Rare Look Inside Baghdad Emergency Room

Insurgents in Baghdad have mounted dozens of separate bombings in recent weeks.

Nowhere is the fallout from the violence more apparent than in the city’s emergency rooms and trauma centers.

Jamal Enad, a second-year surgical resident at Baghdad’s Yarmouk Hospital, said he has seen firsthand the effects of the increased violence.

“It was a very bad week, the last week,” he said.

Enad is one of three doctors and six nurses working the day shift in the emergency room. They have been inundated with patients of late, since Yarmouk is where most Iraqi victims of insurgent attacks in Baghdad are taken for treatment.

Each day, Enad and the other doctors have been treating twisted limbs and pulling shrapnel from the wounded. The families of the victims crowd the ER, waiting in anguish.

Yarmouk is a teaching hospital, where doctors come to learn. They say what they are learning most clearly is how to deal with victims of insurgent attacks — how to recognize instantly who will die, and who might be saved.

It is experience Enad said he would rather do without.

‘Not the Real Job of a Doctor’

“For me as a doctor, I think this is not my future,” he said. “The blast injuries is not the real job of a doctor.”

Enad dreams of performing elective surgery at a peaceful hospital. But in wartime, he willingly goes to work, despite fears for his own life.

“I feel sometimes I might be a target,” he said. “But what can I do?”

Enad said one of his hardest jobs is dealing with patients’ families. While being interviewed by ABC News, one of Enad’s patients — the victim of a recent bombing — died from his injuries.

When the victim’s brother was told, he fell to the floor, screaming and crying in distress.

“This is normal,” Enad said of the man’s reaction. “This is one of his relatives.”

For Enad, the situation is painfully common.

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Top Army Officers Are Cleared in Abuse Cases

An Army inspector general’s report has cleared senior Army officers of wrongdoing in the abuse of military prisoners in Iraq and elsewhere, government officials familiar with the findings said yesterday.

The only Army general officer recommended for punishment for the failures that led to abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison and other facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan is Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski, who was in charge of U.S. prison facilities in Iraq as commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade in late 2003 and early 2004. Several sources said Karpinski is expected to receive an administrative reprimand for dereliction of duty.

Karpinski, who has said she would fight such a charge, did not return calls yesterday. Her attorney, Neal A. Puckett, has not seen the report but said other general officers share responsibility for shortfalls. “I don’t think it’s fair, and it continues to make her the scapegoat for this entire situation, which has been her feeling all along,” Puckett said.

The investigation essentially found no culpability on the part of Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and three of his senior deputies, ruling that allegations they failed to prevent or stop abuses were “unsubstantiated.” A military source said a 10-member team began the investigation in October and based its conclusions on the 10 major defense inquiries into abuse and interviews with 37 senior officials, including L. Paul Bremer, who led the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The report has not been released.

Of those 10 major inquiries, the inspector general’s was designed to be the Army’s final word on the responsibility of senior leadership in relation to the abuses. It was the only investigation designed to assign blame, if any, within the Army’s senior leadership. Questions about Sanchez’s and other senior leaders’ role in approving harsh interrogation tactics — including the use of military working dogs to intimidate detainees — have swirled since photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib surfaced almost exactly a year ago.

Army officials said yesterday that they have identified 125 soldiers and officers who were either tried at courts-martial or issued administrative punishments for detainee abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan. So far, seven low-ranking soldiers have faced the most serious charges in the sexual humiliation and physical abuse cases arising out of Abu Ghraib; five have pleaded guilty or have been found guilty, and two have courts-martial scheduled for next month. Spec. Charles A. Graner Jr., who was characterized as the ringleader of the abuses there, was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

The administrative reprimand Karpinski is expected to receive is the kind of punishment that can end a military career, and officials said it is possible she could be relieved of her command as a result.

Sources close to the investigation said two high-ranking military intelligence officers who worked at Abu Ghraib — Col. Thomas M. Pappas and Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan — could face criminal charges or disciplinary measures for their roles at the prison. Both supervised interrogations, and Sanchez ultimately gave them responsibility for the entire Abu Ghraib operation.

“The dereliction happened at the brigade level and below,” said one defense official familiar with the report.

In a statement released by the Army yesterday, Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, the top Army spokesman, did not comment on the inspector general’s findings but said the Army has thoroughly investigated the abuses. In the 10 major investigations, more than 1,700 people have been interviewed and more than 15,000 pages of documents assembled, according to the Army.

“We will not rush to judgment in these cases or in any others,” Brooks said. “The recommendations and decisions are consistent with, and appropriate to, the findings of these very thorough investigations.”

Top-level investigations into the abuses have largely stopped short of calling them systemic, but some found major problems with the way detention operations in Iraq were conducted after President Bush declared major combat in Iraq over in April 2003. A lack of planning and resources, the reports generally agreed, led to the U.S. detention system getting overwhelmed and fostered frustration with a lack of actionable intelligence with which to fight the insurgency. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have since proposed an overhaul of the military’s wartime detention operations.

Previous inquiries have addressed the roles of distinct military disciplines at the prisons. Some of the probes identified senior leadership as being indirectly responsible for the climate that led to abuses but made no findings on culpability. Responsibility for such findings was given to the Army inspector general.

A comprehensive report about Abu Ghraib by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay concluded that there were failures at the highest levels, mainly in oversight lapses. He found that Sanchez and his deputy “failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations” and “reacted inadequately” to warnings that abuse was occurring.

Sanchez’s top intelligence adviser, Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, learned of abuses in late 2003 after commissioning an independent investigation, but the Abu Ghraib abuses did not get command attention until January 2004, when a soldier turned over digital photographs of some of the abuses.

Fast, who recently assumed command of the Army’s intelligence center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., also was cleared of wrongdoing.

An overarching, independent analysis of the abuses by James R. Schlesinger said senior leadership should bear responsibility. “Commanders are responsible for all their units do or fail to do, and should be held accountable for their action or inaction,” the report said.

Although the Army has not officially announced the results of the investigation, senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff were briefed on the results this week, Hill staff members said. Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the committee, attended a portion of the briefing. Staff members with Sen. Carl M. Levin’s (D-Mich.) office were briefed, but a spokesperson for Levin declined to comment on the issue.

Warner has been adamant about getting to the bottom of senior leadership responsibility, and he issued a statement yesterday in which he said it is “absolutely essential to determine what went wrong, up and down the chain of command, both civilian and military.”

Warner did not specifically address the findings, but he vowed to have another Armed Services Committee hearing about detainee abuses after the reviews are complete, saying that he wants “to examine the adequacy of those reviews, and to offer the opportunity to senior Department and military leadership to address the issue of accountability.”

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Let a Thousand Militias Bloom

In trying to defeat the Iraqi insurgency, the Pentagon has turned to Saddam Hussein’s former henchmen. Under former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, U.S. officials has installed many of the hated Baathists who tormented Iraq in high-level posts in the interior and defense ministries. But the new Iraqi government, overwhelmingly composed of Shiites and Kurds who suffered the most under Hussein, have announced that they are going to purge the ex-Baathists, putting them on a collision course with the United States.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made one of his surprise visits to Baghdad last week, warning the new government not to “come in and clean house” in the security forces. The official line is that the U.S. is worried about losing the “most competent” security forces. But there is a deeper concern that purging the security forces could feed into sectarian tensions and explode in civil war.

Much of that is due to a ruthless U.S. policy of using any tactic, no matter how unsavory, in trying to defeat the insurgency. According to a slew of reports, the U.S. military is encouraging tribal vendettas, freeing kidnappers to spy on insurgents, incorporating ethnic-based military units into the security forces, and encouraging the development of illegal militias that draw in part from Hussein-era security forces.

There is clear evidence that the tactics are having an effect. U.S. casualties have declined by 75 percent since their peak of 126 combat deaths in November 2004. Part of that is probably due to sweeping thousands of Sunni Arab males of the street-Iraqis imprisoned under U.S. control have more than doubled since last October to 10,500.

It is the more ruthless methods that may be having a greater effect on squeezing the insurgency. Yet the establishment of militias may backfire. U.S. military officials express concern that if the former Baathists who lead the militias are removed, they could take their forces with them.

A report by the Wall Street Journal from Feb. 16 revealed that numerous “pop-up militias” thousands strong are proliferating in Iraq. Not only are many of these shadowy militias linked to Iraqi politicians, but the Pentagon is arming, training and funding them for use in counter-insurgency operations.

