Aug 24: Fort Lee May Get Statue of U.S. Founding Father Thomas Paine

Posted on August 24, 2008 by Team VCS

You won’t find Thomas Paine’s face on a coin. You won’t find his monument in Washington, D.C. In fact, there are only five real statues to this important founding father – the most important, some would say – in the world.  Fort Lee is hoping to become the home of the sixth.

The seven-foot bronze statue of a pensive Paine penning “These are the times that try men’s souls …” by Beacon, N.Y., sculptor David Frech would be unveiled in Monument Park, on Palisade Avenue, in November 2009 if representatives of Fort Lee’s Common Sense Society manage to raise the balance of the sculpture’s $128,000 price tag. So far, between a $50,000 contribution from the city and another $25,000 they’ve raised on their own, they’re more than halfway there.

“We will accept donations from anybody, anywhere,” says Fort Lee’s James Viola, chairman of the society.

Today, the fund-raising begins with an “old-fashioned barbecue and dance” at the Alpine Boat Basin Pavilion, noon to sunset, sponsored by the Fort Lee Office of Cultural and Historic Affairs ($25, children $5).

Upcoming Paine fund-raisers include a “Colonial Punch & Pie Night” at Alpine’s Kearney House Museum, 7 p.m. Nov. 14 ($50), and a holiday crafts fair at the Fort Lee Community Center, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. Nov. 29 and 30 (free).

“I have depicted Paine as he was, resolute and determined,” says Frech, who has also sculpted public monuments of Lincoln, Matthew Vassar (founder of Vassar College) and other key American figures.

The sculpture, he says, will depict Paine looking into the oncoming wind while steadying himself to write the notes that would become his famous “The American Crisis.” The statue’s glance, incidentally, will fall on another, already-existing statue group to the immediate west – a pair of anonymous Revolutionary War soldiers, the very people Paine was trying to stir with his writings.

“I find Paine and all the revolutionaries inspiring,” Frech says. “They were willing to sacrifice everything for their freedom.”

In claiming Paine as a native son, the Common Sense Society, founded a year ago, is not just whistling “Yankee Doodle.”

In the fall of 1776, Paine was pretty much where his statue will be – in Monument Park, about a block and a half from Main Street. Only then, it was an encampment for Washington’s army.

“He was actually on the spot where the statue is going,” says society Vice Chairman Kay Nest. “That to me says it all.”

Without doubt, Paine (1737-1809) remains the most radical and controversial of the founding fathers – and probably the least known. Washington, Adams and Jefferson get movies and TV miniseries made about them. Paine’s sole impact on the pop culture world is a couple of memorable lines in the Oscar-winning 1950 hit “Born Yesterday.” “He was quite a fella,” coos Judy Holliday, the dumb blonde who has been reading up on American history. “He was born in London or England – something like that.”

Paine (he was actually born in Thetford, Norfolk) made his mark on the War for Independence at two key points. The first was in January 1776, when his sensational pamphlet “Common Sense” became the spark that transformed a series of Colonial uprisings into a full-scale revolution.

“He really offered a vision of an independent America,” says Paramus native Harvey J. Kaye, author of “Thomas Paine and the Promise of America.” “There would never have been an American Revolution if it had not been for Thomas Paine.”

The second time was later that same year, when Paine, by then an embedded reporter with Washington’s army, witnessed its ignominious retreat from New York in November.

The first of the 13 dispatches he called “The American Crisis,” which began with the line “These are the times that try men’s souls,” became a key recruitment tool for Washington, who had it read to his assembled troops and thus convinced the disheartened men to re-enlist. Again, no Paine, no revolution.

“It’s one of the most quoted lines in American history,” says Kaye, who teaches history at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay. “If you do a [Web] search, you’ll probably find some high school football coach saying, ‘Boys, these are the times that try men’s souls.’ It’s just a phenomenon.”

So how did Thomas Paine get banished from the front ranks of history?

For one thing, Kaye says, he was an outspoken deist – a religious radical. This didn’t make him popular.

For another, he became mixed up in the French Revolution, was imprisoned by the French (for not being radical enough) and eventually circulated vitriolic letters about then-President Washington, whom he accused of not doing anything to free him. This didn’t make him popular either.

But most of all, Kaye says, he was a genuine democrat, who believed in freedom and equal opportunity for all – the working man as well as the landowner. This made him anathema to conservatives, who began a Swift-Boating campaign to vilify him in the press.

“They tried to accuse him of being an alcoholic, of abusing his wife, really terrible stuff,” Kaye says.

Some of that controversy lingers to this day.

Viola, a commander of the Fort Lee VFW (he’s a veteran of Iwo Jima) who describes himself as “more conservative, more old-school,” has his own reservations about Thomas Paine. But he’s all for giving the man his due.

“He was the right man at the right time,” Viola says of Paine.

On the Web: www.commonsensesociety.org

E-mail: beckerman@northjersey.com

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Report: Push for Iraq War Preceded Intelligence Findings

Posted on August 23, 2008 by Team VCS

August 22, 2008 – Editor’s Note: George Washington University’s National Security Archive released a report Friday on prewar Iraq intelligence which found “the U.S. intelligence community buckled sooner in 2002 than previously reported to Bush administration pressure for data justifying an invasion of Iraq.” The report, a portion of which is based on previously undisclosed government documents, was prepared by National Security Archive senior fellow John Prados.
The documents suggest that the public relations push for war came before the intelligence analysis, which then conformed to public positions taken by Pentagon and White House officials. For example, a July 2002 draft of the “White Paper” ultimately issued by the CIA in October 2002 actually pre-dated the National Intelligence Estimate that the paper purportedly summarized, but which Congress did not insist on until September 2002.

A similar comparison between a declassified draft and the final version of the British government’s “White Paper” on Iraq weapons of mass destruction adds to evidence that the two nations colluded in the effort to build public support for the invasion of Iraq. Dr. Prados concludes that the new evidence tends to support charges raised by former White House press secretary Scott McClellan and by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its long-delayed June 2008 “Phase II” report on politicization of intelligence.

U.S. Intelligence and Iraq WMD
Compiled and edited by Dr. John Prados

On June 5, 2008 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a report examining whether the public statements made by U.S. officials, including President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and others were consonant with U.S. intelligence information. This report forms part of a second phase of the SSCI’s investigation of Iraq intelligence issues, most especially Saddam Hussein’s possible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program, originally approved by the Intelligence Committee in February 2004 but stalled by its Republican majority for several years, until the majority changed with the current 110th Congress. Committee chairman Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV) then ordered work on this inquiry resumed, and the present report is the result.

