for secrecy. While Halliburton declared the program’s aim was to reduce costly and lengthy litigation (and limit possible damage awards in the process), in practice it meant that employees like Jones signed away their constitutional right to a jury trial–and agreed to have any disputes heard in a private arbitration hearing without hope of appeal. (While two lower courts declared the tactic illegal, in 2001, the Texas Supreme Court overturned those rulings.)

Accordingly, Jones faces two major roadblocks in the fight for justice. The first is the battle to have the perpetrators prosecuted in criminal court–which, because of Order 17, may be nearly impossible. According to the order, imposed by Paul Bremer, US defense contractors in Iraq cannot be prosecuted in the Iraqi criminal justice system. While they can technically be tried in US federal court, the Justice Department has shown no interest in prosecuting her case. In fact, for more than two years now, the DOJ has brought no criminal charges in the matter. Representative Ted Poe, a Texas Republican who has taken up Jones’s cause, reports that federal agencies refuse to discuss the status of the investigation; meanwhile, in December, the DOJ refused to send a representative to the related Congressional hearing on the matter.

Even more appalling, the Justice Department, which can and should prosecute most of these cases, has declined to do so. “There is no rational explanation for this,” says Scott Horton, a lecturer at Columbia Law School who specializes in the law of armed conflict. Prosecutorial jurisdiction for crimes like the alleged rape of Jones is easily established under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and the Patriot Act’s special maritime and territorial jurisdiction provisions. But somebody has to want to prosecute the cases.

Horton wonders what the 200 Justice Department employees and contractors stationed in Iraq do all day, noting that there has not been a single completed criminal conviction against a US contractor implicated in a violent crime anywhere in Iraq since the invasion.

“We have a complete process in place for solving military criminal violations when soldiers commit crimes, but for the 180,000 employees of private contractors over there, there is nothing,” says Horton. “It’s like Texas west of the Pecos in 1890 over there!” It’s just common sense that you’re going to have some violent crimes when you throw this many people together, he says. “Think about it. You have 180,000 people over there, you’re going to have a few crimes. I don’t know how anybody could fairly view this as a partisan issue. Crimes happen when you bring people together anywhere, and in a war setting, without adult supervision, crimes are going to increase. That is just a fact. And if you eliminate law enforcement, the crimes are going to get worse because people will quickly learn they can get away with it.”

Things don’t look a whole lot rosier when it comes to seeking relief in the civil courts.

For example, KBR is fighting tooth and nail to make sure Jones’s case stays in private arbitration, as per her contract. And given that in February, a federal district court ruled that Tracy Barker–another KBR employee who says she was sexually assaulted–couldn’t present her case in open court, prospects for the civil suit Jones brought last May look dim.

And that’s particularly troubling, according to Jones’s attorney Todd Kelly, because the clandestine nature of arbitration allows corporate malfeasance to go unchecked. Trials serve a purpose above and beyond pronouncing verdicts. “It’s like the Enron trial here in Houston,” he says. “Where every day in the Houston Chronicle there was a story exposing what egregious things go unchecked in the corporate culture. The United States got to peek into the corporate underwear drawer and saw it was not as pretty as it looked from the outside.” Kelly argues that Halliburton and KBR ought to be similarly exposed to public scrutiny via jury trials. These civil remedies arranged in a secretive manner have repercussions beyond the dollar figures. “It allows for future rapes to occur,” he says, arguing that these defense contractors have been able to quietly settle and compel victims to remain silent: the public remains oblivious to the crimes, no one is punished and a hostile and violent workplace continues unchecked.

In the future, the sole recourse for victims like Jones may be through Congress. Last October the House overwhelmingly passed legislation that requires the FBI to investigate allegations of wrongdoing and permits all US contractors to be tried under American jurisdiction. The Senate has yet to vote on the legislation.

For her part, Jones intends to persevere. “Part of the reason I’m going forward with this case is to change the system,” she says. “Who knows how many of us rape victims are out there?”