Most disturbing, one militia in particular-the “special police commandos”-is being used extensively throughout Iraq and has been singled out by a U.S. general for conducting death squad strikes known as the “Salvador option.” The police commandos also appear to be a reconstituted Hussein security force operating under the same revived government body, the General Security Directorate, that suppressed internal dissent.

High-level White House officials are banking on the police commandos to defeat the insurgency. In hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Feb. 16 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said the commandos are among “forces that are going to have the greatest leverage on suppressing and eliminating the insurgency.”

The police commandos were identified as one of at least six militias by Greg Jaffe, the Journal reporter. Last October it was said to have “several thousand soldiers” and lavishly armed with “rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, mortar tubes and lots of ammunition.” Yet these militias owe their allegiance not to the Iraqi people or government, but to their self-appointed leaders and associated politicians such as interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Even the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, Gen. John P. Abizaid, admitted in testimony before Congress on March 1 that such militias are “destabilizing.”

Of these militias, at least three are linked to Allawi. Jaffe writes, “First came the Muthana Brigade, a unit formed by the order of. Allawi.” The second is the Defenders of Khadamiya, referring to a Shiite shrine on the outskirts of Baghdad, which appears to be “closely aligned with prominent Shiite cleric Hussein al Sadr.” Al Sadr ran on Allawi’s ticket in the January elections and proved himself loyal when he attacked the main Shiite ticket publicly for stating it was endorsed by Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. (Al-Sadr also held the infamous press conference in Baghdad where several journalists in attendance were seen receiving $100 gifts from Allawi’s government.)

The special police commandos is led by Gen. Adnan Thabit, who participated in the disastrous 1996 coup against Saddam Hussein that Allawi coordinated. Thabit was jailed and subsequently released shortly before the 2003 U.S. invasion. He is also the uncle of Iraq’s interim minister of the interior, under which the commandos operate.

Thabit told the Armed Forces Press Service last October that the police commandos are drawn from “police who have previous experience fighting terrorism and also people who received special training under the former regime” of Saddam Hussein. The report from Oct. 20, 2004, also quotes U.S. Army Col. James H. Coffman Jr., who specifies that police commandos are “former special forces and (former Directorate of General Security) personnel.”

The Directorate of General Security was one of the main security services Hussein used to maintain an iron grip on Iraq. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies describes the service’s role as “detecting dissent among the Iraqi general public” by monitoring “the day-to-day lives of the population, creating a pervasive local presence.”

Col. Coffman reports to Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who heads the mammoth U.S. effort to create Iraq’s myriad security forces. Petraeus calls the police commandos “a horse to back” and has done so by providing it with “money to fix up its base and buy vehicles, ammunition, radios and more weapons.” In a satellite briefing to the press on Feb. 4, Petraeus repeatedly praised the special police commandos, calling the leadership “tremendously aggressive” in operations. Petraeus also revealed that the commandos, the Muthana Brigade and another militia called the Defenders of Baghdad were used to provide security on election day.

But a senior officer on Petraeus’s staff confided, “If you tried to replace Gen. [Thavit] he’d take his…brigades with him. He is a very powerful figure.”

Ousting wholesale the ex-Baathist security forces now in the government could push them to join the insurgency. And this precisely what Iraq’s new president, Jalal Talabini is suggesting. According to the BBC, Talabani argues “the insurgency could be ended immediately if the authorities made use of Kurdish, Shia Muslim and other militias. Jalal Talabani said this would be more effective than waiting for Iraqi forces to take over from the US-led coalition.”

The militias Talabani is referring to include the Kurdish Peshmerga and Shiite units such as the Badr Brigades. But such a move would cement the conflict as a sectarian one.

Military analyst William Lind notes that “the rise and spread of Shiite militias devoted to fighting Sunni insurgents puts ever-greater pressure on Iraq’s Sunnis to cast their lot with the insurgency.” Add to this the use of Kurdish Peshmerga also against Sunni Arabs and civil war would likely result.

U.S. BETS ON BAATHISTS

Ironically, Allawi-with U.S. encouragement-has put a network of former Baathists in charge of various security services to fight what the U.S. claims are other Baathists who form the core of the insurgency. They include Thavit’s nephew, Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib, who is the son of a prominent Baath official. The Minister of Defense is Hazem al-Shaalan, a former Baathist from al-Hillah, and. Brig. Gen. Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani, an old-time Ba’ath officer, is now head of the Iraqi secret police, according to author and analyst Milan Rai.

This policy of “re-baathification” is actively supported by Bush administration. The Washington Post reported on Dec. 11, 2003, that the CIA met with Allawi and another member of his Iraqi National Accord party to create “an Iraqi intelligence service to spy on groups and individuals inside Iraq that are targeting U.S. troops and civilians working to form a new government.” The plan was to “screen former government officials to find agents for the service and weed out those who are unreliable or unsavory.” Evidence of this role comes from Thabit who told the Armed Forces Press Service that former regime personnel in his force “were efficiently chosen according to information about their background.”

Even before he officially assumed the post of interim prime minister, Allawi announced a reorganization of security forces at his first press conference on June 20, 2004. According to a Human Rights Watch report on torture in Iraq, Allawi mentioned “Special police units would also be created to be deployed ‘in the frontlines’ of the battle against terrorism and sabotage, and a new directorate for national security established.” Human Rights Watch also noted that Al-Nahdhah, a Iraqi newspaper, reported on June 21 that the interior ministry “appointed a new security adviser to assist in the establishment of a new general security directorate modeled on the erstwhile General Security Directorate. one of the agencies of the Saddam Hussein government dissolved by the CPA in May 2003.” That security advisor was “Major General ‘Adnan Thabet al-Samarra’i.” (There are numerous variations on Thabet’s last name.)

Then on July 15, 2004, just two months before the police commandos became public, Allawi said the government would establish “internal intelligence units called General Security Directorate, GSD, that will annihilate. terrorist groups.” Jane’s Intelligence Digest commented at the time that the GSD, “will include former members of Saddam Hussein’s feared security services, collectively known as the Mukhabarat. These former Ba’athists and Saddam loyalists will be expected to hunt down their colleagues currently organizing the insurgency.”

Perhaps Allawi’s announcement was spurred by events in the city of Samarra. A July 15 report from Radio Free Europe noted that a Shiite website, www.ebaa.net , stated Islamic militants had blown up numerous sites in Samarra, including “the headquarters of the Iraqi National Movement Party led by Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib, the City Council, the headquarters of the [Kurdish] peshmerga forces, and the home of Municipal Council Chairman Adnan Thabit.”

It seems then, former Baathist brutes may have gone from one security service under Hussein to the exact same one as under Allawi, another ex-Baathist. And the rougues apparently haven’t forgotten their old tactics.

‘GAY ORGIES’

The police commandos have been supplying suspects who confess their crimes on the TV show, “Terrorism in the Hands of Justice.” Described as the Iraqi government’s “slick new propaganda tool,” the program runs six nights a week on the Iraqiya network, which was set up by the Pentagon and is now run by Australian-based Harris Corp. (a major U.S. government contractor that gave 96 percent of its political funding, more than $260,000, to Republicans in 2004). According to the Boston Globe, camera crews are sent “wherever police commandos make a lot of arrests.”

The show features an unseen interrogator haranguing alleged insurgents for confessions. Virtually every press account notes that the suspects appear to have been beaten or tortured, their faces bruised and swollen. The London Guardian states “some have. robotic manners of those beaten and coached by police interrogators off-camera.” The Boston Globe observed, “The neat confessions of terrorist attacks at times fit together so seamlessly as to seem implausible.” And then there’s the nature of the confessions. Many suspects admit to “drunkeness, gay orgies and pornography,” according to the Guardian. The Financial Times reported that, “One long-bearded preacher known as Abu Tabarek recently confessed that guerrillas had usually held orgies in his mosques.” Another preacher giving a confession says he was fired for “having sex with men in the mosque,” the Globe account stated that suspects “frequently admit to rape and pedophilia.”

The show is said to be popular, particularly among many Shiites and Kurds, which causes concern that depicting Sunni Arab nationalists as “thieving scumbags” could deepen communal strife. Political and religious leaders from the Sunni Arabs have denounced the show, calling for it to be pulled off the air.

The police commandos’ penchant for tall tales caused them considerable embarrassment after they crowed about a major operation that killed more than 80 insurgents at a training camp along Lake Tharthar in Al Anbar on March 22. Within a day many discrepancies emerged-how many insurgents were killed, reports of more than 20 prisoners versus none, a number of different locations cited, many miles apart. The story fell apart after an AFP reporter visited the camp and still found 40 to 50 insurgents camped there.

