VA Blasted Over Veterans Suicides

May 6, 2008 – The chairman of the House Veterans Committee blasted the Veterans Affairs Department on Tuesday, accusing the agency of criminal failure to respond to evidence of rising suicide rates among former soldiers.

“This is a matter of life and death,” said Chairman Bob Filner, D-California, “and I think there was criminal negligence in the way this was handled.”

In a follow-up hearing on the veteran suicide issue, Filner insisted the VA either ignored critical suicide data or covered up the numbers.

“The pattern is deny, deny, deny,” Filner told Veterans Secretary Jim Peake, “then when facts seemingly come to disagree with the denial, you cover up, cover up, cover up.”

The committee was reacting to a December hearing in which Ira Katz, the VA’s chief for mental health, insisted suicide data reported in the media had been exaggerated.

Three days after his testimony, Filner said, the agency indicated some alarming statistics could, in fact, be correct.

Peake responded with a list of statistics by age and gender, insisting such data can be incomplete and easily manipulated.

He confronted one of the most heated figures, an estimate that 1,000 veterans a month are attempting suicide.

“I can appreciate that the number of 1,000 suicide attempts a month might be shocking,” he said, “but in a system as large as ours … and consistent with the literature, we might well expect a larger number of attempts than that.”

Peake denied there was any attempt to downplay the numbers on suicides among veterans.

“I believe that Dr. Katz was not trying to obfuscate,” Peake told reporters afterward, “I have no intention of relieving Dr. Katz.”

Peake, answering questions in a hallway after his testimony, said “maybe we should have been looking at this sooner, but we didn’t have that infrastructure in place.”

He described the data as “erratic,” and said “it means nothing until we start to refine it, and make sure we have good data. And that’s what the American public deserves, is good data.”

In earlier testimony, Peake repeatedly testified he would not condone a cover-up.

“Our intent is to be forthcoming,” he told the committee. “If we’ve got something to hide, we shouldn’t be hiding it. We should be doing something about it.”

Anger was evident across the hearing room Tuesday.

Rep. Harry Mitchell, a Democrat from Arizona was particularly irate at what he sees as stonewalling by the VA. He said he has spent four months requesting specifics on what resources the agency needs to handle the suicide issue.

“That’s not just an insult to me, it’s an insult to me and our veterans,” he said.

He was told to file a Freedom of Information Act request, a method more commonly reserved for the public and media, not congressional committee members, he said.

“I’ve tried to be reasonable,” Mitchell told the committee, “I’ve tried to work with Secretary Peake’s office, but Mr. Chairman, my patience is at an end.”

Mitchell told Peake that if he does not receive the documents by Friday, he will push for a committee subpoena.

In the past, Peake has denied the agency suppressed or ignored key suicide records.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Comments Off on VA Blasted Over Veterans Suicides

Testimony of Dr. James Peake, VA Secretary

May 6, 2008 – The purpose of this testimony is to provide information on the issues related to veterans suicide: what VA knows, including the sources of information we use; what we do not know, and what we intend to do about that problem; and what we have been doing to directly address the issues of suicide from a clinical perspective, and how we are expanding our outreach, even as we seek better ways to measure the problem.

The language used to talk about suicide is complex. Suicidal behavior exists along a continuum; from thinking about ending one’s life, to developing a plan to do so, to non-fatal suicidal behavior, to actually ending one’s own life. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has come up with some definitions of suicidal behavior which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has adopted.

CDC has defined suicidal ideation as having thoughts of harming or killing oneself; a suicide attempt is a non-fatal, self-inflicted destructive act in which a person has either an explicit or an inferred intent to die; self-inflicted injuries are suicidal and non-suicidal behaviors such as self mutilation; and suicide itself refers to a fatal self-inflicted destructive act in which there is an explicit or an inferred intent to die.

Suicide is a relatively infrequent act. Although suicide is the 11th leading cause of death among Americans of all ages, when studying any group over short periods of time the number of actual suicides will be low. Only very large studies conducted over long periods of time allow the accumulation of enough observations to make meaningful comparisons.

Suicide risks vary by age, gender and other factors. For Americans in general, the highest rates of suicide are among older men, but middle-aged veterans appear to take their own lives in greater proportions than their elders.

Suicides often occur in close proximity, especially after media attention. This kind of behavior is called “copycat behavior,” or the “Werther effect,” after a wave of suicides in 18th century Europe following the publication of a book by Goethe. It can be difficult to tell when a cluster represents a temporary trend, or a sustained trend.

Official suicide rates based on death certificate data can be incomplete. There are regional differences in how suicides are defined; how ambiguous cases are classified; and how thoroughly coroners or medical examiners investigate causes of death. In some areas religious traditions, life insurance policies, or legal sanctions may lead to underreporting. The increased awareness of the relationship between mental illness and suicide may cause an apparent increase in the reported number of suicides—without the rates actually differing.

And finally, reconstructing the events leading up to a death is difficult. Death certificates provide only a limited amount of information about actual causes of death, so researchers need to contact those closest to the victim to understand the true circumstances of death, and the factors that contributed to a death. Family members and others can often provide inaccurate or incomplete information.

The way researchers determine incidences for suicide is to express the number of suicides in a population per hundred thousand people per year. Because suicide rates vary by age, with both older and younger people at higher risk, any rates that attempt to make comparisons across different populations by year must be adjusted to allow for accurate comparisons. One way to do so is to look at age specific rates of suicides and compare them to the U.S. population as distributed by age. CDC uses the U.S. population census figures for 2000 to do this.

Another method of adjustment is called the standardized mortality ratio. This ratio compares the number of observed deaths in a defined group with the number of deaths that would be expected if that group had the same age-specific rates as a standard population.