The appearance of this long-awaited SSCI “Phase II” report coincided with controversy over the revelations of former White House press secretary Scott McClellan who, in a memoir appearing almost simultaneously, argued that “in the fall of 2002, Bush and his White House were engaging in a carefully orchestrated campaign to shape and manipulate sources of public approval to our advantage.” (Note 1) A review of new evidence along with previously-available documents sheds important new light on this debate. Among the findings:

    * The Phase II report on Bush administration public statements, in conjunction with the SSCI’s original July 2004 report on Iraq’s alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction, indicates that political manipulation extended beyond the intelligence itself to affect investigation of the intelligence failures on Iraq as well as the Bush administration’s use of that information.
    * In conjunction with other recently declassified materials, the Phase II report shows that the Bush administration solicited intelligence then used to “substantiate” its public claims.
    * A recently declassified draft of the CIA’s October 2002 white paper on Iraqi WMD programs demonstrates that that paper long pre-dated the compilation of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi capabilities.
    * The timing of the CIA’s draft white paper coincides with a previously available draft of the British Government’s white paper on Iraqi WMD, demonstrating that the Bush administration and the Tony Blair government began acting in concert to build support for an invasion of Iraq two to three months earlier than previously understood.
    * A comparison of the CIA draft white paper with its publicly released edition shows that all the changes made were in the nature of strengthening its charges against Iraq by inserting additional alarming claims, in the manner of an advocacy, or public relations document. The draft and final papers show no evidence of intelligence analysis applied to the information contained. Similar comparison of the British white paper shows the same phenomenon at work.
    * Declassified Pentagon documents demonstrate that the CIA white paper was modified in ways that conformed to the desires of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and his office, in much the same way that British documents indicate that country’s white paper was changed to conform to the desires of the Blair government.

The many official investigations and unofficial investigations carried out, plus the statements and speeches of former CIA officials defending themselves against charges of distortion, have established a few points beyond question. Most important, following Saddam Hussein’s 1998 final expulsion of UN weapons inspectors from Iraq, very little new information fell into the hands of U.S. intelligence. Notable exceptions include data from Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, recruited as a CIA source (Note 2), and from Iraqi scientists clandestinely approached by the CIA under a covert program. (Note 3) Both these streams of information denied the existence of Iraqi WMD. On the other side were data from Iraqi exile sources that claimed all sorts of WMD and a set of fabricated documents alleging an Iraqi deal to buy uranium ore in Niger. The only concrete “find” was of a shipment of aluminum tubes being imported into Iraq, but analysts were divided over whether these tubes had anything to do with WMD at all. U.S. intelligence largely discounted the (accurate) details from Sabri and the scientists and – despite the CIA’s expressed misgivings -made use of the exile data. This thin data conditioned the intelligence analysis.

There was also a source of intelligence failure that flowed not from bad information but from analytical procedures. American intelligence knew that Saddam had worked through the 1990s to deceive UN weapons inspectors – they assumed he was hiding his WMDs rather than concealing the lack of them. On specific weapons, for example long-range Iraqi missiles, intelligence took a standard accounting approach, and since they could not account for every Iraqi missile, assumed Saddam was hiding a covert force of ballistic missiles. U.S. intelligence was coming off a record of underestimating Iraqi WMD progress in the 1980s and now overcompensated in the other direction.

The recent SSCI Phase II report concludes that Bush administration statements, while “substantiated” by the CIA reporting, went beyond that data. The Republican minority on the committee attacked that conclusion. The main defense offered – and repeated by media commentators – is that the root cause of the administration’s Iraq hysteria was intelligence failure, not intent to manipulate the American public. A typical formulation is that of columnist Fred Hiatt in the Washington Post, who argued that “the phony ‘Bush Lied’ story line distracts from the biggest prewar failure: the fact that so much of the intelligence upon which Bush and Rockefeller and everyone else relied turned out to be tragically, catastrophically wrong.” (Note 4)

But the question of the role of threat manipulation in the origins of the Iraq war is complex and goes beyond analytical failure. Its center is the degree to which the Iraq intelligence was politicized. Absent the drumbeat for war, even exaggerated estimates of Iraqi WMD prowess would have represented only a standard foreign policy problem. Bush administration intentions made a difference. Both the SSCI Phase I report and that of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States on Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Silberman-Robb Commission) investigation, though arguing that no politicization had occurred, also cited cases suggesting the opposite. Former national intelligence officer Paul Pillar told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations that the Silberman-Robb finding did not surprise him for two reasons: because any intelligence analyst would be reluctant to make the damning admission that his paper had been politicized, and because “in my experience, the great majority of cases of actual politicization – successful politicization – are invariably subtle.” (Note 5)

There were several avenues by which the Bush administration made its preferences clear. Vice President Richard Cheney questioned his CIA briefers aggressively, pressing them to the wall when he saw intelligence from other agencies that portrayed a more somber picture than that in CIA’s reporting. He sent briefers back for more information, including in instances when they checked with headquarters and returned with the same word. Cheney was especially acerbic on CIA’s rejection of claims that one of the 9/11 terrorists had met with Iraqi intelligence officers in Prague. On a number of occasions, Cheney sent his chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby, to CIA headquarters to follow up on his concerns. Mr. Cheney went there himself, not just once but on almost a dozen occasions. The practice encouraged the CIA to censor itself, driven, as Pillar put it, by “the desire to avoid the unpleasantness of putting unwelcome assessments on the desks of policymakers.” (Note 6)

A second avenue to influence U.S. intelligence lay through Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon. There, William Luti’s Near East and South Asia unit of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) was in close touch with the Vice President’s office. Papers circulated back and forth, and both offices utilized claims from Iraqi exiles – claims that Saddam trained terrorists or possessed various WMDs – to press the intelligence agencies for similar information. Under Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the undersecretary for policy, Douglas Feith, the Pentagon formed a special group to review reports on Saddam’s links to Al Qaeda. This unit, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) has been represented by Feith as merely charged with assembling a briefing on terrorism, but its real function was to bring additional pressure to bear on the CIA.

Not all the manipulation was visible. Behind the scenes at the State Department, Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton, also closely allied with the Office of the Vice President, pressured both the State Department and the CIA to fire individuals who refused to clear text in his speeches leveling the most extreme charges against other countries. Although Bolton’s actions did not concern Iraq directly, they came to a high point during the summer of 2002 – the exact moment when Iraq intelligence issues were on the front burner – and they aimed at offices which played a central role in producing Iraq intelligence. These included the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at State plus the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the Weapons Intelligence, Proliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC) center at CIA. Analysts working on Iraq intelligence could not be blamed for concluding that their own careers might be in jeopardy if they supplied answers other than what the Bush administration wanted to hear.