But the police commandos are still receiving special treatment from the U.S. occupation. A State Department report to Congress from Jan. 5 noted that at the request of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, “billeting space” was provided for 1,500 police commandos in the Baghdad Public Safety Academy, postponing a basic training class of 2,000 scheduled to begin in November and limiting the number of students to 1,000 while the commandos received training “until the planned January 2005 elections.”

Overall, the militias are a tacit admission that the U.S. effort to create an Iraqi military force has been a colossal failure, costing at least $5 billion to date. During the most recent large-scale military campaign, “Operation River Blitz,” U.S. Marines raided towns West of Baghdad along the Euphrates River. The first order of business in many of these Sunni Arab towns, according to the Christian Science monitor, was to “round up and detain police officers”-the very ones who had been “trained” by the U.S. to fight the insurgency. In Tikrit in early March, the police went on strike after U.S. troops raided the provincial police headquarters there and arrested two high-ranking officers. (About the same time in Samarra, the mayor and city council resigned after the mayor’s office was raided and in protest of U.S. troops refusing to withdraw from the city as agreed.)

At the end of March, police brandishing Kalishnikovs staged a demonstration in Hit, one of the towns targeted, demanding their jobs back. An AP account of the protest dated March 29 noted that police forces have been dismissed across the province of Al Anbar, the heart of the insurgency, and “former local police officers have been protesting in several cities in recent weeks against a new plan to replace them with police from other Iraqi provinces.”

By introducing of militias and other units composed of Shiites and Kurds into the Sunni Arab regions, the U.S. may just turn the insurgency into a civil war.

10,000 STRONG

In terms of numbers, a column by David Ignatius in the Feb. 25 Washington Post notes that Thabit “commands a force of about 10,000 men,” which would make them larger than the British military, the second largest foreign force in Iraq. The commandos have been used extensively, first last October in the assault on Samara that was called a “model” for how to retake a city from insurgents (but which is stilled roiled by regular attacks). The commandos have also become a fixture in major cities such as Ramadi and Mosul. In Ramadi, The Stars and Stripes describes the commandos as “the Iraqi forces that might soon be responsible for security in the city.”

A report in Dec. 25 issue of The Advisor-a Pentagon publication with the tagline “Iraq’s Official Weekly Command Information Reporter”-stated that the “Special Police Commandos have been deployed all over Iraq to hunt down insurgents and to help provide security for the upcoming Jan. 30 elections.”

FEARS OF CIVIL WAR

Jaffe notes many of the pop-up militias come “from Shiite-dominated southern Iraq.” And they appear to be operating mainly in Sunni Arab areas. The police commandos in particular are taking the lead in operations in such Sunni Arab hotspots as Samarra, Ramadi, Mosul, Tikrit and Baghdad. Last October they were assigned to Haifa Street, which had been a resistance stronghold on the edge of the Green Zone, the heart of the U.S. occupation. It’s a district of 170,000 Sunnis and Shiites where insurgents find willing recruits among the Sunni neighborhoods. Two Iraqi battalions of more than 2,000 patrol the neighborhood, and the New York Times observes that one is lead by a Shiite general “commanding a unit composed mostly of Shiites.” (The units are the Iraqi 302nd and 303rd Battalion; it’s unclear if they are affiliated with the police commandos assigned there.)

Knight Ridder correspondent Tom Lasseter filed a report from Haifa on March 16, also noting that “Most of the Iraqi troops who patrol the area. are Shiite.” During the operations, Lasseter wrote, “When Iraqi and American soldiers detained a suspected Sunni insurgent in Haifa this week, a group of the Shiite troops crowded around him. A sergeant kicked him in the face. Another soldier grabbed him by the neck and slammed his head into a wall. A third slapped him hard in the face.” The Americans’ Iraqi interpreter yelled at the detainee, “If you come with us, we will slaughter you.”

The ethnic-based militias are having a trickle-down effect on Iraqi society. With no functioning government, various communities are increasingly arming themselves. In another report, Lasseter spoke to a Shiite soldier who claimed that, “Shiite neighborhoods on the edges of Haifa have formed militias to enforce the sectarian boundary.” The soldier added, “”That militia is secretly funded by a sheik at a local Shiite mosque… what’s happening right now could be the beginning of civil war in Baghdad.” And in what remains of Fallujah, “Sunni residents say anger toward Shiite troops is reaching a boiling point.” Bush may be right after all that “freedom is on the march” in Iraq: the freedom to hate and kill.

As for the “hunt” for insurgents, it seems to include death squads. Retired Gen. Wayne Downing, the former head of all U.S. special operations forces, appeared on NBC’s Today show on Jan. 10 to discuss a Newsweek report about the Salvador option. The reference is to the extensive use of death squads by El Salvador’s military during its war against the left in the 1980s. Downing called it a “very valid tactic” that has been employed “since we started the war back in March of 2003.” In the account, brought to light by analyst Stephen Shalom, Downing adds, “We have special police commandos now of the Iraqi forces which conduct these kind of strike operations.”

And there is evidence for such operations. According to the March 12 London Times, the body of Qahtan Jouli was delivered to his family in Samarra by commandos from the interior ministry. He had appeared on “Terror in the Grip of Justice” and confessed to collaborating with insurgents in 10 killings. Qahtan’s father charged that “My son was killed after he was tortured by the Interior Ministry commandos. They killed him to cover up the lies they broadcast on the al-Iraqiya channel that my son killed many people, including Iraqi army officers.”

Despite the pressure, the insurgency is still capable of conducting large-scale attacks. It’s still mounting 50 to 60 strikes a day across Iraq. The difference is U.S. forces have become more effective at responding to the attacks-with more armor, more surveillance and electronic countermeasures. The insurgents have responded by shifting their targets to the Iraqi security forces and intensifying economic sabotage by crippling the electrical and petroleum infrastructure. They still have the upper hand there by showing the U.S. and its Iraqi allies are incapable of ruling the country.

The militias are central to many of these roundups. According to The Advisor, in Samarra, the special police commandos detained 200 suspected insurgents in the “short time [they] have been operational in the area.” In one week in the Mosul area, according to a Dec. 7 press release from U.S. Task Force Olympia, the commandos and Iraqi National Guardsmen, backed by U.S. troops, detained 232 people. A report from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense claimed that more than 400 suspects were seized in Baghdad in just one week in March with hundreds more taken from surrounding towns. Many of those arrested remain under Iraqi control-where many are tortured according to human rights groups as well as the U.S. State Department. Thus the actual prison population in Iraq is unknown, with many more thousands probably in custody above the U.S. total (which itself is unverified).

U.S. Marine units have taken the militia strategy to a new level: by creating their own. In a recent sweep through Al Anbar province, The 7th Marines Regiment brought with the Iraqi Freedom Guard, a 61-man unit set up by the Marines in January and paid $400 a month each, according to a Reuters report. During the same operation, Marines of the 23rd Regiment were accompanied by 20 members of a special forces unit called the Freedom Fighters. The Christian Science Monitor described them as Shiites from the southern city of Basra, with “little love between them and the Sunni Arab citizens of Anbar.”

In the greatest irony, U.S. forces have reached a pact with elements of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army to have them hunt down insurgents. This is the same militia that U.S. forces fought in lopsided battles last year that saw the Americans’ massive firepower devastate much of Sadr City in Baghdad and Najaf’s old city and kill thousands of Iraqis.

According to Agence France-Presse, U.S. forces are using a Shiite tribal leader to enforce vigilante justice in Baghdad’s Dura district. One U.S. officer calls the leader, Sayed Malik, “the godfather” and notes he’s received lots of public works contracts, enough to make him a millionaire. Another Sadr official states point blank that “people from Sadr organization are publicly hunting down the terrorists.” This apparently includes the kidnapping and disappearing of a Sunni cleric from a mosque in Dura.

The U.S. military is so obsessed with defeating the insurgents that it is “routinely freeing dangerous criminals in return for a promise to spy on insurgents,” according to The Independent. One senior Iraqi police officer charged that “The Americans are allowing the breakdown of Iraqi society.We are dealing with an epidemic of kidnapping, extortion and violent crime, but even though we know the Americans monitor calls on mobiles and satellite phones, which are often used in ransom negotiations, they will not pass on any criminal intelligence to us. They only want to use the information against insurgents.”

Despite the grab bag of ruthless and destabilizing tactics, the insurgency is far from over. One U.S. general recently noted that it takes on average nine years to defeat an insurgency. Additionally, it’s the violence of the U.S. occupation that gives the insurgency such force. Even if the rebellion is contained to “manageable” levels for the Pentagon, meaning a low rate of combat deaths, that does not mean the resistance will end. U.S. forces long ago lost the battle for hearts and minds.