Finally, there are sophisticated statistical techniques which can be used to derive a relative risk that take into account multiple characteristics of individuals, such as gender, race and ethnicity, medical conditions and other factors.

Each of these methods of adjustment has their strengths and their weaknesses. Each is potentially misleading when comparing populations with very different age or gender distributions. A careful analysis of suicide rates that is age and gender specific is both necessary and appropriate.

Because of this, VA has long subjected its own data, that of the Department of Defense, and data from nationally-accepted statistical sources to careful and painstaking analysis to obtain the truth about veterans’ suicide.

A suicide rate is normally calculated by describing the number of cases occurring in a defined group over a specific period of time. These are called incidences of suicide, and to avoid expressing incidences as very small fractions, suicide rate is typically expressed in terms of the number of suicides per 100,000 persons per year.

To make accurate comparisons of suicide rates, such as trends over time or comparisons among veterans and non-veterans, three important elements are needed. First is an accurate count of events for both groups, called the numerator. Second is an accurate estimate of the total population at risk, called the denominator. And third, as already mentioned, there needs to be an adjustment for age and gender differences between populations.

HOW VA COLLECTS SUICIDE DATA
VA relies on multiple sources of information to identify deaths that are potentially due to suicide. This includes VA’s own Beneficiary Identification and Records Locator Subsystem, called BIRLS; records from the Social Security Administration; and data compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics in its National Death Index.

This is a painstaking and difficult process for VA and for others, best illustrated by the fact that suicide data from the Centers for Disease Control and prevention are available only through 2005. Calculating suicide rates specifically for veterans is made even more difficult by the fact that the National Death Index does not include information about whether a deceased individual is a veteran or not.

The National Death Index is simply a central computerized index of death record information on file in the vital statistics offices of every state. The Index is compiled from computer files submitted by State vital statistics offices. Death records are added to the file annually, about twelve months after the end of a calendar year. CDC uses this data to compile its statistics on American death rates.

Given that the NDI does not indicate veteran status, VA regularly submits requests for information to NDI. Because the system contains a list of all Americans who have died, and because of the capabilities of its Electronic Health Record system, VA is able to send NDI a list of all patients who have not been treated at any VA medical centers in the past twelve months and before, to see if they are still among the living.

NDI checks this list against their records, and tells VA which veterans have died, and the cause of their death as listed on the veterans’ death certificates. From this information, VA is able to learn the approximate number of veterans under its care who have died of suicide, and to use that information to make comparisons on rates of suicide among those veterans and all other Americans.

This information tells VA about the suicide rates among veterans under its care, but says nothing about the rates of suicide among veterans who are not currently in the system. For those veterans, an even more complicated process has to be followed in order to estimate rates. VA obtains regular updates from the Department of Defense’s Defense Manpower Data Center on soldiers separating from the military. Those new veterans immediately become part of total population and suicide calculations.

In 2002, the CDC established the National Violent Death Reporting System, or NVDRS. NVDRS today is fully implemented in 16 states, and collects data on violent deaths, including suicides. NVDRS collects data on violent deaths from a variety of sources, including death certificates, police reports, medical examiner and coroner reports, and crime laboratories. Veteran status is included in the database.

Together, these sources offer a comprehensive picture of the circumstances surrounding homicides and suicides. This, too, is a time-consuming and difficult task, and standard reports from NVDRS are available only through 2005.

Because NVDRS is a comprehensive source of data, and because it indicates whether or not a coroner has indicated that the deceased is a veteran, VA is able to obtain counts of the number of suicides among all veterans in the sixteen stats that have fully implemented this system, broken down by sex, age, race and state. To summarize, determining suicide rates among veterans is a challenging puzzle. Multiple data sources must be used, and data must be carefully checked and rechecked. Each system helps obtain a piece of the complicated puzzle that constitutes the process of accurately estimating rates of veteran suicides.

These are time-consuming processes—but they are the best ways VA knows to obtain aggregate data on suicide. The weaknesses inherent in this method are clear.

First, the CDC’s manual for completion of death certificates states that the determination of whether or not someone is a veteran should usually be done by funeral directors. The information available to directors is limited, and their willingness to investigate the question of veteran status varies. Generally, these directors allow families to self-certify their response to the question of whether their loved one was a veteran; an approach fraught with pitfalls. In addition, funeral directors may not be clear on whether a young person died on active duty, or shortly after leaving the service.

Second, the classification of a death as suicide is dependent on the work of coroner’s offices throughout America. This paper has already discussed issues related to coroner determinations: regional differences in definitions; the manner in which ambiguous cases are classified; the level of investigative determination; religious traditions, and legal sanctions all create difficulties in data reliability.

And third, data takes a very long time to assemble. Neither NDI nor NVDRS has released reports of data newer than 2005—and it is midway through 2008 at present.

There are actions VA can take, and is taking, to improve the reliability and the speed of the data the Department is obtaining and providing to Congress. First, VA has begun negotiations with NVDRS staff that will provide information from all of NVDRS’ sources (death certificates, police reports, medical examiner and coroner reports, and crime laboratories) on a monthly and quarterly basis, as they are received by NVDRS.

VA will not be able to determine when there is sufficient information to provide full and publishable data—only NVDRS can do that—but will be able to examine and analyze these reports in a way that will allow the Department to spot suicide trends by age, sex and even region more quickly and to take action in those areas.

The Department will also systematically assess its efforts to inform funeral directors about the importance of determining whether or not a person who has died of suicide is or is not a veteran, and what sorts of information to consider in making that determination.

VA will also investigate working directly with state vital records offices, as the NDI does, to obtain information on veteran suicides directly from them.