Under the circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the CIA and other intelligence agencies defended themselves against the dangers of attack from the Bush administration through a process of self-censorship. That is the very essence of politicization in intelligence. And the degree to which public statements on Iraq by Cheney, Bush, and others were “substantiated” by the existing intelligence must be viewed through that prism.

We shall offer only a few examples here. First is the case of the CIA white paper, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.” That document is dated October 2002 [Document 1] and was issued on October 4. It has been represented as a distillation of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq published two days earlier, with the most sensitive, secret information stripped out. Posted here today is the major portion of the text of the same paper in draft [Document 2], as it existed in July 2002. This document demonstrates that the white paper existed long before the NIE was even requested by Congress. In fact the illustrations in the July version are the same as those in the final report. A close comparison of the text shows, further, that much of the argumentation is identical, and that the differences between the two are strictly in the nature of separating text to insert more charges or to sharpen them. The entire product has the character of rhetoric. Little of the text shows the kind of approach characteristic of intelligence analysis. The fact that this document was in preparation at the CIA in July indicates that the Bush administration was actively engaged in a process of building support for war months ahead of the time it has previously been understood to have done so. In fact evidence exists that the CIA white paper was commissioned as early as May 2002. (Note 7)

This point is made even sharper by recently declassified Department of Defense documents, including a memorandum from the OUSDP that details the kinds of information seen as desirable to obtain from intelligence in order to strengthen the case for war against Iraq [Document 3]. The timing of this document suggests that this text was a response to the draft CIA white paper, created at a point when Pentagon critics of CIA reporting were actively pressing their case against the agency’s refusal to accept arguments that Saddam Hussein was allied with Al Qaeda. Changes in the CIA white paper between its July draft and the final document track closely with the OUSDP comments. The net impression is that the CIA white paper was rewritten to conform to administration preferences. If so, U.S. intelligence a priori made itself a tool of a political effort, vitiating the intelligence function and confirming the presence of a politicized process. The specific analytic failures on Iraq intelligence become much less significant in such a climate, especially in that they all yielded intelligence predictions of exactly the kind the Bush administration wanted to hear.

This impression is strengthened, and suspicions of collusion broadened, when the record of the British government’s white paper on Iraqi WMD is laid side by side with that of the CIA. In the course of British official investigations of the antecedents to the war, and the death of physicist David Kelly, a draft of the British white paper was released that is dated June 20 [Document 4]. As in the American case, the Joint Intelligence Committee, which originated this document and plays a role similar to that of the National Intelligence Council in the U.S., modified its draft to issue a final version on September 24, 2002, that was even more somber [Document 5]. There is a considerable record on the Blair government’s efforts to shape the content of the British white paper in directions not supported by the intelligence.

The second example concerns the U.S. government’s use of information drawn from Iraqi exile sources, principally those of the organization known as the Iraqi National Congress (INC) [Document 6]. This anti-Saddam group has had a long and stormy history with the CIA, which actually severed relations with it, an action the Clinton administration’s NSC Deputies Committee approved in December 1996. The agency was later forced to resume ties, and even to fund the group, as a result of the Iraq Liberation Act, which Congress passed in 1998. Proponents of that legislation included many individuals who became senior officials of the Bush administration. The State Department took up funding of the INC. Both State and CIA questioned the value of the intelligence it provided, and State in turn sought to end the relationship. In 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) took over responsibility for the Iraqi exiles. During this period the INC opened channels to the Office of the Vice President as well as Pentagon units responsible to Douglas Feith. In his own account of this period, Feith takes pains to defend the exile group and its leaders. (Note 8)

In the summer of 2002, the intelligence community compiled a detailed assessment of the material provided by the INC on several subjects and found it to have little current intelligence value, with sourcing and attribution impossible to verify. (Note 9) Despite this, and in spite of the fact that the INC went beyond providing intelligence to using the defectors it brought to the attention of the U.S. government as part of an anti-Saddam publicity campaign, the SSCI report on the group concludes that “false information from the Iraqi National Congress (INC)-affiliated sources was used to support key Intelligence Community Assessments on Iraq and was widely distributed in intelligence products prior to the war” (pp. 113-122). Intelligence agencies also avoided identifying these sources as INC-related in their reporting. Among the defectors was the notorious source “Curveball,” whose false allegations concerning Iraqi mobile biological weapons factories underlay some of the most alarming Bush administration charges against Baghdad.

This begs the question why, given distrust of the INC’s information at both the CIA and State Department, and an awareness of these doubts even within the DIA, the data was used at all, much less relied upon. Part of the answer no doubt has to do with the desperation of U.S. intelligence to obtain any information from inside Iraq – in itself a reflection of an intelligence failure. But the other part of the answer most likely flows directly from the prodding of the intelligence community by high levels at the Pentagon and White House for reactions to the defector information. This point stands out in stark relief when contrasted with the fact that the alternate stream of Iraqi insider information – from high-level agent sources and Iraqi scientists – seems to have had no discernable role in U.S. intelligence reporting. That is very arguably politicization.

Our third example has to do with the charges that Saddam sought to buy uranium ore from the African country of Niger. As widely reported, this affair involved fabricated documents, a Bush administration effort to discredit the U.S. envoy sent to check on the report by outing his wife, a CIA undercover officer; and ultimately, the criminal trial of Vice President Cheney’s top national security aide; but those matters are not of concern now. What is disturbing here, in the context of politicization of the intelligence, is the specific treatment the CIA gave to the information it developed. The record is established by the SSCI Phase I report, the Silberman-Robb report, and the proceedings of the trial of “Scooter” Libby, Mr. Cheney’s national security assistant. (Note 10)

On February 13, 2002 Vice President Cheney asked his CIA briefer about reports that Iraq was procuring uranium in Niger [Document 7]. Cheney represented the information as having come from the DIA, which indeed had issued an “executive highlight” on February 12. If this was in actuality what Cheney saw, the DIA was basing its account on information provided by Italian military intelligence, already aware of the fabricated Nigerien documents that later became the heart of this affair. The CIA had reported the same information a week earlier. The briefer promised to check, and the CIA’s WINPAC center prepared a note which observed that the foreign information on which the claim was based was only single-source and lacked crucial detail [Document 8]. The agency subsequently set up a trip to Niger by retired Ambassador Joseph V. Wilson IV, who returned with the conclusion that there was no substance to these claims. Wilson arrived in Niger on February 26 and returned on March 4. Just as Wilson came home, Vice President Cheney renewed his inquiry into the Niger allegation, and WINPAC responded by noting that the foreign intelligence service had no new information, that the Nigerien government insisted it was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium was used only for peaceful purposes, and that CIA was about to debrief “a source who may have information related to the alleged sale.”