And Iraq’s own “democracy” is already in trouble, leaving many Iraqis disillusioned. The winning parties have been unable to form a government almost three months after the election. They are still squabbling over who will control the most important portfolios-defense, interior and oil-which is where the real power lies. With a do-nothing government ensconced in bosom of the deadly U.S. occupation, the stage is now set for a further descent into rebellion and repression.

A.K. Gupta is an editor with the NYC Indymedia Center, www.nyc.indymedia.org . This is an updated version of an article that appears in the May issue of Z Magazine.

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Bush Administration Religious Profiling Sparks Federal Lawsuit

Bush Administration Religious Profiling Sparks Federal Lawsuit

Three influential civil rights groups charged Wednesday that border control tactics used by the Department of Homeland Security discriminate against U.S. citizens solely on the basis of their religion and ethnicity, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

NEW YORK, Apr 20 (IPS) – Three influential civil rights groups charged Wednesday that border control tactics used by the Department of Homeland Security discriminate against U.S. citizens solely on the basis of their religion and ethnicity, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

In simultaneous news conferences held in New York City and Buffalo, on the Canadian border, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the New York Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union announced that they were suing the head of the Department of Homeland Security over the practice of targeting U.S. citizens participating in religious conferences outside the United States.

The lawsuit was filed in U.S. district court on behalf of five Muslim-Americans who, along with dozens of others, were detained for six and a half hours, interrogated, fingerprinted, and photographed at the Canadian border crossing to Buffalo as they returned home from an annual Islamic conference in Toronto.

”None of the plaintiffs had engaged in any unlawful conduct nor any other conduct that would justify the mistreatment to which they were subjected but instead were subjected to this treatment solely because they had attended the conference,” court documents charged.

Catherine Y. Kim, a staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, told IPS that the action taken at the border ”is part of a broader pattern of profiling innocent individuals — in this case American citizens — solely on the basis of their religion, ethnicity or exercise of First Amendment protected rights.”

The lawsuit seeks to prevent the government from taking similar actions against other citizens and seeks the return or removal from government databases of all information obtained from the plaintiffs during their detention.

”During the detentions, border agents confiscated cell phones when they learned that those being held were attempting to contact lawyers or the media,” the suit charges.

”The same religious conference is scheduled to take place again in December 2005, and the plaintiffs all want to attend it but are reluctant to do so if they will be subjected to similar treatment.”

CAIR National Legal Director Arsalan Iftikhar declared, ”When American citizens are targeted by their own government and detained, searched, fingerprinted, and photographed with threat of arrest for committing no crime, this is not only unacceptable and unlawful, but also unconstitutional and un-American.”

CAIR is America’s largest Muslim civil liberties group, with 31 offices and chapters nationwide and in Canada. Its mission is to enhance the understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American-Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.

The suit says that on three occasions since January 2003, a large religious assembly known as the Reviving the Islamic Spirit (RIS) Conference has been held in Toronto, Canada.

Organised by college students and considered the largest Islamic conference in Canada, the RIS Conference is a mainstream cultural and religious gathering that advocates peace, tolerance, and unity. It features speakers, includes religious activities, and has been endorsed by prominent politicians.

The most recent RIS Conference took place in late December 2004 at a stadium in downtown Toronto called the Skydome. As in prior years, the Canadian government welcomed the December 2004 conference.

Several Canadian officials addressed the gathering, including the premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty; Toronto Mayor David Miller; and Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Among the conference’s keynote speakers was Hamza Yusuf, a U.S. citizen and prominent imam from Hayward, California, who has advised President George W. Bush on several occasions on matters regarding Islam. Yusuf sat near First Lady Laura Bush during the president’s Sep. 20, 2001 address to a joint session of Congress.

Valerie Smith, a spokeswoman for the Department of Homeland Security, would not discuss details of the case, but told the New York Times: ”The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to protect Americans from terrorism and the mission of Customs and Border Protection is to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering our country.”

”It is incumbent upon Customs officers to be right each and every time. Terrorists only have to get it right once.”

None of those detained returning from the December 2004 conference were charged with any crime. (END)

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Iraq insurgents switch strategy, go for major attacks

Iraq insurgents switch strategy, go for major attacks

Strategists who keep close tabs on the war in Iraq are scratching their heads over a sudden shift to large-scale attacks on American bases by the insurgents who heretofore have primarily bedeviled U.S. forces with their roadside bombs and hit-and-run attacks.

Just when military commanders in Iraq were beginning to feel optimistic about the marked fall in the number of terrorist incidents and attacks in the wake of the January elections, the insurgents twice so far this month have staged well planned and coordinated mass attacks on U.S. facilities at Abu Ghraib prison and a Marine base on the Syrian border.

In the case of the remote and isolated Marine base at Husaybah, the insurgents massed a force estimated to number more than 100 men and distracted the defenders with mortar and rocket-propelled grenade attacks as a dump truck loaded with explosives blew apart a roadblock at the entrance to the base.

Marine defenders, their ears ringing from that blast, then saw a bright red fire truck, loaded with propane tanks filled with explosives, come thundering through the thick smoke aiming at the gap opened by the dump truck suicide bomber. A Marine sentry poured fire into the fire truck and it exploded 40 yards short.

The insurgents then attacked in force, attempting to overrun the American base. They were thrown back after losing an estimated 19 killed and 15 wounded as fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships summoned by the Marines raked their positions. Only three Marines were lightly wounded.

The attack at Husaybah on April 11 came a week after a similar mass insurgent attack on the prison at Abu Ghraib, just outside the capital of Baghdad, which injured 44 Americans guarding or working in the prison. That attack was preceded by a fierce enemy bombardment of American positions by 80mm and 120mm mortars, as well as twin suicide car bombings aimed at breaching the prison wall.

Two columns of 30 to 40 insurgents each advanced directly against the American Marines guarding the perimeter. The attack was so fierce the Marines were forced to pull back. The attack lasted three hours, beginning at sunrise, and ended with an estimated 50 killed and wounded out of an enemy force of about 60 to 70 men.

American commanders long ago recognized the ability of the terrorist leaders to adapt quickly to changing conditions and exploit any perceived weakness. Some U.S. commanders privately hoped that this day would come when the poorly trained terrorists would go head-to-head with American regulars. If terrorists come out in the open in large numbers, it makes it easier to find them and kill them.

The insurgent/terrorist leaders score points for being able to pull a company-size attack force together quickly in so open and barren a terrain, and to plan and coordinate a complicated, precisely timed assault. But it’s good their fighters are all volunteers for martyrdom. When a hundred of them charge a hard-core battalion of 700-plus Marines, that’s what awaits.

Some Pentagon officials say that the bigger scale attacks reflect the frustration of terrorist commander and al-Qaeda ally Abu Musab Zarqawi at the lack of attention the roadside bombs receive at this stage of the war. Zarqawi figured that staging bigger attacks directly on his enemy would get more publicity.

One military analyst, who asked that his name not be used, told Knight Ridder that the insurgents displayed a greater level of coordination and synchronization than the Americans had seen in the past.

“I see (the attack on the Marine base) as both a signal of resolve and perhaps an opportunity,” the analyst said. “The good news was that the Marines responded rapidly and effectively.”

That analyst added, “The argument about ‘bigger targets equals easier to find and hit’ to a degree fails to explain if we are looking as hard as we should be, how did the ‘bigger targets’ get formed up without detection?”

The strategists will be watching to see if these attacks continue in the face of the terrorist failure to overrun any of their targets, or whether Zarqawi opts to drop back to the daily round of car bombings and roadside bombs.

ABOUT THE WRITER

Joseph L. Galloway is the senior military correspondent for Knight Ridder Newspapers and co-author of the national best-seller “We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.” Readers may write to him at

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Iraq War Veteran to Speak in Boone North Carolina

Iraq War Veteran to Speak in Boone: Navy Corpsman Addresses Veterans Rights

With increasing media attention on issues of the day such as Social Security, the installation of the new Pope at the Vatican, and the Michael Jackson trial, you could understand why some people might be under the impression that the War in Iraq is a done deal.

When you talk to Navy Corpsman 2nd Class Charlie Anderson, however, you begin to realize that there are many unresolved issues regarding our country’s conflict in Iraq.

“There are 50 to 60 attacks on U.S. personnel every day in Iraq,” said Anderson Tuesday in a phone interview. “Make no mistake about it, we’re still in Iraq.”

Anderson recently got out of the Navy after a stint in Iraq and has made increasing the public’s awareness about the war and about veterans’ issues his top priorities.