And finally, VA has a new way of obtaining information on both suicides and suicide attempts: the Department’s suicide prevention coordinators.

Until VA committed itself last year to providing full time suicide prevention coordinators at each of its 153 hospitals, it could provide no useful number of attempted suicides among patients. Last October, a standardized definition of suicide attempts was developed and coordinators were asked to begin to count the number of such attempts of which they were aware.

VA’s definition of a suicide attempt included any behaviors that might have potentially allowed veterans to injure themselves, when there was evidence that the veteran had the intent to kill himself or herself—whether or not he or she was actually injured. The definition also included events in which a veteran was rescued, an attempt thwarted, or a veteran changed his or her mind after taking an initial action.

On February 13, 2008, an internal email from VA’s Deputy Chief of Patient Care Services for Mental Health discussed the existence of this information. In this email, he suggested 1,000 veterans a month under VA care were being reported as attempting suicide, and was concerned about disclosing the information.

The data was not sent to CBS because of his concerns.

The number of attempts referenced was based on only three months worth of data, too short a time period to determine if it was reliable.

The data was demonstrably not accurate. Even now, six months after collecting data began, the reports indicate that a number of states have suspiciously low reporting rates—and there is remarkable variability among individual VA facilities throughout the United States, due either to regional variability in suicide rates, differences in the manner in which individual suicide coordinators reported data, or both.

VA’s suicide prevention coordinators were new to their jobs, and new to their tasks. There was a great deal of uncertainty over “borderline calls,” and many of them were just beginning to make the community and in-hospital contacts that are essential in making an accurate count of the number of suicide attempts among patients.

VA is addressing the problem of the accuracy of suicide coordinators’ data in a number of important ways; by regularly reviewing the data the Department receives, and educating coordinators on the proper way to collect and report this information;

And VA is regularly reviewing difficult “calls” with its suicide coordinators—and encouraging them to meet the right people in their communities to obtain additional data.

In the near future, the Department intends to ask suicide prevention coordinators for the names of all those in their facility who have attempted suicide. This will allow further refinement of this data by checking the electronic medical records of individual veterans whose names have been reported as having attempted suicide. VA will learn how this information has been entered into the health record, and how practitioners have incorporated this information into the treatment plan for the individual whose record is being reviewed—with important implications for preventing suicide throughout VA’s system.

VA’s suicide coordinators are providing another important service; they are providing an additional source of data on the number of completed suicides at their facilities. This data, too, has significant problems: while VA can tell with considerable accuracy how many veterans commit suicide within its facilities, suicide coordinators have both limited time and contacts among coroners and funeral directors to provide accurate counts of the numbers who have died of suicide in the community.

While coordinators will be encouraged to continue to make those contacts, and to attempt to refine the accuracy of the numbers of dead they submit, VA believes that the focus of suicide prevention coordinators must be on preventing suicide among the living. Epidemiologists and researchers, using the data sources described above, will be the ones to learn more from those who have been lost.

Before turning to the actual data, here is a brief explanation of some data which has been widely attributed to VA, but which, in fact, is not the Department’s. On March 20, 2008, CBS aired a story on veterans’ suicide which included a statement in which the network said it had “obtained from VA” the information that there had been 790 attempted suicides among veterans under the Department’s care in all of 2007.

VA has since reviewed its records to try to understand where CBS might have gotten their information, and believes the number stemmed from a response to a Freedom of Information Act Request CBS made to the Veterans Health Administration’s Freedom of Information Act Officer on December 20, 2007; a request that was subsequently modified on January 29, 2008. VA provided CBS with the information they asked for–information in the Department’s National Patient Care Data base for the years 2000 through 2007, broken down by year, state, age group, gender and race.

This data provides a breakdown of why veterans were seen in VA’s hospitals and clinics by International Classification of Diseases code. Once such code is “Suicide and other Self-Inflicted Injuries.” CBS apparently counted the total number of veterans for whom that code was entered—and came up with 790 attempts for 2007.

That number, unfortunately, is not at all useful if the purpose of the count is to determine the total number of suicides and attempts among veterans under VA’s care. Some people who attempt suicide, but do not die, do not then present directly to VA for care. Others do not admit that their injuries were due to suicide attempts until a counselor discusses their situation with them. And still others treat their own wounds without seeing a clinician; the attempt is only revealed later, during counseling. CBS’s number, while arithmetically correct, is actually misleading.

VA’s DATA ON SUICIDES AND ATTEMPTS
To review what we do know specifically, let us compare veterans’ rates of suicide to non-veterans rates. The source of the base data is the National Death Index, a product of the National Center for Health Statistics of the Department of Health and Human Services. The most current complete data in this area is from 2005; 2006 data should be released soon. The overall rates of suicide for men and women from 2001 through 2005 are shown in Tables 1 and 2. It is important to separate the rates for men and women. By doing so, we see that men have a higher rate of suicide than women; a rate that is statistically significant. It is also important to separate these figures by age groupings, because there are significant differences in that area as well. These tables provide that information as well.

Table 1: Suicide Rates Per 100,000 Male U.S. Citizens by Fiscal Year and Age

 2001
 2002
 2003
 2004
 2005
 
All men
 23.18
 23.63
 23.20
 23.20
 23.19
 
18-29
 20.14
 20.08
 19.38
 20.21
 19.35
 
30-64
 22.45
 23.10
 23.13
 23.00
 23.19
 
65+
 31.42
 31.81
 29.76
 29.01
 29.53
 

Table 2: Suicide Rates Per 100,000 Female U.S. Citizens by Fiscal Year and Age

 2001
 2002
 2003
 2004
 2005
 
All women
 5.22
 5.44
 5.42
 5.81
 5.65
 
18-29
 3.40
 3.67
 3.56
 3.91
 3.90
 
30-64
 6.28
 6.47
 6.57
 7.09
 6.78
 
65+
 3.88
 4.09
 3.79
 3.79
 3.99
 

Source: CDC’s WISQARS Injury Reporting System and CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics’ National Death Index

Tables 3 and 4 provide overall rates of suicide for male and female Veteran VA users, broken down into three age groups: 18 to 29; 30 to 64; and 65 and older.