Ambassador Wilson was in fact debriefed by two CIA officers on March 5. The way this was handled is what raises questions. Wilson’s data was recorded by the officers and written up by a reports officer who, according to the SSCI, “added additional relevant information from his notes.” The declassified text of this March 8, 2002, report [Document 9] shows that CIA Headquarters added the comment that the officials who provided information to Wilson “may have intended to influence as well as inform.” The ambassador himself was described as “a contact with excellent access who does not have an established reporting record.” However, Wilson had in fact carried out a mission on behalf of CIA previously, and he had been the senior U.S. envoy in Baghdad (the deputy chief of mission) before the first Gulf War. Therefore, Wilson did have an established reporting record. The comment regarding the Nigerien officials was gratuitous. The combination of these remarks cast doubt within the U.S. government on the information.

The report on Wilson’s information was then circulated in routine channels but never given to the Vice President. Director George Tenet’s comment: “This unremarkable report was disseminated, but because it produced no solid answers, there wasn’t any urgency to brief its results to senior officials such as the vice president.” (Note 11) But a look at the trip report we post here shows Wilson’s information was in fact quite solid. It simply does not say the uranium charge was real. Tenet has a secondary defense that the report was completed just after Vice President Cheney left on a trip to drum up support for war with Iraq, and that when he returned other matters seemed more pressing. Yet Cheney had renewed his inquiry into the Niger claim and surely its refutation had an impact on the arguments he had just made to encourage support for an American military option.These points drive the conclusion that the CIA was loathe to confront Mr. Cheney with a direct refutation of the Niger uranium claim. This too smacks of politicization.

Wilson’s was only one of a number of streams of reporting that undermined the Niger story, including an investigation by French intelligence and inquiries from the current U.S. ambassador and a senior U.S. military officer. Likely based on these materials and on the embassy cables reporting on Wilson from Niger, State Department intelligence filed a report doubting the claims of a Nigerien sale to Iraq [Document 10], and filed a dissent when the claim was included in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. But the developments of early 2002 became only the beginning of a highly ambivalent treatment of the uranium claim. On the one hand, the CIA intervened to keep this material out of the major speech President Bush gave in Cincinnati in October 2002, and also objected when British intelligence included it in their own white paper about the Iraqi threat. On the other hand, senior CIA officials mentioned the uranium claim in congressional testimony at the same time, permitted it to be included in a December 2002 “fact sheet” on Iraq, and mounted only tepid opposition to inclusion of the charge in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address, where it would become notorious as the “16 Words.”

The SSCI later investigated the Iraq intelligence in detail, reporting on it in 2004. This was followed by the Silberman-Robb commission account. The SSCI Phase II report on the use of that intelligence [Document 11] examines Bush administration public statements regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction plus certain other topics related to war in Iraq against the inventory of intelligence reports circulated within the U.S. government. The idea was to determine whether administration claims were supported by the available intelligence. The “public statements” were winnowed down to a few, essentially the speech by Vice President Cheney in Nashville on August 26, 2002, those by President Bush to the United Nations General Assembly, in Cincinnati, and before the U.S. Congress at the 2003 State of the Union address (September 12 and October 7, 2002, and January 29, 2003), and the presentation to the United Nations Security Council by Secretary of State Powell (February 5, 2003). The subjects covered include nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction generally, delivery systems, the Saddam Hussein regime’s alleged links to terrorists, Iraqi regime intent, and predictions for post-war Iraq.

In most of these cases the SSCI study found administration claims “substantiated” by the available intelligence but portraying the data as more certain than it was, thus going beyond the intelligence, while failing to convey disagreements among intelligence experts. The Committee found claims regarding Saddam’s intentions were contradicted by the intelligence (p. 82) and those about a rosy post-Saddam future as not reflecting intelligence concerns (p. 88). In the case of Bush administration claims about links between Saddam and terrorists the report reached several conclusions, judging that the intelligence substantiated general claims of Iraqi knowledge of and support for terrorist activities, but that claims of an Iraqi-terrorist alliance or of Iraqi training of terrorists were not backed up by the intelligence reporting (p. 71-2). In general Bush administration claims asserted greater certainty than existed in CIA reports.

This analysis was assailed by Republican members even before the SSCI report appeared. In minority statements attached to the eventual primary document (pp. 100-170) they detailed their objections. The minority charges that the investigation improperly confined itself to comparisons with finished intelligence products rather than the wider range of material actually available to top officials, and that it did not make similar assessments of the statements made by Democratic Party politicians, including Senator Rockefeller himself. Republican members and staff were not permitted to be involved in the drafting work on the report and the numerous amendments they offered were rejected.

The question of whether the “Iraqi threat” resulted from manipulation, as Scott McClellan and the SSCI majority suggest, or simple intelligence failure, as in the view of the Committee minority, is a key issue for all concerned. A real intelligence failure did occur. This is plain from the Intelligence Committee’s 2004 “Phase I” report as well as that of the Silberman-Robb Commission. (Note 12) The present author argued as much even before those studies appeared. (Note 13) The CIA director of that time, George Tenet, concedes, “In many ways, we were prisoners of our own history.” (Note 14) Retired CIA analyst Melvin A. Goodman, observing this analytical effort from the outside, concludes, “The U.S. rush to war against Iraq marked the worst intelligence scandal in the history of the United States.” (Note 15) But intelligence failure was abetted and magnified by the Bush administration’s drive to use charges about alleged Iraqi WMDs as justification for war.

Ascertaining the truth in this matter does not seem to have been as important as seeming to do so, at least for the Senate Intelligence Committee. A review of the minority statements contained in the new SSCI report in comparison to similar ones in the Phase I report – by the then-Democratic minority [Document 12] – reveals identical complaints regarding the conduct of the investigation. The present Republican minority’s charge that the report errs on politicization because both the Phase I SSCI and Silberman-Robb Commission concluded there was no evidence of this flies in the face of the strong assertions by the Democratic minority during Phase I that allegations of this type had not been taken seriously. Current Republican charges that the report erred by failing to check the public statements of Democrats against the intelligence are a red herring: they effectively rely upon the Bush administration’s success at hoodwinking political opponents and then take those opponents’ statements as authoritative evidence, an example of reverse logic. The SSCI staff rules which the Republican minority now says were used to shut it out of the investigation are the same ones a Republican majority previously relied upon to limit Democrats’ influence on the scope and content of the inquiry.