Corpsman Anderson, currently working as the Southern Regional Coordinator for the organization Iraq Veterans Against the War, will speak on Friday, April 22 at 7 p.m. at the ASU Catholic Campus Ministry Building at 232 Faculty Street. He will also speak on Saturday, April 23 at 7 p.m. in the Roan Mountain Room at ASU’s Plemmons Student Union and on Sunday, April 24, he will lead a discussion group at the High Country United Church of Christ on State Farm Road in Boone. Also on Sunday he will speak at St. Luke’s Episcopal Church on Council Street in Boone at 2:30 p.m.

All talks are free and open to the public.

Anderson was first deployed to Iraq during the initial invasion on February 1, 2003 and worked as a medic with a tank division in country until May 28, 2003. The tank division stayed on the move around Basra and Bagdad until it was moved out of country into Kuwait.

“Tank divisions are a big target,” said Anderson. “So we tend to keep moving.”

Anderson retired from the Navy three weeks ago, receiving an Honorable Discharge after being diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). “I’ve been in treatment for PTSD and pretty much couldn’t continue with the duties of my job,” said Anderson.

After become a leader in Iraq Veterans Against the War, Anderson decided the best way to utilize his experiences was to tell the public about ways in which he feels that veterans and active military personnel are being treated unfairly by the policies of the Bush Administration.

“There was a lot of misunderstanding among military personnel and the public about why we went to war in the first place,” said Anderson. “I’m trying to raise the collective consciousness of the people who were lied to. Most of the people in the military went in wanting to help other people. Some went in for job opportunities, some went in to better themselves as people, and some went in to get money to go to school.

“We were misused and misled. At first we were told that it was about weapons of mass destruction. They were not there and our leaders knew that before the invasion. We were told that there was a link between Iraq and 9/11 when there was no such link. And we were told that Saddam Hussein was a threat when he was no threat whatsoever.

“We keep losing good people over there and it’s wrong.”

Anderson also wants people to know that the government is reneging on promises made to military personnel regarding education and health benefits for veterans.

“Veterans benefits are a completely under-funded aspect of the war,” said Anderson. “There are a lot of vets coming home that are going to need those benefits and they just aren’t going to be there. That was supposed to be the deal with an all-volunteer military. We have contracts that we signed in good faith and now they are not being honored. I’m speaking to people to tell them that if we send people to war, we need to be willing to honor those contracts and do the right thing when they get home.”

Anderson is particularly dismayed that the current conflict in Iraq has been put on the back burner and that the media seems reluctant to cover the issue of wounded veterans that are trying to put their lives back together at home.

“I’ve talked to a lot of people who don’t even realize that there is still a war going on in Iraq,” said Anderson. “I talked to a high school group a couple of weeks ago and one guy asked me what war I was talking about. He was honestly surprised when I told him that we were still in Iraq. The problem is that we just don’t hear about it as much these days.”

As a medic, Anderson saw his share of wounded men and women and he feels that one of the bigger problems related to the War in Iraq is the number of disabled Americans that will have to be rehabilitated stateside.

“A lot has been made of the fact that this war has resulted in a lower number of people killed (1,559 American deaths as of Wednesday, April 19) in this conflict compared to, say, the Vietnam War,” said Anderson. “A lot of that is due to modern medicine and advances in in-the-field care. A lot of people who would have been dead in Vietnam or in other wars have been kept alive. They’re coming back to communities that are simply not prepared to receive them. They are becoming misfits in their own communities, without the help or training that they will need to become useful members of society for the rest of their lives. That issue is like the elephant in the room that no one is willing to talk about.”

Anderson stated that he plans to use this weekend’s speaking opportunities as a chance to tell people about what it was like in Iraq and to remind them that there is still a war taking place.

“When I returned home to Virginia Beach, I felt a very hollow sense of support from a lot of people in my community,” said Anderson. “When I went to church that first Sunday, a lot of people pointed to the yellow stickers on their cars that said ‘Support Our Troops.’ But those same people did very little to help my family or send letters to the troops in Iraq. It takes about 30 seconds to buy a sticker at Wal-Mart and put it on your car. But what does it really mean?”

Anderson said that there are some very able and committed groups that are now being formed to create tangible support for both active military personnel and returning veterans.

“I’m going to continue to go around and speak on these issues as long as we have problems to solve,” said Anderson. “I want our troops to come home now and I want our veterans to have the benefits to which they are entitled.”

For more information on Anderson’s appearances in the High Country, call (828) 268-1532

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Racism and War Crimes

Aiden Delgado, an Army Reservist in the 320th Military Police Company, served in Iraq from April 1st , 2003 through April 1st, 2004. After spending six months in Nasiriyah in Southern Iraq, he spent six months helping to run the now-infamous Abu Ghraib prison outside of Baghdad.

The handsome 23-year-old mechanic was a witness to widespread, almost daily, U.S. war crimes in Iraq. His story contains new revelations about ongoing brutality at Abu Ghraib, information yet to be reported in national media.

I first met Delgado in a classroom at Acalanes High School in Lafayette, California, where he presented a slide show on the atrocities that he himself observed in Southern and Northern Iraq. Delgado acknowledged that the U.S. military did some good things in Iraq. “We deposed Saddam, built some schools and hospitals,” he said. But he focused his testimony on the breakdown of moral order within the U.S. military, a pattern of violence and terror that exceeds the bounds of what is legally and morally permissible in time of war.

Delgado says he observed mutilation of the dead, trophy photos of dead Iraqis, mass roundups of innocent noncombatants, positioning of prisoners in the line of fire – all violations of the Geneva conventions. His own buddies – decent, Christian men, as he describes them – shot unarmed prisoners.

In one government class for seniors, Delgado presented graphic images, his own photos of a soldier playing with a skull, the charred remains of children, kids riddled with bullets, a soldier from his unit scooping out the brains of a prisoner. Some students were squeamish, like myself, and turned their heads. Others rubbed tears from their eyes. But at the end of the question period, many expressed appreciation for opening a subject that is almost taboo. “If you are old enough to go to war,” Delgado said, “you are old enough to know what really goes on.”

It is a rare moment when American students, who play video war games more than baseball, are exposed to the realities of occupation. Delgado does not name names. Nor does he want to denigrate soldiers or undermine morale. He seeks to be a conscience for the military, and he wants Americans to take ownership of the war in all its tragic totality.

Aiden Delgado did not grow up in the United States. His father was a U.S. diplomat. Aiden lived in Thailand and Senegal, West Africa. He spent seven years in Cairo, Egypt, where he became fluent in Arabic and developed a deep appreciation of Arab culture.

On September 11th, 2001, completely unaware of the day’s fateful events, Delgado enlisted in the Army, expecting to serve two days a month in the Reserves. When he turned on the television, he realized instantly that his whole world had changed.

After he joined the Army, Delgado began to read the Sutras. He became a Buddhist, a vegetarian, and eventually became a Conscientious Objector. Delgado was honorably discharged when he returned home. Delgado earned four service medals which, he says, are standard awards. He faced criticism from the Army when he began to speak out about military conduct in Iraq. Don Schwartz, spokesman for the Army in Washington, D.C., said that Delgado should have reported any wrongdoing to Army personnel. “He should have reported first to his boss, his commander. That is the standard way the chain of command works.”

When I interviewed Delgado recently, he expressed his deep love of his country, but he also insisted that racism – a major impetus to violence in American history – is driving the occupation, infecting the entire military operation in Iraq.

Delgado’s testimony tends to confirm the message of Chris Hedges, the New York Times war correspondent who wrote prior to the invasion of Iraq: “War forms its own culture. It distorts memory, corrupts language, and infects everything around it…. War exposes the capacity for evil that lurks not far below the surface within all of us. Even as war gives meaning to sterile lives, it also promotes killers and racists.”

Here is Aiden Delgado story.

Q: When did you begin to turn against the military and the war?

DELGADO: From the very earliest time I was in Iraq, I began to see ugly strains of racism among our troops—anti-Arab, anti-Muslim sentiments.

Q: What are some examples?

DELGADO: There was a Master Sergeant. A Master Sergeant is one of the highest enlisted ranks. He whipped this group of Iraqi children with a steel Humvee antenna. He just lashed them with it because they were crowding around, bothering him, and he was tired of talking. Another time, a Marine, a Lance Corporal – a big guy about six-foot-two – planted a boot on a kid’s chest, when a kid came up to him and asked him for a soda. The First Sergeant said, “That won’t be necessary Lance Corporal.” And that was the end of that. It was a matter of routine for guys in my unit to drive by in a Humvee and shatter bottles over Iraqis heads as they went by. And these were guys I considered friends. And I told them:“ What the hell are you doing? What does that accomplish?” One said back:“ I hate being here. I hate looking at them. I hate being surrounded by all these Hajjis.”