Table 3: Suicide Rates Per 100,000 Male Veteran VA Users by Fiscal Year and Age

 2001
 2002
 2003
 2004
 2005
 
All Male VA users
 36.49
 41.58
 32.92
 35.40
 37.19
 
18-29
 27.75
 36.54
 35.64
 42.54
 26.94
 
30-64
 41.37
 46.32
 39.57
 38.44
 40.66
 
65+
 32.03
 37.03
 26.77
 32.09
 34.27
 

Table 4: Suicide Rates Per 100,000 Female Veteran VA Users by Fiscal Year and Age

 2001
 2002
 2003
 2004
 2005
 
All Female VA users
 9.87
 12.49
 9.00
 12.28
 13.59
 
18-29
 2.12
 15.75
 5.93
 7.41
 7.81
 
30-64
 11.99
 11.17
 10.76
 14.88
 13.96
 
65+
 6.58
 15.66
 3.95
 4.31
 17.60
 

Source: CDC’s National Center For Health Statistics’ National Death Index

These tables show that men, whether or not they are veterans, have a higher rate of suicide than women, in numbers that can be considered statistically significant. In addition, there are significant differences by age groupings. VA is able to make these comparisons, because it is able to match the names of veterans under our care whom we have not recently seen against the National Death Index. The Death Index then provides information on which of these men and women have died, and the cause of their death, including suicide.

What cannot be learned from this table is how the rates of suicide compare among all veterans, not only those in the VA system, to the general population. Doing so would require matching the full list of 24.5 million veterans against the National Death index to see how many of them have committed suicide. That currently is not possible. However, VA has matched up general population rates of suicide in the sixteen states reporting to NVDRS in 2005 against the rate of veteran suicide in those states.

Table 5: Suicide Rates per 100,000 in 16 States Among General Population vs. Veteran Population (Males) in 2005

 18-29
 30-64
 65+
 
All male VA users
 53.18
 36.85
 36.00
 
All male veterans
 44.99
 25.60
 31.52
 
All men
 20.36
 23.28
 30.51
 

Table 6: Suicide Rates per 100,000 in 16 States Among General Population vs. Veteran Population (Women) in 2005

 18-29
 30-64
 65+
 
All female VA users
 25.02
 15.81
 —
 
All female veterans
 15.35
 11.41
 3.66
 
All women
 4.35
 7.04
 3.63
 

Sources:

General Population: CDC’s Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System

OEF/OIF: DoD’s Defense Manpower Data Center

Suicide Data: CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics National Death Index and CDC’s National Violent Death Reporting System

At this time, there is no firm explanation of the reason for the disparity in rates between VA’s patients and other Americans. However, the veterans VA serves—as opposed to the overall population of American veterans—are older, sicker, and poorer than the general population of the United States. VA researchers believe this may account for at least some of the apparent differences.

VA’s summary of this data from 2001 through 2005 yields the following hypotheses:

Male veterans commit suicide at a somewhat higher rate than other men, but with varying statistical significance by age and over different years.
Within the group of male veterans there are differences in the age at which veterans die of suicide compared to what is seen in the general population—especially in the ages between 30 and 64, at which ages veterans have a statistically significant higher rate. This finding is reproducible over time.
Male veterans commit suicide at a higher rate than female veterans.
Within the group of female veterans, there is nearly a twofold increase over the rate of suicide for women in the general population, which is also variably statistically significant over the years and by age.
Clearly, returning service men and women represent a group of particular interest to the Nation. VA has a particular sense of urgency to understand why these men and women might be taking their own lives—and to intervene to prevent even a single suicide. To better understand suicide in this particular cohort, Dr. Han Kang of VA’s Environmental Epidemiological Service conducted a study that matched those service members who had served in the theater of operations, and who separated from service between 2002 and 2005 against the National Death Index.

Using this method, Dr. Kang found that 144 out of 490,346 separated OEF/OIF servicemembers committed suicide during that time, for an overall rate of 21.9 per 100,000. These are deaths only of men and women who separated from the military, and the data does not include any suicides while a servicemember was on active duty.

To compare this to other national norms, Dr. Kang looked at this cohort against the national averages discussed above. For OIF/OEF veterans who had deployed and separated from 2002-2005, the rate was slightly higher than would be expected in an age, gender and race matched general population, but not by a statistically significant amount. (Standardized mortality Ratio of 1.15 (p>.05.)

Dr. Kang also examined this data for differences in suicide rates between those who have used VA for care and those who have not. He found that 17.0 of every 100,000 OEF/OIF veterans who use VA for care take their own lives, compared to 24.0 of every 100,000 OEF/OIF veterans who do not use VA for care. This apparent advantage of VA care, though encouraging, is not statistically significant. In this group, the same is true for vet center users.

Male veterans 18-29 who used VA care took their own lives at a rate of 21.0 per 100,000, compared to veterans of that age who did not use VA for care, a group which died of suicide at a rate of 30.4 per 100,000—a statistically significant difference. Male veterans aged 30-64 who used VA for care died of suicide at a rate of 17.5 per 100,000, compared to a rate of 22.8 per 100,000 for their fellow veterans who did not use VA for care—not a statistically significant difference. Since only 3 women OEF/OIF veterans died of suicide through 2005, accurate rates within age groups cannot be calculated.