Smith, who is now back in the United States on two weeks R&R, is uncertain what the future holds for her. “I don’t think I’ve been able to make any decisions or plans or goals yet,” she says. First of all, there is the fact that she arrived home from Iraq to learn that her husband had been rushed to the hospital earlier that day after a partial stroke. She needs her job with SEII because she is the one who gets health insurance–vital not only for the two teenage daughters still living at home but for her husband, with his health problems. She worries, “Human Resources made me sign statements saying that I’m supposed to be back in Dubai on April 7 at 10 p.m., and if I’m not there I will not be reimbursed my $1,600 airfare or for my two weeks’ vacation.”

And indeed, the March 17 letter her attorney received from KBR attorney Celia Ballí says that Smith can be placed on medical leave “pending resolution of the investigations related to this matter” but warns, “However, per Company policy, [her] leave will be unpaid.” She is welcome to apply for workers’ comp, the lawyer states.

Can she return to her old job as a paramedic in Lena, Illinois?

“Yes, my license is in good standing, and I’ve never had a problem,” she says. “But it means a difference of about $6,000 a month in salary and no health insurance. My biggest reason for working for KBR in the first place was so I could get insurance for my husband and girls…” Smith’s sentence trails off. She begins a new one. Stops midway. She tries again to organize her thoughts. “I’ve been trying to figure out how I’m going to go back to work. How am I going to make myself do this?” she says, manifesting the confused indecisiveness and sense of a “foreshortened future” that are hallmarks of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Has she seen a rape crisis counselor?

Not yet, Smith says. “Someone from KBR Employee Assistance gave me a flier to call someone in Houston,” she says, but it turned out to be for general financial or emotional problems during deployment. They referred her to a website. “I’m 9,000 miles away in Iraq and the website says, ‘Please put in your zip code and we’ll refer you to a rape crisis counselor in your zip code area.'”

Smith, who says she cannot sleep, appears exhausted. She tells her story without affect, little inflection and tamped emotion. She only tears up twice, most visibly when speaking about one of her sons, a 22-year-old US soldier who served in the Middle East recently. While she was in the process of debating whether–and how–to go about reporting her assault, she contacted him to see what his feelings were on the matter. “I didn’t want him upset with his mom,” she says, explaining that she was very loyal to the mission in Iraq and that he was similarly loyal to his service. “I was assaulted by somebody who was wearing the same uniform as him, and I just didn’t want him to think bad of me. My children are pretty much my world.” Smith’s eyes fill with tears, and she pauses to collect herself. “I didn’t want him to be upset because I was calling out somebody who was wearing his same uniform. They’re supposed to be proud of what they do. And I’m proud of my sons. And in my mind, I live that war every day. I can make all sorts of excuses under the sun for bad behavior.”

Her son advised her to make the formal complaint.

“He was like, ‘Of course you’re going to talk to CID, Mom. Of course you are.'” Smith smiles. “He doesn’t think people should be allowed to wear his uniform and act like that. He’s been in the war too and says it’s no excuse. They’re better trained than that. That’s what my son thought. And he’s not angry at his mom.”

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‘Emergency” Bill Tries to Make Electronic Voting More Accurate, but Will It?

April 3, 2008 – Efforts to improve the machinery that will count the 2008 presidential vote fell prey to a classic Washington compromise on Wednesday, when a House committee approved a bill giving money to both opponents and supporters of controversial paperless electronic voting systems.

The “Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008,” or H.R. 5036, now goes to the House floor, where its goal is helping cities and counties create a “verifiable” paper trail and audits for individual votes cast for president and Congress.

But just how that paper trail is achieved is broadly defined in the bill. Opponents of paperless electronic voting can seek federal funds to buy paper ballot-based systems, where voters mark ballots by hand and computer scanners tally the result. Several states, notably California, Ohio and Florida, already are making this transition. Meanwhile, proponents of all-electronic voting can keep their machines but seek funds to add printers that theoretically will allow voters to see if their choices have been properly recorded.

Under the bill, jurisdictions can also federal money to buy back-up paper ballots for precincts outfitted with computer touch-screen voting machines. They also can seek funds for audits, where they would have to meet a minimum standard of hand counting at least 2 percent of the ballots cast. The audit’s goal is to ensure the vote count is accurate.

“It will reduce the uncertainly, questions and disputes about the election in many places in our country,” said Rep. Rush Holt, D-NJ and the bill’s chief sponsor. “It is intended for counties to provide voter verified paper ballots and or audits. And although it does not establish a national standard [for a paper trail], it encourages counties and states to do the right thing. And that means offer voter verified paper ballots and audits.”