Q: They refer to Iraqis as “Hajjis”?

DELGADO: “Hajji” is the new slur, the new ethnic slur for Arabs and Muslims. It is used extensively in the military. The Arabic word refers to one who has gone on a pilgrimage to Mecca. But it is used in the military with the same kind of connotation as “gook,” “Charlie,” or the n-word. Official Army documents now use it in reference to Iraqis or Arabs. It’s real common. There was really a thick aura of racism.

Q: Were there any significant incidents besides racial slurs and casual violence against civilians?

DELGADO: The last mission I ran in the South before we were redeployed North was strange. I was told to drive way out into the desert, off the road. When we got there, we found Kuwaitis excavating a mass grave site (from the Saddam era). Kuwaiti engineers wanted to identify and repatriate the remains. It was a solemn affair. I was with the First Sergeant. He said: “Give me that skull. I want to hold the skull in my hands.” He picked up the skull, tossing it to himself. Then he turned to me and said: “Take my picture.” It was taken while he was standing by a mass grave. This was a very surreal, dark time for me in Iraq. It was tough for me to see brutality coming out of my own unit. I had lived in the Middle East. I had Egyptian friends. I spent nearly a decade in Cairo. I spoke Arabic, and I was versed in Arab culture and Islamic dress. Most of the guys in my unit were in complete culture shock most of the time. They saw the Iraqis as enemies. They lived in a state of fear. I found the Iraqis enormously friendly as a whole. One time I was walking through Nasiriyah with an armful of money, nadirs that were exchanged for dollars. I was able to walk 300 meters to my convoy – a U.S. soldier walking alone with money. And I thought: I am safer here in Iraq than in the states. I never felt threatened from people in the South.

Q: What happened when you moved North, before you reached Abu Ghraib?

DELGADO: We were a company of 141 Military Police. We gave combat support, followed behind units to take and hold prisoners. I was a mechanic. I fixed Humvees. We followed behind the Third Infantry division. It was heavily mechanized with lots of tanks and scout vehicles. We could trace their path by all the burned-out vehicles and devastation they left behind. The Third pretty much annihilated the Iraqi forces. Iraqis did not have much of an organized military. They had civilian vehicles, and they resisted pretty valiantly, given how much we outclassed them. The Third Infantry slaughtered them wholesale. We took so many prisoners, we couldn’t carry them all. Large numbers of civilians were caught in the crossfire.

Q: How were the civilians killed?

DELGADO: It was common practice to set up blockades. The Third Infantry would block off a road. In advance of the assault, civilians would flee the city in a panic. As they approached us, someone would yell: “Stop, stop!” In English. Of course they couldn’t understand. Their cars were blown up with cannons, or crushed with tanks. Killing noncombatants at checkpoints happened routinely, not only with the Third Infantry, but the First Marines. And it is still going on today. If you check last week’s MSNBC, they dug out a father and mother and her six children. We were constantly getting reports of vehicles that were destroyed (with people in them) at checkpoints.

Q: Your unit, the 320th Military Police, was stationed at Abu Ghraib for six months. Who were the prisoners at Abu Ghraib? Where did they come from? Do you have any new information not yet reported in the media?

DELGADO: There were 4,000 to 6,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib. I got to work with a lot of officers, so I got to see the paperwork. I found out that a lot of prisoners were imprisoned for no crime at all. They were not insurgents. Some were inside for petty theft or drunkenness. But the majority – over sixty percent – were not imprisoned for crimes committed against the coalition.

Q: How did so many noncombatants get imprisoned?

DELGADO: Every time our base came under attack, we sent out teams to sweep up all men between the ages of 17 and 50. There were random sweeps. The paperwork to get them out of prison took six months or a year. It was hellish inside. A lot of completely innocent civilians were in prison camp for no offense. It sounds completely outrageous. But look at the 2005 Department of Defense Report, where it talks about prisoners.

Q: When you arrived at Abu Ghraib, what did you see, beyond what we all learned from the scandal in the news? And how were you affected?

DELGADO: I was becoming disillusioned. I expected brutality from the enemy. That was a given. But to see brutality from our own side, that was really tough for me. It was hard to see the army fall so much in my esteem. The prisoners were housed outside in tents, 60 to 80 prisoners per tent. It rained a lot. The detainees lived in the mud. It was freezing cold outside, and the prisoners had no cold-weather clothing. Our soldiers lived inside in cells, with four walls that protected us from the bombardment. The Military Police used the cold weather to control the prisoners. If there was an infraction, detainees would be removed from their tents. Next, their blankets were confiscated. Then even their clothing was taken away. Almost naked, in underwear, the POWs would huddle together on a platform outside to keep warm. There was overcrowding, and almost everyone got TB. Eighteen members of our unit who worked closely with the prisoners got TB too. The food was rotten and prisoners got dysentery. The unsanitary conditions, the debris and muck everywhere, the overcrowding in cold weather, led to disease, an epidemic, pandemic conditions. The attitude of the guards was brutal. To
them Iraqis were the scum of the earth. Detainees were beaten within inches of their life.

Q: Were any detainees killed?

DELGADO: More than 50 prisoners were killed.

Q: What happened?

DELGADO: The enemy around Baghdad randomly shelled our base. Under the Geneva Conventions, an occupying power cannot place protected persons in areas exposed to the hazards of war. More than 50 detainees were killed because they were housed outside in tents, directly in the line of fire, with no protection, nowhere to run. They were hemmed in by barbed wire. They were trapped, and they had to sit and wait and hope they would survive. I know what it was like because a single mortar round would flatten a whole line of tires on the Humvees, a whole line of windshields. That’s how I thought about the damage because I was the mechanic who had to replace the windshields. So the mortar bombardments killed and wounded many prisoners.

Q: So your commanders knowingly kept your prisoners in the line of fire? How many U.S. soldiers were killed during the shellings?

DELGADO: There were two U.S. soldiers killed during my stay.

Q: Were there any other incidents?

DELGADO: The worst incident that I was privy to was in late November. The prisoners were protesting nightly because of their living conditions. They protested the cold, the lack of clothing, the rotting food that was causing dysentery. And they wanted cigarettes. They tore up pieces of clothing, made banners and signs. One demonstration became intense and got unruly. The prisoners picked up stones, pieces of wood, and threw them at the guards. One of my buddies got hit in the face. He got a bloody nose. But he wasn’t hurt. The guards asked permission to use lethal force. They got it. They opened fire on the prisoners with the machine guns. They shot twelve and killed three. I know because I talked to the guy who did the killing. He showed me these grisly photographs, and he bragged about the results. “Oh,” he said, “I shot this guy in the face. See, his head is split open.” He talked like the Terminator. ‘I shot this guy in the groin, he took three days to bleed to death.” I was shocked. This was the nicest guy you would ever want to meet. He was a family man, a really courteous guy, a devout Christian. I was stunned and said to him: “You shot an unarmed man behind barbed wire for throwing a stone.” He said, “Well, I knelt down. I said a prayer, stood up and gunned them all down.” There was a complete disconnect between what he had done and his own morality.

Q: Commanders permitted use of lethal force against unarmed detainees. What was their response to the carnage?

DELGADO: Our Command took the grisly photos and posted them up in the headquarters. It was a big, macho thing for our company to shoot more prisoners than any other unit.

Q: When did all this happen?

DELGADO: November 24th. The event was actually mentioned in the Taguba Report, under Protocol Golden Spike. And there’s more. Before our company transported the bodies, the soldiers stopped and posed with the bodies and mutilated them further. I got photos from the guy who was there, my friend. I have a photo of a member of my unit, scooping out the prisoner’s brains with an MRE [meals-ready-to-eat] spoon. Four people are looking on, two are taking photographs. If you remember the Abu Ghraib stuff that came out on CNN, this kind of stuff was common. You see guys posing with bodies, or toying with corpses. It was a real common thing in the military, all because the guys thought Arabs are terrorists, the scum of the earth. Anything we do to them is all right.

Q: So far as I know, no commanders have been held accountable for events at Abu Ghraib. Your story implicates commanders in ongoing brutality. In one of your presentations, you said: “Our command definitely knew about the prisoners being shot. They posted the photos in their headquarters. They knew all about prisoners being beaten.” Did your commanders try to prevent information from reaching the public?