VA statisticians have worked with this now-older data in anticipation of follow-on data when the updated National Death Index information is available. Some of the insights they have found include the knowledge that there appears to be little variation in suicide risk by branch of service. Statisticians also found that a diagnosis of a mental disorder predicted a nearly 1.8 times higher suicide risk than the general population. This is consistent with what has been published in research journals regarding the non-veteran population, and emphasizes the importance of the Department’s mental health efforts.

All of this data comes from national data for suicide against those who are known, from VA’s data sources or from Department of Defense records, to be veterans. These national numbers must be used because VA’s clinical records do not capture, in any reliable or complete way, such events as suicides or suicide attempts.

The National Death Index, a national roll-up of information from coroners through the states, offers the most complete compilation of deaths among veterans and their causes—since VA may not know of a death even if it occurs in an area in which the Department has a facility. Because information on deaths continues to be updated as reports come in over time, confidence in the completeness of those numbers only comes after several years of data collection. VA is awaiting at this time the release of National Death Index compilations for 2006 for further analysis.

Regarding inpatient deaths: from 2000 through 2007, exactly 50 VA inpatients took their own lives while under the Department’s care, based on root cause analyses of the deaths received by VA’s Office of Patient Safety. That number varies from a high of 14 such suicides in 2002, to a low of 2 in 2007, when Veterans Health Administration officials demanded that all facilities pay special attention to improving their environment of care to reduce opportunities for suicide.

VA’s SUICIDE PREVENTION EFFORTS
The steps VA is taking to prevent suicide among veterans are important and significant. All VA employees have been given the message that even strong and resilient people can develop mental health conditions; care for those conditions is readily available and should be immediately provided; and treatment works.

VA has held two National VA Suicide Prevention Awareness Days throughout its system to focus all 200,000 health care employees on this issue. The first event focused on enhancing overall awareness of the issue. The second coincided with National Suicide Prevention Awareness Week. During that week, VA staff was trained on how to work with available prevention resources, including the hotline and the suicide prevention coordinators. VA will continue participating in Suicide Prevention Awareness Week activities every year, with a special focus on veterans and ways VA can continually improve its suicide prevention efforts.

The Department is in the process of adding 23 new vet centers throughout the Nation to provide more individual, group and family counseling to veterans of all wars who have served in combat zones, bringing the total number of vet centers to 232.

VA’s suicide prevention program includes two centers that conduct research and provide technical assistance in this area to all locations of care. One is the Mental Health Center of Excellence in Canandaigua, New York, which focuses in developing and testing clinical and public health intervention related to suicide risk and prevention. The other is the VISN 19 Mental Illness Research Education and Clinical Center in Denver, which focuses on research in the clinical and neurobiological sciences with special emphasis on issues related to suicide risk.

VA’s system of care also includes a suicide prevention call center, also located in Canandaigua, and the suicide prevention coordinators previously discussed, who are located at each of VA’s 153 hospitals. Altogether, VA has more than 200 mental health providers whose jobs are specifically devoted to preventing suicide among veterans.

To develop the suicide prevention call center, the Department has partnered with the Lifeline Program of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Those who call 1-800-273-TALK are asked to press “1” if they are a veteran, or are calling about a veteran.

Unlike other such hotlines, VA’s hotline is staffed solely by mental health professionals—24 hours a day, seven days a week. Hotline staff is trained in both crisis intervention strategies, and in issues relating specifically to veterans, such as traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress disorder. In emergencies, the hotline contacts local emergency resources such as police or ambulance services to ensure an immediate response.

Cards, pamphlets and posters—even refrigerator magnets—bearing the number are distributed by suicide prevention coordinators to at-risk veterans and their family members.

In addition, posters with hotline information are located throughout VA medical centers and clinics, and in all residential rehabilitation programs there are stickers on phones and by doors with the hotline number. Vet Centers also make this information available.

If the caller is a veteran enrolled with VA for care, the hotline staff is able to use the veteran’s electronic medical record during the call, if the veteran is a VA patient and willing to identify himself or herself. These records provide information that is invaluable during a crisis, including information on medications; the patient’s treatment plan; and who to contact during this emergency.

Staff can talk directly to the facility that is treating the veteran. They can place consults in the patient’s medical record, and are able to make arrangements to directly refer veterans to a Medical Center or Community-based outpatient clinic to be seen if that’s appropriate.

And hotline staff follows up on these referrals. They check patient’s records to see if consultations were completed; actions are taken; and follow-ups are ongoing. If the record does not show this information, the suicide prevention coordinator is called, ensuring that no referral is lost in the process.

From its beginnings in July, 2007 through the end of April, 16,414 calls have come to the hotline from veterans and 2125 family members or friends have called. These calls have led to 3464 referrals to suicide prevention coordinators and 885 rescues involving emergency services. 493 active duty servicemembers have also called.

Besides keeping track of veterans who have tried to take their own lives, suicide prevention coordinators receive referrals of those at risk for suicide from both the hotline and from providers in their facilities. They also ensure that care for these veterans is appropriate for their situations.

Coordinators educate their colleagues, veterans and families about risks for suicide. They provide enhanced treatment monitoring for veterans at risk and ensure that any missed appointments are followed up on. The coordinators work with the entire staff of their medical centers to maintain awareness of those who have previously attempted suicide, and ensure their care is enhanced to reduce the risk of renewed attempts.

They also work with patient safety officers to conduct quarterly safety inspections of inpatient psychiatry units, and coordinate staff education programs about suicide prevention. These coordinators are in the process of organizing a system of flags in the electronic medical record system to alert providers about those at high risk. They are also conducting training for community members who have frequent contact with veterans to help them recognize those at risk and encourage them to seek treatment.