The preparation of white papers on both the United States and British sides also needs to be taken into account. That Bush and Blair each turned to their intelligence agencies for the papers is significant – they were evoking the imprimatur of secret intelligence to justify policy preferences. Both papers had the function of justification, not analysis, and neither government waited until it had compiled all the evidence before demanding these products. Neither government asked for intelligence estimates, fashioned in secret, in order to inform policy on Iraq. Instead, both Bush and Blair did want their intelligence agencies to carry out avowed political agendas. And the timing of the white paper drafts – now established as being in the summer of 2002, before there ever was a UN debate or a Security Council resolution – clearly indicates their true function. The accumulating weight of evidence currently supports the interpretation Scott McClellan gives, not that supplied by apologists for the Iraq war.

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1.8 Million Veterans Are Uninsured and At Risk

Posted on August 23, 2008 by Team VCS

August 22, 2008 – The U.S. health care system remains in a state of crisis. Despite incremental efforts at reform, the number of uninsured continues to grow, the cost of care continues to rise, and the safety and quality of care are questioned. The discussions, debates, proposed resolutions, and positions has been overwhelming, but very little emphasis has been placed on the 1.8 million military veterans in the U.S. who neither have health insurance nor receive ongoing care at the Veterans Health Administration (VHA)

Two months shy of the elections, debate on the campaign trail has heated up  over health care.  Presidential candidates; Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain  continue to tout  their position on health reform, few proposals have articulated a comprehensive solution for the health care system as it affects veterans. The United States spends more than $2 trillion a year on health care and we have some of the best medical researchers and most advanced technology in the world, but we have 47 million people without health insurance, and this is having a devastating effect on veterans and their families.

A study by Harvard Medical School and testimony given before the House Committee on Veterans Affairs by Dr. Stephanie J. Woolhandler, Associate Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, and Co-Founder, Physicians for a National Health Program documented the plight suffered by veterans and their families because of the health insurance crisis.

Of the 47 million people without health insurance, one out of every eight, or 12.2 percent, is a veteran or member of a veteran household. Specifically, the study said 1.8 million veterans and 3.8 million household members are uninsured.

In January 2008 the United States Department of Veteran Affairs extended its benefits to combat veterans. But of the 64.3{cd9ac3671b356cd86fdb96f1eda7eb3bb1367f54cff58cc36abbd73c33c82e1d} of uninsured veterans who were employed and the nearly nine out of ten (86.4{cd9ac3671b356cd86fdb96f1eda7eb3bb1367f54cff58cc36abbd73c33c82e1d}) that had worked within the past year did not have health coverage. Most uninsured veterans, like other uninsured Americans were in working families and many earned too little to afford health insurance, and too much to qualify for free care under Medicaid or VA means testing. One out of every four of the homeless in America is a veteran.

Going without health insurance is a huge risk for veterans, who often suffer from both physical and psychological conditions related to their time in the armed services. With a high percentage of minorities serving in the military, it also adds to the health problems in minority communities, where a disproportionate number of residents are already without access to quality health-care services.

Our health care system is a complexity, but I am hopeful in the foreseeable future our nation’s leaders will deliver a comprehensive solution to accessible, affordable, and high-quality health care for everyone including our veterans.

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PTSD Vet Gets Help from Service Dog

Posted on August 23, 2008 by Team VCS

August 23, 2008, Billings, MT – Post Traumatic Stress Disorder can cause life-long struggles with depression and flash-backs. Christina Avey was unsure when someone recommended she get a service dog. Making a mistake many do by thinking the animals only assist people with physical disabilities. But Christina is now very emotional about the way her new dog Zeus has changed her life.

Christina Avey is an army veteran. She served from 19-80 to 1986 and again in 1997. Christina no longer talks about the trauma that caused her Post Traumatic stress Disorder, but she lives with the consequences every day. She says since her diagnosis 11 years ago life has changed dramatically. “It’s destroyed my life.” says Avey. She says because of PTSD, she has trouble dealing with society in general and suffers from depression, nightmares and flashbacks. Now, 11 years later, Avey finally feels like she has hope. “I met another person who had a therapy animal, and for me I needed it more because I knew where I was heading. Deeper inside where I might not come out of my house anymore.”

Soon after Avey got in touch with Deb Bouwkamp, an instructor with Service Canines of Montana. Deb has trained service dogs for 13 years; but Zeus is the first animal she trained to help a PTSD patient. “It’s a very new concept. it’s not fully accepted around the U.S.” But Bouwkamp says medical professionals are recommending it.
And Avey is getting the word out with a web-site because she thinks this can help other veterans. “He is a bridge to a life that I had been missing. There’s people talking to me, there’s people talking to me that I had pushed away and didn’t want to talk to before. You lose trust with PTSD. He’s what I call a bridge to life.” says Avey. Bouwkamp says she sees a huge change in Avey since getting Zeus. “She called me and I had to ask who it was because it wasn’t the same sown voice, her voice has lifted.” It’s still a daily struggle for Avey, but she says she now feels something she hasn’t in a long time, safe. To see Avey’s web-site, click on connections on the Kule-8 website.

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Editorial Column: Why Whistle-Blowing is Patriotic

Posted on August 23, 2008 by Team VCS

August 23, 2008 – I recently witnessed instruments of music inspire patriotism at the Chicago Air and Water show. Actor Gary Sinise and the Lt. Dan Band — named for the character Sinise played in the film “Forrest Gump” — led a crowd of thousands in tribute to our wounded warriors. Actor Bill Murray threw care to the wind by parachuting from the sky with the Army’s Golden Knights.

The rally was attended by many wounded warriors, and it was beautiful to see how they were honored and given such attention by Murray and others.

Here in Texas, we honored those returning home with combat-related traumatic brain injury with a rally and 5K run on Flag Day.

All that served as a reminder that acts of patriotism come in many forms. I suggest that whistle-blowing of fraud, waste and mismanagement of the public trust and resources is also an act of commitment to the integrity of our democracy.

The Office of Special Counsel, an organization whose primary mission is to protect federal employees from prohibited personnel practices — especially reprisal for whistle-blowing — suggests that:

“A whistle-blower is an ordinary hero who helps America function when it wants to slip into self-interest and faction … Today, we hear of wasteful government bureaucracies, bloated hand-out programs, unheralded pork and corrupt self-dealing. While there is some truth in this, media over-coverage of such matters distracts us from focusing on solutions. Solutions lie with ordinary Americans. When we see something wrong, we need to blow the whistle … Is it easy doing these things? No, but it is far less easy for whistle-blowers themselves. Their history is one of being singled out and reprised against. It goes back far in mankind’s history, to Sophocles who wrote, ‘Nobody likes the man who brings bad news.’ “

An updated watch-word to potential whistle-blowers might be that everyone loves to admire a whistle-blower but no one wants to hire one. However, we as citizens all need to blow the whistle to protect the integrity of our democracy, use of public funds and resources and to uphold our commitment and services to those, as Lincoln said, who have “borne the battle,” our wounded heroes of war.