DELGADO: After the Abu Ghraib scandal broke on CNN and TV, commanders came out to us and said: “We are all family here. We don’t wash our dirty linen in public. This story doesn’t need to go on CNN. Nobody needs to find out about this.” There was a sort of informal gag order.

Q: You enlisted in the Army Reserve in good faith. Now you are a conscientious objector. Once in the Army Reserve, how did you become a C.O.?

DELGADO: After advanced training, I became serious about Buddhism. I read translations of the Sutras. I became a vegetarian. Later, when I met Iraqi prisoners firsthand, I saw the people who were supposed to be our enemies. I did not feel any hatred for them. They were young, poor guys without an education, like us. They had to fight us. And our guys were the same; they had to fight them. And I said: “What am I doing here, fighting poor people?” I went to my commander, turned in my rifle, and said; “Look, I will stay in Iraq. I will finish my tour as a mechanic. I will do my job, but I am not going to kill anyone.”

Q: You still served the whole tour in Iraq. How did your command respond to your request to become a C.O.?

DELGADO: As soon as I told them, they became hostile. They first took away my hard, ballistic plates that go into my vest. They said: “You are not going to fight, so you won’t need body armor.”

Q: The plates protect you from bullets and mortars. They are needed for safety, right? Were you still vulnerable?

DELGADO: Yes I was. They also took away my home leave, saying: “You won’t come back.” I was supposed to be promoted, but they said we can’t promote you. The command tried a lot of things to get me to recant. I was ostracized. But the more they did to me, the more obstinate I became. I made trouble for my command. I didn’t shave. I threatened to get my Congressman involved. I called Buddhist organizations and the ACLU. They finally relented.

Q: I would like to review your observations. Your account does not focus on one or two bad individuals. Essentially, you are describing the brutality of a group, a collective loss of restraint, a complete breakdown of moral order within the military. I am sure that your Christian buddy, a typical American youth, would never shoot an unarmed person in private life. The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr tells us that, with the sanction of the state, driven by nationalism, moral, decent individuals become killers and torturers in groups. You attribute the breakdown of restraint to racism. When did the process of dehumanization of Arabs begin? Did basic training influence the consciousness of our soldiers?

DELGADO: I went to Fort Knox for basic training. It was known to be harsher than other bases. The training was mentally taxing, and there was already some anti-Arab sentiment.

Q: Like what?

DELGADO: In the early stages I remember Army chants. We sang in cadences. And the chants had anti-Arab themes. Like burning turbans, killing ragheads, killing the Taliban.

Q: What did the chants say?

DELGADO: It was three years ago. I can’t tell the exact words, but the sentiment was to burn turbans and kill ragheads. That was the phraseology. Our drill sergeants would give us motivational talks to pump up our fighting spirit. The theme was the need to get revenge, to go to the Middle East to fight Arabs.

Q: All this was before you even went to Iraq?

DELGADO: Yes. My own commander was infamous for anti-Arab speeches. Before we were deployed to the Middle East, he said, “Now don’t go tell the media that you’re going over there to kill some ragheads and burn some turbans.” Everybody laughed, and he laughed with them. I remember standing there in formation, having grown up in Egypt. And I was thinking: “Oh, my God, this is going to be a disaster. Our commander has this anti-Arab attitude even before we go over.” The commander would give lectures about Islam. He said that Muslims advocate a holy war against us, that Islam promotes perpetual war. I’ve been surrounded by Muslims for a decade, exposed to their culture. He is wrong.

Q: In the 1980s the U.S. military made a lot of reforms. It is widely believed that racism in the military is now a thing of the past.

DELGADO: I have two answers. First, have we overcome racism in the sense that blacks and whites are banded together in the hatred of Arabs? That’s not progress. Second, we had an incident in our unit with a black specialist. He was a nice guy, really popular in the unit. There was no physical fight, but there was a dispute over him dating this white girl, having a relationship with a white girl. Two white guys took a piece of rope, tied a noose, and put a hangman’s noose on his bed. He found out who it was and went to his black sergeant. They went to the equal opportunity representative. The issue was effectively stifled.

Q: After your long ordeal, how do you feel about your country, and what do you want from the American people?

DELGADO: I still love my country. I love the idea of America. But I became disillusioned. Now I want to let the American people know what they’re signing on for when they say they support the war in Iraq. And I want Americans to recognize the racial undertones of the occupation and to understand the human costs of war.

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The casualties of war go far beyond the battlefields

The casualties of war go far beyond the battlefields

With the second anniversary this month of the United States invasion of Iraq, many peacemakers will participate in vigils or memorials for the dead. An interfaith group in Salt Lake City will read the names of the war dead. 

    The list includes both American and other soldiers who have fallen as well as the names of as many Iraqis as can be found. When ABC News “Nightline” devoted an entire program to reading names of war dead, some TV affiliates chose not to air the broadcast. They claimed it was too political. 

    Honoring the victims of war is something our country has etched in stone. War and veterans’ memorials can be found in nearly every city, town and hamlet across this nation. It is from these hometowns that this country’s young men — and now women – have left for foreign battlefields. 

  Seeing all those names on the stark, black stone wall of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C., was a moving experience for me. It is an emotional experience to touch the name of a loved one or friend on that wall. 

    The World War II Memorial opened just last year has a crescent wall on its west side with thousands of gold stars. Each star represents 100 fallen. There is no room for all the names. The words carved in the stone below denote “the price of freedom.” 

    The price is much higher. The cost is greater than we first see. The names of those casualties of war far outnumber those officially listed as killed in action. 

    The Wasatch Mountains of Utah are about as far away from a war zone as you can get. In the waning days of last summer, when the wildflowers were not yet gone, a casual hike turned into a horrible reminder. 

    Seeing a business acquaintance along the trail was a surprise. Usually, I see him behind a customer service   counter. But I recognized him with his backpack passing on the trail. 

    He reminded me of his name. I asked how he was doing. Not so well, he said. 

    The trail we were on was a place he used to bring his favorite nephew. The uncle had come up to the tall pines, the stands of aspen and the unrestricted views of the peaks to remember. And to try to forget. 

    His nephew had enlisted in the Army. He and a buddy from a suburban Midwestern city had been to Iraq and back. 

    “We’re not getting the whole story,” the uncle told me as we stood in a sun-drenched meadow. His nephew had recounted the horrors of war to his uncle. He had told his uncle that they shot at anything that moved. He had bared his tormented soul to someone he trusted, someone who loved him, someone who had brought him to these mountains for peace and solitude and new experiences.

    Their names will not appear on any war memorial of those killed in the Iraq war. But their lives were cut short by the horrors of war just as though they had been targeted by a roadside bomb in Baghdad. 

    One summer night, the two Iraq war veterans drank too much. The buddy had a new sports car, a “welcome home” gift from his father. These two young veterans sped down a highway careening and crashing the new sports car. Both died. 

    Their names were not seen on any national TV news program listing those who gave the ultimate price. Their names will not appear on any war memorial of those killed in the Iraq war. But their lives were cut short by the horrors of war just as though they had been targeted by a roadside bomb in Baghdad. 

    This is not likely an isolated case. How many returning soldiers become casualties, the number of beaten and abused military   spouses, may never be completely known. The returning veterans from Vietnam who have dealt with the horrors of their war through drug and alcohol abuse took years to quantify and the numbers are likely “best guesses.” 

    Vietnam so damaged this country’s families and fabric that we discovered in the 2004 presidential election it still is an unhealed national wound. Is there any correlation between the end of World War II and its returned victims of war’s horror and the reorganization of Alcoholics Anonymous in the following decade? How many of the returning WWII vets were medicating themselves to dull the memories that were too unbearable? 

    The casualties of war go far beyond the battlefields. They are in the homes and coffee shops, the support groups and the cemeteries of those cities, towns and hamlets that continue to send their youngest to serve in the nation’s wars. 

    It is a cycle   that somehow needs to be stopped. Reading the names of those we know about in this latest war will bring to my mind the unnamed thousands of veterans who came home scarred and those others who are just as much part of the war dead and wounded but who never set foot “in country.”

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Army Documents Shed Light on CIA ‘Ghosting’: Systematic Concealment Of Detainees Is Found

Senior defense officials have described the CIA practice of hiding unregistered detainees at Abu Ghraib prison as ad hoc and unauthorized, but a review of Army documents shows that the agency’s “ghosting” program was systematic and known to three senior intelligence officials in Iraq.