There is a large body of scientific literature on suicide. Over the years, VA has been a prime contributor to the knowledge that has been developed in the scientific community on this issue. Our research has helped us target our efforts to reduce suicide. Some of the information our researchers have developed includes:

Among veterans receiving care from VA who died from suicide, almost 60{cd9ac3671b356cd86fdb96f1eda7eb3bb1367f54cff58cc36abbd73c33c82e1d} of those under age 65 had a mental health or substance abuse diagnosis on their medical records—but only 24{cd9ac3671b356cd86fdb96f1eda7eb3bb1367f54cff58cc36abbd73c33c82e1d} of those 65 or over had such a diagnosis.
There is significant variability in suicide rates among veterans by geography. In general, rates are lowest in the Northeast and highest in the West.
Firearms are the most common means used by veterans who died of suicide, accounting for nearly two-thirds of all deaths.
There appears to have been an increase in suicide rates among Vietnam veterans during the first two years after these veterans returned home. After a few years, however, Vietnam veterans’ rates of suicide were comparable to those of the general population.
There was no increase in suicide rates among veterans who returned from the first Gulf War.
Those veterans who are wounded in combat are at higher risk of suicide.
5. FUTURE ACTIVITIES

In the near future, the Department will continue to educate its employees; through additional Suicide Prevention Days; through posters identifying the warning signs of suicide; and through its continuing Employee Education process to identify those at possible risk of suicide to ensure they get proper care. As new data on suicide rates, risk factors for suicide and regional variations become available, VA will use that data to refine its programs, and to better evaluate their level of success.

VA will increasingly reach out to the newest generation of veterans, by using communications outlets familiar to them. VA now has a virtual office on “Second Life;” and recently collaborated with MTV on a video on readjustment issues for returning veterans that can be found on their web site.

VA will continue its efforts to meet the mandate of the President’s New Freedom Commission to reduce the stigma that surrounds mental illness.

VA will also continue the expansion of its mental health program that has enabled the Department to hire more than 3800 new mental health employees in the past three years, and expand hours of operation for mental health clinics beyond normal business hours. These efforts to better identify and treat mental illness will help prevent contemplation of suicide and suicide attempts—and will help ensure that veterans in crisis are already involved in VA’s system and have somewhere to turn when they need help.

The Department will aggressively follow up on patients in mental health and substance abuse programs who miss appointments to ensure they are not lost to follow up care. VA will also monitor the standards the Veterans Health Administration has set for itself: to provide initial evaluations of all patients with mental health issues within 24 hours, provide urgent care immediately when that evaluation indicates it is needed, and to complete a full evaluation and initiate a treatment plan within 14 days for those not needing immediate crisis care.

On May 2, VA began contacting nearly 570,000 combat veterans of the Global War on Terror to ensure they know about VA medical services and other benefits. The Department will reach out and touch every veteran of the war to let them know it is here for them. The first of those calls are going to an estimated 17,000 veterans who were sick or injured while serving in Iraq or Afghanistan. If any of these 17,000 veterans do not now have a care manager to work with them to ensure they get appropriate health care, VA will offer to appoint one for them.

All case managers for OEF/OIF veterans will be trained in suicide risk recognition and management for their patients, and encouraged to establish a personal relationship with those veterans to support their health care needs.

I have also directed the creation of a work group on suicide prevention in the veteran population. This work group will look at all matters relating to VA’s ability to prevent suicide among veterans. They will be given all the data VA has, and access to the best experts VA knows.

The work group will be asked to provide a report within fifteen days of the completion of their meeting on how VA can better approach suicide prevention, suicide research, and suicide education.

All work group members will come from outside the Department of Veterans Affairs. Some will be DoD specialists; others will be from other government agencies. Nationally recognized clinical treatment, research and public health experts on suicide and suicide prevention will augment them. The work group will provide an additional level of advice and oversight to all the issues described above.

There is nothing more tragic than the loss of even one of those great men or women who have served this nation. The VA is committed to doing all that we can to serve the individual while we continue to try to understand a very complicated problem that is also a national problem. We owe this committee and the nation accurate information and carefully studied, thoughtful conclusions while we provide the “best care anywhere” to our Veterans.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Tagged | Comments Off on Testimony of Dr. James Peake, VA Secretary

Veterans Aged 20-24 are Three Times More Likely to Commit Suicide, Expert Tells Congress

May 6, 2008, Washington, DC – A statistician told a House panel today that male U.S. veterans between the ages of 20 and 24 are three times more likely to commit suicide than non-veterans their ages.

In general, veteran suicide rates are about double those of non-veterans, Stephen L. Rathbun, interim head of the Department of Epidemiology & Biostatistics at the University of Georgia, said in testimony before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs.

“The pattern of higher estimated veteran suicide risk was observed for both genders and all age classes,” Rathbun said.

Rathbun said he analyzed the statistics on veteran suicides for a CBS News investigation and was not paid for his work. He said he was chosen for his impartiality, but did not have a peer review his findings. The news story aired Dec. 12.

E-mail attracts attention

U.S. Rep. Bob Filner, D-Calif., the committee chairman, called the hearing titled, “The Truth About Veterans’ Suicides,” and requested that Ira Katz, the mental health director at the Department of Veterans Affairs, explain to the committee an internal e-mail he sent to the VA public affairs office.

The subject line of the e-mail read, “shh,” which Katz said was “unfortunate.” The e-mail states that 12,000 veterans attempt suicide a year while under VA treatment. “Is this something we should (carefully) address ourselves in some sort of release before someone stumbles on it?” the e-mail asks.