With a new generation of veterans, many thousands of whom have traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder or other chronic problems, we must not lose sight of our obligation to those who have served us.

Van Boven’s VA disclosures led to the discovery of hundreds of thousands of dollars of waste, funding of questionable science by an untrained investigator and suspect billing practices by a contractor working without a contract at Central Texas VA.

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Is the Iraq War Winding Down?

Posted on August 23, 2008 by Team VCS

August 22, 2008 – In the middle of the Vietnam War, aides to President Lyndon Johnson spoke of seeing “the light at the end of the tunnel” — that is, until the Tet offensive early in 1968 showed the light to be that of an onrushing train. Are we finally seeing light at the end of the Iraq tunnel? It’s messy, it’s not what we were promised, and it’s not over yet… but the basic outlines of the conflict’s conclusion are emerging.

The Iraq war seems to be ending in what the Bush Administration will argue is victory. Granted, it’s not the kind of fledging democracy that will spread like wildfire to neighboring nations in the Middle East. And Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent move against elements of the Sunni Awakening Councils, which have been instrumental in helping American forces secure order, could reignite violence. But it is amazing how much things have changed.

Casualties among both Iraqis and Americans are way down (the 13 Americans killed in July was the lowest monthly toll since the war began, 18 have died so far this month). The Iraq economy, fueled by oil production, is on the upswing. The Iraqi army is growing in size and skill. And, in perhaps the biggest surprise of all, Washington has acceded to Baghdad’s wish and tentatively agreed to pull all of its combat troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said this week that al-Qaeda is “in disarray” in northern Iraq and largely out of Baghdad. “There is a sense of normalcy that’s returning to Iraq,” he told Pentagon reporters. Austin spoke of a recent visit to a major outdoor market in Mosul that was “overflowing” with Iraqis, something he said “would not have been possible just a couple of months ago.”

Timing is everything in war, as in politics. The draft withdrawal agreement was signed on the eve of the Democratic convention and takes away a lever that anti-war activists had planned to use to push their party back into the White House. And while it’s too soon to know how quickly U.S. troops will be leaving Iraq (and in what numbers), the tentative agreement opens the door for strengthening the American military presence in Afghanistan, where both parties agree it is desperately needed. Tens of thousands of U.S. troops will leave Iraq next year if present trends continue, Pentagon officials say. Defense Secretary Robert Gates may soon decide to divert a pair of 4,000-strong combat brigades — now slated to head to Iraq next spring — to Afghanistan instead.

Yet even if this is the beginning of the end, the war ended up being far from the “cakewalk” some war boosters predicted. More than five years after it began, there remain about 145,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. A total of 4,146 Americans military personnel have died, and 30,324 more have been wounded. There have been more than 100,000 violent Iraqi deaths. The war, even if it were to stop tomorrow, will likely end up costing U.S. taxpayers more than $1 trillion, including the cost of long-term care for wounded veterans.

It is important to acknowledge that the so-called deal remains unfinished, and, even when it is inked, will contain loopholes big enough to drive an M-1 tank through. First, while the Bush Administration has agreed to the 2011 deadline, there are other outstanding issues that must be settled before a final pact is concluded. Key among them is whether or not U.S. personnel in Iraq will be subject to any Iraqi jurisdiction if they are suspected of wrongdoing. U.S. officials initially wanted such protection for U.S. contractors as well as soldiers, but the Iraqis have been steadily peeling away at such immunity. Once these issues are settled, the pact will have to be approved by Iraq’s fractious parliament.

Secondly, the agreement applies only to combat troops, meaning about half of the U.S. military personnel now in Iraq could remain there in supporting and training roles beyond 2011.

Finally, the draft agreement could be derailed by an upsurge in violence. The Iraqis have been telling reporters it contains specific dates, including June 30, 2009, for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities and towns, and December 31, 2011, for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from the country. But Bush Administration officials, having been burned repeatedly since launching the invasion for brandishing overly optimistic predictions, now seem allergic to setting such precise deadlines. They instead prefer to label them “aspirational time horizons.” Given its track record at predicting the course of events in Iraq since March 18, 2003, that’s probably wise.

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Jury Chosen in Trial of Ex-Marine Accused of Crimes in Combat

Posted on August 22, 2008 by Team VCS

August 19, 2008 – More than 50 prospective jurors answered questions in federal court in Riverside on Tuesday about whether their views on the Iraq war would affect their verdict for a former Marine sergeant accused of crimes in combat.

By the end of the day, the federal judge and lawyers had questioned 54 members of the jury pool that reached nearly 100 and agreed on 12 jurors and two alternates.

The trial of Jose Luis Nazario Jr., 28, stems from accusations he took part in the killings of four unarmed detainees during Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, Iraq, in November 2004.

The former Riverside police officer faces a maximum of 30 years in prison if convicted on the charges of voluntary manslaughter, assault with a dangerous weapon and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence.

Under a little-known 2000 law, Nazario is being tried in federal court because he had left the service before he was arrested a year ago. This is the first time a veteran has been tried for actions in combat in civilian court.

The trial is expected to last one to two weeks with opening statements scheduled for Thursday. The one-day break in the case will allow the copyright infringement trial between Mattel Inc., the creator of Barbie, and MGA Entertainment Inc., the creator of Bratz dolls, to finish.

In the brief opening statements made to the jury pool, Assistant U.S. Attorney Charles Kovats said the fighting was bloody and fierce in Fallujah.

He said Nazario was trained to take prisoner the four men found during a house search.

“Instead he shot and killed and ordered members of his squad to shoot and kill these men,” Kovats said.

Defense attorney Kevin McDermott said the government has the burden to prove that the killings took place.

“Not only are you deciding Jose Nazario’s fate but that of many others,” he told the jury.

U.S. District Court Judge Stephen Larson asked each of 54 jurors a list of 14 questions.

He inquired whether they had heard about the case, whether anyone close to them had served in the armed forces and whether their views on the war in Iraq would prevent them from being fair and impartial.

Several prospective jurors said they are against the war and the strain it puts on the men and women who are serving. Many had friends and family serving or who had served. A few were veterans themselves.

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DND Says 14.1{cd9ac3671b356cd86fdb96f1eda7eb3bb1367f54cff58cc36abbd73c33c82e1d} of Soldiers Returning from Afghanistan Have OSI and PTSD [Canada]

Posted on August 22, 2008 by Team VCS

August 4, 2008 – Some 14 per cent of Canadian soldiers returning from Afghanistan reported experiencing symptoms of operational stress injuries, and 6.5 per cent of that total experienced symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, or both, according to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces Health Services Group.