Army and Pentagon investigations have acknowledged a limited amount of ghosting, but more than a dozen documents and investigative statements obtained by The Washington Post show that unregistered CIA detainees were brought to Abu Ghraib several times a week in late 2003, and that they were hidden in a special row of cells. Military police soldiers came up with a rough system to keep track of such detainees with single-digit identification numbers, while others were dropped off unnamed, unannounced and unaccounted for.

The documents show that the highest-ranking general in Iraq at the time acknowledged that his top intelligence officer was aware the CIA was using Abu Ghraib’s cells, a policy the general abruptly stopped when questions arose.

CIA operatives began looking for a central place to put detainees captured during secret missions in Iraq in mid-2003, and an early choice was the high-security Camp Cropper near Baghdad International Airport, where CIA officers hoped to deposit a few of their prisoners without registering their names. Lt. Col. Ronald G. Chew, the military police commander there, told Army investigators later that he “argued against the practice” and turned the operatives away.

Instead, according to the documents, the CIA quickly looked to Abu Ghraib, then a dusty and decrepit compound outside Baghdad that was slated to be transformed into the central U.S. detention center for the war.

According to statements investigators took from soldiers and officers who worked at the prison, a stream of ghost detainees began arriving in September 2003, after military intelligence officers and the CIA came to an arrangement that kept the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations from knowing the detainees existed. The investigative documents show that Col. Thomas M. Pappas and Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, the top two military intelligence officers at the prison, took part in discussions with the CIA on how to handle agency detainees.

Pappas and Jordan are still under investigation, and Army officials said they believe a decision about whether to discipline them could come by the end of the month.

Keeping ghost detainees was harshly criticized by Army investigators who looked into abuse at the prison, and human rights groups condemn the practice. The Red Cross regularly inspects prisons and is supposed to have access to all inmates to ensure their rights are protected.

The most recent Pentagon review of detainee abuse was released this month by Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III, who told reporters that his probe found 30 cases in which prisoners were held off the books, including one kept secretly for about 45 days.

According to investigative statements by some soldiers, such detainees were left in isolation cells for weeks without being interrogated, they were sometimes registered under fake names and essentially lost, and the rules that applied to thousands of other detainees did not always apply to them.

Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the top Army officer in Iraq at the time, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last spring that there was no system of keeping such detainees at Abu Ghraib, but he later acknowledged two cases in which it had happened, including that of one detainee who died in custody and another who was kept without registration at the behest of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

In a deposition on Sept. 1, 2004, however, Sanchez said he learned after the hearing that there had been a “staff officer understanding” that allowed ghosting by the “Other Government Agency,” a code term for the CIA. He said in the deposition that Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, his top intelligence officer in Iraq, “had been made aware of the allocation of cells for use by OGA.” Fast has been cleared of wrongdoing in Abu Ghraib investigations and last week assumed command of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

“I do know now that there was not a procedure in place to properly inprocess and assign ISNs [internee serial numbers] for those individuals,” Sanchez said, according to a transcript of the deposition obtained by The Post. “And when we found out about that, that was fixed.”

One of the highly publicized incidents at Abu Ghraib was the death of an unregistered CIA detainee in a shower room in November 2003. Another case that year allegedly gained Sanchez’s attention as well, when the CIA logged three Saudi nationals into Abu Ghraib under false names.

In one of several Pentagon studies of detainee abuse, Army Maj. Gen. George Fay reported last August that the three hospital workers had been swept up by the CIA. The Saudi government asked the United States if it held the three but was told no, because their real names were not registered.

A statement to investigators provided more detail. Darius Khaghani, chief of interrogation operations under Sanchez’s command, said it became “a very political situation.” Over several weeks, he said, requests to locate the Saudi citizens came from L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and then from the office of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

Finally, soldiers “came up with the idea to question three detainees” who had been brought to the prison by the CIA, “even though they were registered under other names,” Khaghani said. “In short order, the three were released and transported to Saudi Arabia on a CIA aircraft, and later I heard the chief of station was relieved over this matter and recalled back to Washington.”

An intelligence official last week disputed the allegation that the station chief was removed for that reason, and said the change was made to bring in a more experienced person.

Nail Jubeir, spokesman for the Saudi Embassy in Washington, said that as Saudi officials made unsuccessful requests to find the three men, they kept emphasizing that they were humanitarian workers helping the coalition. “It’s always disturbing when you have citizens detained under false names,” Jubeir said. “It took some time to get them released.”

The investigative documents showed that several soldiers and civilian contractors reported seeing ghost detainees and being confused about their status and rules pertaining to them.

Luke Olander, a civilian intelligence analyst, said: “We had intelligence reports from one particular detainee and the report showed we did not have him at our facility, but he was there.” Spec. John Harold Ketzer, an interrogator, said that the ghosts were “off-limits for Army interrogators” and that “some OGA detainees have waited for months for OGA interrogators to see them, violating the 30[-day] isolation limit rule.”

Capt. Carolyn Wood, a military intelligence officer in charge of interrogations at Abu Ghraib, told investigators that she was one of a few who objected to the CIA using her facility for “overnight parking” of unregistered prisoners and that she expressed her “disapproval” to Pappas and Jordan. “But I was overridden,” she said, and ghosting continued at least until her departure on Dec. 4, 2003.

Chief Warrant Officer Jon D. Graham, a member of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, told investigators that “OGA [CIA] had what we refer to as ghost detainees that were ‘buried’ or hidden in our facility,” adding that he also objected to the practice.

Jordan, in his statement to investigators, said there was a memorandum of understanding between his unit and “OGA” to guide the housing of prisoners brought in by the CIA and Task Force 1-21, a secret Special Operations unit. He said they “dropped off a detainee about two to three times a week.”

Pappas told investigators he initially “had concerns over this arrangement” and asked Col. Steven Boltz, then the second-ranking military intelligence officer in Iraq, if they were going to continue housing ghosts. “He said yes, to facilitate their request,” Pappas said, according to his statement. “They would drop off detainees without notifying us.”

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US Army seeks longer enlistments as recruitment falters

US Army seeks longer enlistments as recruitment falters

WASHINGTON, District of Columbia, United States of America — The US Army has asked Congress to allow it to extend enlistment contracts offered to future soldiers by two years in order to “stabilize the force,” as top defense officials warned that key recruitment targets for the year could be missed.

The request came as the House of Representatives on Wednesday put its stamp of approval on an 81.4-billion-dollar supplemental spending bill that contains new benefits for US troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But the new money notwithstanding, Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck told a House subcommittee that yearly recruitment goals for the Army reserve and the National Guard were “at risk.”

“In the manning area, we need Congress to change the maximum enlistment time from six years to eight years in order to help stabilize the force for longer periods of time,” Hagenbeck went on to say.

The appeal coincided with the release of a new congressional report that showed that the intensifying anti-American insurgency in Iraq and continued violence in Afghanistan were followed by a distinct drop in the number of volunteers willing to serve in the branches of the military that see the most combat.

The Army reserve and Army National Guard respectively met only 87 percent and 80 percent of their overall recruiting goals in the first quarter of fiscal 2005, according to the study by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress.

The Air Force Reserve attained 91 percent of its target, the Air National Guard 71 percent and the Navy Reserve 77 percent.

The shortfalls could potentially have a noticeable effect on units operating in Iraq, Afghanistan and surrounding areas because, according to defense officials, reservists and guardsmen make up about 46 percent of the total force deployed there.

Recruitment problems are beginning to dog even active duty units that have not experienced them in a long time.

The Marine Corps, whose reputation for efficiency and toughness has always helped it attract ambitious young men and women, missed its goal by 84 recruits in January and another 192 in February for the first time in 10 years, the GAO report said.

“There is no disputing the fact that the force is facing challenges,” acknowledged Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Charles Abell.

The obvious cooling off in Americans’ interest in military service is observed despite multiplying benefits and financial enticements offered by the Pentagon to those signing up for service.

The supplemental measure passed by the House, for example, increases the maximum service member group life insurance benefits from 250,000 dollars to 400,000 dollars.

The onetime death gratuity for combat fatalities received by family members is going up from 12,000 to 100,000 dollars.

At 150,000 dollars a pop, reenlistment bonuses paid to experienced Special Forces members are beginning to resemble Christmas paychecks on Wall Street, while one-time cash incentives for brand new recruits went up from 8,000 dollars to 10,000 dollars — and to 20,000, if they agree to take one of the military jobs deemed hard to fill.

College scholarships, the principle reason why many young people join the military, have been boosted by the Army from 50,000 dollars to 70,000.

Still, Army reserve commander Lieutenant General James Helmly warned in January that with lengthy and grueling deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reserve is rapidly turning into “a broken force” and may not be able to meet its operational requirements in the future.

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