Filner asked the new Veterans Affairs Secretary James B. Peake – whose tenure began in December – if he was “going to assure accountability” of Katz “and anyone who participated in the cover-up of this data. I want to know if you are really going to take your role seriously. This isn’t an abstract. This is about our veterans and whether they have a life ahead of them or not.”

Filner told Katz that he seemed – in the e-mail – more concerned about managing the data than helping veterans.

Katz said that the e mail “was in poor tone” and that the “content was a dialog” about discussing the high rate of suicides, adding, “I deeply regret the subject line.”

Filner said that Katz should be fired, but Peake said after the hearing he did not plan to fire him. White House press secretary Dana Perino said that the president has “full confidence in Peake.”

The e-mail was recently disclosed during a trial in San Francisco which is still pending. Two veteran groups are asking the judge to order the VA to improve its mental health care.

Belchertown connection

In Western Massachusetts, a Belchertown couple, Joyce and Kevin Lucey, filed suit in the summer against the Department of Veterans Affairs for the wrongful death of their son, Marine Lance Cpl. Jeffery M. Lucey, 23, an Iraq veteran who returned home and within several months began having nightmares and drinking heavily.

The parents allege in their suit that the VA Medical Center at Leeds failed to give their son the medical care he needed which led to his death. The parents said the VA center refused to admit the Marine reservist on June 5, 2004. He hung himself on June 22, 2004, within a year of returning home.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Comments Off on Veterans Aged 20-24 are Three Times More Likely to Commit Suicide, Expert Tells Congress

Iraq: No Evidence Iran is Arming Shiites

May 4, 2008, Baghdad – A top Iraqi official said Sunday there was no “conclusive” evidence that Shiite extremists have been directly supplied with some Iranian arms as alleged by the United States.

Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said Iraq does not want trouble with any country, “especially Iran.”

Al-Dabbagh was commenting on talks this week in Tehran between an Iraqi delegation and Iranian authorities aimed at halting suspected Iranian aid to some Shiite militias.

Asked about reports that some rockets made in 2007 or 2008 and seized in raids against militias were directly supplied by Iran, al-Dabbagh replied: “There is no conclusive evidence.”

Al-Dabbagh said Iraq wants friendly ties with Iran and stressed both countries share common interests.

“We can’t ignore or deny we are neighbors. We do not want to be pushed in a struggle with any country, especially Iran,” he told a news conference.

“We are fed up with past tensions that we have paid a costly price for because some parties have pushed Iraq (in the past) to take an aggressive attitude to Iran.”

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Comments Off on Iraq: No Evidence Iran is Arming Shiites

May 5: Another Outrage as VA Official Says Suicides Occur ‘Just Like Cancer Occurs’

May 5, 2008 – Suicides among veterans of wars overseas occur “just like cancer occurs,” and are not an indication of negligence by Veterans Affairs Department mental health care providers, a top VA official has argued in a lawsuit filed by two veterans groups. The official said he does not know how well VA hospitals are complying with a directive to provide 24-hour referrals to veterans with mental health problems.

Last year, two groups, Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans United for Truth, filed suit in U.S. District Court in San Francisco, charging that VA had failed to make mental health services immediately and widely available to returning veterans. Testimony in the non-jury trial ended last week.

Documents filed in the case revealed that the Justice Department tried to have the lawsuit thrown out on the grounds that language in the department’s appropriations bills and prior case law “specifically and substantially limits VA’s obligation to provide care … [and] creates no such expectation [that veterans are entitled to care] (emphasis and brackets added by Justice).”

Internal VA memos released at the trial in April disclosed that in February, the department knew it was facing 1,000 suicide attempts per month, which the veterans groups argued could have been avoided if VA had adhered to its 2004 Veterans Health Administration Mental Health Strategic Plan, which called for development of a “national, systemic program for suicide prevention.”

A deposition by a VA medical center psychiatrist caring for veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan backed up the veterans groups’ assertion that the department had not done enough to provide adequate mental health care for all veterans.

Dr. Marcus Nemuth, medical director of Psychiatry Emergency Service for VA’s Puget Sound Health Care System in Seattle, which operates three hospitals, said in his deposition on March 25 that he expected a high volume of post-traumatic stress disorder cases among veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. He said he was concerned with both with the quantity and quality of care provided to those veterans.

Nemuth said during the past year he had seen such a growth in the caseload of Afghanistan and Iraq veterans seeking psychiatric emergency help at the Seattle VA hospital that he concluded the department faced a “tsunami of medical need.”

But William Feeley, the Veterans Health Administration’s deputy undersecretary for health for operations and management, said in an April 9 deposition that VA did not have a metric to track suicides or attempts. He added that he could not recall a time since he took office in February 2006 when VA had conducted a quarterly review of suicides or attempts among the department’s 21 Veterans Integrated Services Networks.

When asked in the deposition if any regional health care network directors had been disciplined or demoted because of increased rates of suicides or attempts, Feeley answered, “A suicide does not mean negligence on the part of a medical center director or a network director. Suicide occurs just like cancer occurs.”

Feeley said he did not know how many Afghanistan and Iraq veterans in VA’s care had committed suicide since February 2006. “I would consider that suicides go on with all war eras, and a particularly vulnerable population is a 55- to 65-year-old veteran as well, so I have not broken it out, or no one, to the best of my knowledge, has broken it out related to war era.”

VA spokeswoman Laurie Tranter said VA would not provide additional comment on Feeley’s remarks pending resolution of the lawsuit.

Before taking his job at VHA headquarters in Washington, Feeley served as director of the Veterans Integrated Services Network in upstate New York for three years, including 19 months after VA released its mental health action plan in June 2004. Though the plan required Veterans Integrated Services Networks take immediate action on a number of recommendations, including a requirement that the networks ensure that all community-based outpatient clinics with a population at least 1,500 veterans provide on-site, contract or telemedicine mental health services, Feeley said at his deposition that he had only read an executive summary of the plan while serving as a network director.