Election integrity activists, who documented many problems with paperless, electronic voting systems and played a big part in convincing top officials in several states to return to paper ballot-based voting, were generally disappointed in the bill.

“I do not support any version of the HOLT bill or any other proposed bill that solidifies the continued use of DREs with printer,” said Nevada’s Patricia Axelrod, who has an extensive technical background, in an e-mail Wednesday. DRE, or direct recording equipment, is industry slang for the paperless voting systems.

“I am well-seasoned in the use of such machines as I battling against the Sequoia AVC Edge with Verivote printer now in use throughout the entire State of Nevada since 2004,” Axelrod said. “I hasten to assure you that the attachment of a Mickey Mouse printer to a poorly designed, engineered and manufactured computer – one built to the same specifications as your average lap or desk top computer; only with less oversight – is not going to assure accurate and reliable elections.”

“I do not support any legislation that perpetuates the myth of verified voting,” said New Hampshire’s Nancy Tobi, Election Defense Alliance legislative director. “The problem is the current bill is fundamentally wrong in its originating premise. Holt and his supporters believe the key is the audit, but the key is the first count. And the audits they recommend are not even audits. They are spot checks. So you have a fake audit for a fake election.”

Holt acknowledged H.R. 5036 was a compromise bill. Activists following its progress in Washington said lobbyists for the disabled community, election officials and the voting machine industry pushed to preserve the use of DREs. The House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, D-MD, siding with those constituencies, apparently would not allow a bill on the House floor that said paper ballots were superior to paperless voting, they said. However, Holt said most election supervisors at the local level recognized that the paper-based optical-scan systems were more reliable and accurate than DREs with printers.

“We have found that electronic machines with attached printers don’t work very well,” he said. “I think more and more states are moving away from that. My guess is that states and counties that choose to opt in [to buy new voting machinery] would probably use the technologies that are gaining favor.”

Beyond the apparent compromise appeasing both sides of the paperless voting machine debate, the bill also has constitutionally significant ramifications because it accords paper printouts with the same legal standing as hand-marked paper ballots. This factor could become very significant for close elections and recounts.

“Now we will rely on printed receipts as reflective of voter intent, when it’s the case that they jam, they don’t print, they cause long lines, and they cannot be trusted,” said John Bonifaz, Counsel for Voter Action, a public interest law firm. “Voter Action endorsed the original version of this bill, HR 5036, and did that because we think it is critical that we shift from DRE machines to optically scanned paper ballot systems. This substitute bill effectively undermines the underlying principle of that original bill.”

Holt said he believed hand-marked paper ballots would be taken more seriously in recounts than print-outs from add-ons to DRE systems. However, he said it was not possible, given the current political landscape, to establish a national standard for a paper record – such as legislation requiring hand-marked paper ballots.

“I think that a hard copy vote that the voter can verify is always going to be regarded better than an ethereal electronic memory. That’s the lesson of the last few years,” he said. “Now, it is true that in different states, the studies and the experience of the election officials shows that not all methods of recording ballots are equally good. Some systems break down. Some systems don’t seem to work very well in practice with voters. But it has not been possible, this year, anyway, to establish a national standard.”

The bill would also require any jurisdiction taking federal funds for new machines audit 2 percent of their precincts to determine if the vote count was accurate. An earlier version of the bill required that mandatory audit consist of 3 percent of the precincts. Election officials lobbied to ease that audit requirement, Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-CA said, when telling Administration Committee of the changes in the bill’s text.

The bill also will cover the cost of printing backup paper ballots, in case the DRE systems fail. However, like the rest of the bill, it is an “opt-in” proposal, meaning that any jurisdiction can choose to take advantage of the federal funding, as opposed to mandate.

Still, not all election integrity activists criticized the bill.

“I think it’s a good bill,” said Warren Stewart of VerifiedVotingFoundation.org. “Maybe it gets us some more audits. It pays for back-up paper ballots for jurisdictions with DREs. It will help states like Iowa change to paper ballots. I think it is unfortunate that it funds the purchase of flawed printers. But legislation is compromise.”

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