Maj. André F. Berdais, a senior public affairs officer, at the Canadian Forces Health Service Group, in an email response to The Hill Times, said 85 per cent of the members of the Canadian Forces report “good health,” but 14.1 per cent reported “experiencing certain symptoms of one or more six common mental health problems—major depression, minor depression, suicidal thoughts, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, or PTSD.”

Maj. Berdais said “more specifically, symptoms of PTSD, depression, or both were seen in 6.5 per cent of returning CF personnel. These are by far the most common operational stress injuries seen in the CF.”

However, some believe that figure is low.

“The only thing you have to remember is the aspect that if it is PTSD, it’s the post-thing, we don’t know when it will transpire, that’s just the snapshot right now. Cumulatively, over time, how many of 1,000 people who were in Afghanistan eventually get it, because some may only get PTSD or symptoms of it five years from now, that’s what’s bizarre about it. That’s a snapshot in time of whenever they did the stats, if you want to do it cumulatively overtime who knows how many [will develop PTDS],” said Fred Doucette, a CF veteran who served as a peacekeeper in Cyprus and in Bosnia and was medically released in 2001 from the military after he was diagnosed with PTSD.

Mr. Doucette now runs peer support groups for the Department of National Defence in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island for members of the Canadian Forces who have operational stress injuries, including PTSD.

Mr. Doucette said another issue with the DND’s statistics on mental health among soldiers is that the numbers do not take into account former soldiers who are no longer with the military.

He said that when a veteran dies, Veteran Affairs does not keep track of whether or not it was a suicide, and therefore it gets streamed into provincial suicide statistics and does not contribute to the information on mental health issues for former soldiers.

Also, according to statistics from the Canadian Forces Health Services Group, 52 per cent of CF members with PTSD-related concerns were already in care soon after their return from deployment, which they say is an indication that efforts from within the Forces to decrease the stigma around PTSD and facilitate early care-seeking have been successful.

“In the last two years, [there’s] been a real effort to increase the number of mental health professionals. So, screening and serving the Armed Forces personnel, we’ve made a post-deployment decompression time so coming out of the theatre they have a little time to adjust before coming back to society,” said Conservative MP James Lunney (Nanaimo-Alberni, B.C.), who serves on the House National Defence Committee, last week in an interview with The Hill Times.

“[We’ve] almost doubled the number of mental health professionals, which is difficult knowing there’s a shortage of health professionals all across the country. So, you’re competing with the public sector, in general, for health professionals who are in demand all over the country. By and large, we know that there’ve been deficiencies in the past, the Armed Forces are making great strides in moving forward and trying to address those needs,” Mr. Lunney said.

The committee has been working on a report, expected to come out in the fall, on the state of mental health services in the Canadian Forces, with a special emphasis on PTSD.

Auditor General Sheila Fraser issued a report in 2007 where she took issue with the inadequate availability of mental health care for CF members.

The military is hoping to double the number of mental health staff by 2009 from 229 to 447, at an estimated cost of $98-million.

NDP defence critic Dawn Black (New Westminster-Coquitlam, B.C.), who also sits on the House National Defence Committee, said she thinks this number is still insufficient and that CF members are not getting the care they need.

Ms. Black said she believes one of the biggest barriers to soldiers getting adequate treatment for mental health issues is the enduring stigma in the military around the condition.

“Canadian Forces personnel came form different parts of Canada but told basically the same story, that they were not believed, that they were made fun of, that they were belittled. That they were told to, ‘Suck it up soldier, just get on with it,’ ” Ms. Black said last week.

“I found the consistency of the testimony from soldiers and their families who testified as well of the barriers towards treatment and the barriers towards receiving mental health services that they needed to become well again, and strong again, which is not there for them. Each of those soldiers, and each of their families told basically the same story, and if anything surprised me it was just how similar each of these stories were,” said Ms. Black.

Ms. Black said there are also things the military could be doing, in terms of the way soldiers in the field are dealt with, to help safeguard the mental health of CF personnel.

In June The Toronto Star reported claims that Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan were being told to ignore incidents of sexual assault among the civilian population.

The claims were made by several Canadian Forces chaplains, and one solider, Cpl. Travis Schouten, who said he witnessed an Afghan national army solider abusing a young boy in 2006.

The story said Cpl. Schouten now suffers from “severe post-traumatic stress disorder.”

Ms. Black said she can’t comment on the specifics of the case, but she did say that she raised it in an in-camera session of House Defence Committee and that she hopes the issue will be addressed in the final report.

“I’ve certainly been in contact, for over a year now, with that young solider,” she said. “I wrote to Defence Minister MacKay about that case months, and months ago.”

Ms. Black said she has not received any “meaningful” response about the issue from the Mr. MacKay (Central Nova, N.S.).

Dr. Joyce Belliveau, a clinical psychologist who has worked extensively with members and veterans of the Canadian Forces, said she went to Ottawa to testify before the House of Commons Defence Committee because the mental healthcare system for Canadian Forces in New Brunswick, where she practises, was “going to hell in a hand basket.”

She echoed some of the Auditor General’s criticisms, that soldiers were getting “lost” in the system and the military was not adequately monitoring their care.

Dr. Belliveau said that in the 12 years that she has been working with CF members with operational stress injuries (OSI) she has seen a “remarkable” improvement in the attitude towards mental health issues in the military.

She said also that she has noticed improvement in some areas of mental health care, for instance, now there are social workers stationed in Afghanistan to offer counseling to CF members.

“I had an email from a former client of mine who is in Afghanistan right now, and she was having some difficulties and she was able to go see the clinical social worker who is there in Afghanistan. That wasn’t available to people who were on tours before, so that to me is very preemptive,” said Dr. Belliveau.

Dr. Belliveau said that, despite some positive steps by the military, there are still CF members who are waiting as long as 18 months to receive treatment.

She said that she would like to see recommendations in the House Defence Committee’s report that there be more qualified clinical staff available to soldiers and veterans because right now the military is relying too much on “bachelors level” social workers who she feels aren’t adequately qualified to address all of the needs of CF personnel suffering from an OSI.

Dr. Belliveau also said that the system needs to be improved so that soldiers can get treatment more quickly, and their care also needs to be tracked better from when they enter the system.

“Research has demonstrated that people who are actually treated for PTSD and OSI are good to go back to theatre. They know what it is, they know how to handle it they and know what to do in the situation. It’s a treatable disorder; people can go into remission, we don’t say they’re cured but they go into remission and with proper therapy they’re given all sorts of tools to stabilize, to deal with the traumas and, as they say, they’re ‘Good to go,’ and they are.”

Maj. Berdais said the CF Health Services provides a “full spectrum, high-quality, health services to Canada’s fighting forces wherever they serve. It is responsible for all aspects of health care and well-being of CF members, at home and abroad, including mental health care.”

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2 Marines Refusing to Testify Ordered to Court

Posted on August 22, 2008 by Team VCS

August 22, 2008, Riverside, CA – A judge has ordered two Marines to disclose whether they will testify against their former squad leader who is the first to be tried under a federal law that allows the prosecution of former combatants for war crimes.

The two Marines – Sgt. Ryan Weemer and Sgt. Jermaine Nelson – risk being jailed Friday if they refuse to obey the order to testify against Jose Luis Nazario Jr. The two have already been jailed twice for refusing to testify before a federal grand jury looking into allegations that Nazario shot and killed unarmed detainees in November 2004 in Fallujah, Iraq.

Weemer and Nelson haven’t accepted an offer of immunity and therefore do not have protection against self-incrimination. Both face courts-martial on charges of unpremeditated murder and dereliction of duty for their alleged roles in the killings.

It’s the latest development in the first-of-its-kind federal trial in which a civilian jury will decide whether the alleged actions of a former service member in combat violated of the rules of engagement.

“It’s going to take a lot of explanation for these folks to understand,” said Kevin McDermott, one of Nazario’s attorneys.

During opening statements Thursday, a prosecutor told the jury that they would hear testimony of several witnesses to help them understand the Marine Corps, such as the differences between a battalion, a regiment and a squad.

“You will get ‘Marine Corps 101,'” said U.S. Assistant Attorney Charles Kovats.

Jurors got their first lesson from Kovats and McDermott during their respective opening statements about the events that led to November 2004 battle of Fallujah, one of the fiercest battles of the Iraq war.

McDermott described the months leading up to the battle, including an incident in which the bodies of private security contractors were burned and hung from a bridge.

Kovats told the jury that Nazario and his Marines were under orders to move into Fallujah and clear it of insurgents on Nov. 9, 2004 – the opening day of the battle for the city.

Kovats described Nazario as a man who killed “unarmed, submissive, docile” detainees and encouraged men under his charge to do the same.

McDermott countered that Nazario killed insurgents in a city where every resident was looking for a fight.

Nazario, 28, is charged with one count of voluntary manslaughter on suspicion of killing or causing others to kill four unarmed detainees. He also faces one count of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence.

He has pleaded not guilty. If convicted of all the charges, he could face more than 10 years in prison.

The case came to light in 2006, when Nazario’s former squadmate Weemer volunteered details to a U.S. Secret Service job interviewer during a lie-detector screening that included a question about the most serious crime he ever committed.

Weemer was ordered this month to stand trial in military court on charges of unpremeditated murder and dereliction of duty in the killing of an unarmed detainee in Fallujah. He has pleaded not guilty.

Several Marines allege Nazario shot two Iraqi men who had been detained while his squad searched a house, according to a Naval Criminal Investigative Service criminal complaint.

The complaint claims four Iraqi men were killed during the action.

Nelson, 26, is slated to be court-martialed in December. Although he has not entered a plea in military court, Nelson’s attorney has said his client is innocent.

Nelson and Weemer were jailed in May and June for contempt of court for refusing to testify against Nazario before a federal grand jury believed to be investigating the case. Both were released and returned to Camp Pendleton.

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U.S. Military Halts Shipment of Deadly Toxins

Posted on August 22, 2008 by Team VCS

August 21, 2008, Washington, DC – The military routinely used FedEx to ship biological warfare agents Military leaders have suspended some activities at biological research laboratories to review safety rules for some of the world’s deadliest germs and toxins, including how they are shipped through FedEx and other civilian carriers.

Defense officials said the action is part of a larger review ordered when a researcher at an Army lab committed suicide last month after being told he would be charged in the 2001 anthrax attacks that killed five people.

Navy and Air Force officials told The Associated Press on Thursday that they are temporarily halting shipments of dangerous biological agents to and from their medical and research labs.

They also said that during the review, they won’t allow any employees to handle such materials inside their labs unless the employee is enrolled in a special program to do so — or monitored by someone who is enrolled.

The Army also said for the first time Thursday that it had halted it shipments from Aug. 8-14 for a similar review of procedures — and then tightened some.

The Army has six, Navy five and Air Force two labs where biomedical research is done to support counterterrorism efforts, research protection for the armed forces and keep track of infectious diseases across the globe. Employees work with a range of dangerous materials such as anthrax and germs that cause Avian flu and encephalitis.

All such Navy material “is accounted for and none has been compromised. A thorough inventory will be a part of this stand down,” said Cmdr. Jeff A. Davis, a Navy spokesman, using the military term for a suspension of activities.

The Air Force, which said its labs handle bacterial, viral, fungal and toxin agent samples, said its samples were all accounted for as well.

‘An abundance of caution’
Davis said Navy Secretary Donald Winter had ordered the suspension of activities and review “out of an abundance of caution” to make sure the handling of sensitive biological material is safe at its labs — two in the United States and one each in Peru, Egypt and Indonesia.

Air Force spokesman Maj. Richard Johnson said the same was true for his service, adding that neither of the Air Force labs had made any shipments of dangerous biological materials since 2002, and one had accepted only two shipments since then.

The review also will be trying to determine whether employees who need to be are enrolled in the so-called Personnel Reliability Program — a system that requires personal screening, drug screening, evaluation of medical and work records and then provides for follow-up through evaluations by supervisors, fellow workers and others.

The Army announced early this month that it created a team of medical and other military experts to review security measures at its biodefense labs, including Fort Detrick, Md., where scientist Bruce Ivins worked when he became the suspect in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks.

To date, the Army has offered no explanation for how its biosecurity system, which is set up to identify mentally troubled workers, failed to flag Ivins for years.

Officials said Thursday that the review continues and that some changes already have been made at Fort Detrick and nationwide, including an updating of rules for commercial shipments of biological materials by ground.

Concern after anthrax attacks
Companies previously had to have personnel certified by the government for handling hazardous materials and now also will have to provide two drivers for the deliveries — both with classified security clearances, said Paul Boyce, an Army spokesman.

The service also is working on tightening safety procedures for commercial air shipments of biological materials.

FedEx spokeswoman Sandra Munoz said she was unaware of any changes in procedures. Shipping of dangerous materials is common, is carried out by a number of companies and is done by universities, research centers and others in the civilian and military world.

Accidents happen and there have been cases in which shipments have gone missing, been damaged or lost. In one case reported to the government, plague bacteria that was supposed to be delivered to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in 2003 somehow ended up in Belgium and was incinerated safely.

“The issue of properly safeguarding biological agents and toxins has become a concern following recent developments in the 2001 anthrax case,” Davis said. “While Navy standards already meet or exceed those of civilian laboratories that handle the same materials, the Navy is taking proactive steps to critically self-assess its programs.”

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