The plan contained 260 recommendations and mandates to be implemented in fiscal 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. But Feeley said in his deposition that he did not know as of June 2007 “whether [the plan] had been implemented.” He added he did not know whether the national program for suicide prevention had ever been developed and deployed throughout VHA.

In June 2007 Feeley sent out a memo to Veterans Integrated Services Network directors requiring hospitals and community-based outpatient clinics to provide an initial evaluation within 24 hours to veterans who requested or were referred for mental health evaluation and/or substance abuse treatment.

Feeley also told network directors that as of Aug. 1, 2007, follow-up to these evaluations should occur within 14 days.

In his deposition Feeley said the June 2007 memo was sent in part in response to a May 2007 VA inspector general report that found initiatives detailed in the mental health plan pertaining to 24-hour crisis availability, outreach, referral and development of methods for tracking veterans at risk had not been deployed systemwide.

The inspector general recommended that VHA facilities make arrangements for 24-hour crisis and mental health care availability, either on site or through a hot line staffed by trained personnel. In addition, the IG said, an on-call mental health specialist should be available to crisis staff.

Feeley could not say during his deposition whether the policies laid out in his memo for 24-hour mental health referral and 14-day follow-up had been adopted throughout VHA. And aside from the suicide hot line, he could not say whether VHA had complied with other recommendations contained in the IG report. He said he “would have some trust in the organization” that the memo had been met with compliance. Otherwise, he said, “we will be spending millions of dollars related to auditing procedures.”

Melvin Goldman, an attorney at Morrison & Foerster, the San Francisco law firm representing the veterans groups, asked Feeley: “If those millions of dollars resulted in the saving of one veteran’s life, wouldn’t they be worthwhile?” Feeley answered: “I think we have to make tough judgments in the industry on how to best measure success.”

Feeley said he intended to ensure compliance with his memo through random site visits, saying he had completed five or six such visits as of April. But Antonette Zeiss, deputy chief consultant for patient care services at VA’s Office of Mental Health Services, said at a pretrial hearing in March that site visits had been completed at only two VA facilities, in Los Angeles and Pittsburgh. Zeiss did not provide details on compliance in Pittsburgh, but said the Los Angeles facility was not in full compliance.

Gordon Erspamer, a Morrison & Foerster attorney, said in a trial brief that the 24-hour mental health evaluation procedures detailed in the Feeley memo as well as other suicide prevention steps taken by VA, such as the suicide hot line, amount to “nothing more than an empty promise on which too many veterans have tragically learned they cannot rely.”

Justice Department attorney Daniel Bensing in his closing argument on April 30 called the charges by the veterans’ groups “extreme and outrageous,” adding that VA is providing “world-class health care in the mental health area.”
Judge Samuel Conti is not expected to issue his ruling for a number of weeks.

The House Veterans Affairs Committee has scheduled a hearing for Tuesday on veteran suicides. The committee, chaired by Rep. Bob Filner, D-Calif., is expected to question top department leaders, including VA Secretary Dr. James Peake; Gerald Cross, principal deputy undersecretary for Health; and Dr. Ira Katz, deputy chief patient care services officer for mental health.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Comments Off on May 5: Another Outrage as VA Official Says Suicides Occur ‘Just Like Cancer Occurs’

Post-War Suicides May Exceed Combat Deaths, US Says

May 5, 2008 – The number of suicides among veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may exceed the combat death toll because of inadequate mental health care, the U.S. government’s top psychiatric researcher said.

Community mental health centers, hobbled by financial limits, haven’t provided enough scientifically sound care, especially in rural areas, said Thomas Insel, director of the National Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, Maryland. He briefed reporters today at the American Psychiatric Association’s annual meeting in Washington.

Insel echoed a Rand Corporation study published last month that found about 20 percent of returning U.S. soldiers have post- traumatic stress disorder or depression, and only half of them receive treatment. About 1.6 million U.S. troops have fought in the two wars since October 2001, the report said. About 4,560 soldiers had died in the conflicts as of today, the Defense Department reported on its Web site.

Based on those figures and established suicide rates for similar patients who commonly develop substance abuse and other complications of post-traumatic stress disorder, “it’s quite possible that the suicides and psychiatric mortality of this war could trump the combat deaths,” Insel said.

Post-traumatic stress disorder, known as PTSD, is the failure to cope after a major shock, such as an auto accident, a rape or combat, Insel said. PTSD may remain dormant for months or years before it surfaces, and in about 10 percent of cases people never recover, he said.

Difficult to Predict

“We don’t yet know how to predict who is going to be the person to be most concerned about,” Insel said.

The Pentagon didn’t dispute Insel’s remark.

“The department takes the issue of suicide very seriously, and one suicide is too many,” said spokeswoman Cynthia Smith in an e-mail.

The department has expanded efforts to encourage soldiers and veterans not to feel stigmatized if they seek mental health treatment, Smith said.

Soldiers who’d been exposed to combat trauma were the most likely to suffer from depression or PTSD, the Rand report said. About 53 percent of soldiers with those conditions sought treatment during the past year. Half of those who got care were judged by Rand researchers to have received inadequate treatment.

Failure to adequately treat the mental and neurological problems of returning soldiers can cause a chain of negative events in the lives of affected veterans, the researchers said. About 300,000 soldiers suffer from depression or PTSD, the report said.

Treatment Options

Researchers aren’t sure whether it’s appropriate to treat such patients with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, a class of medications that include Prozac, and other anti- depressants, Insel said. His institute is examining that question and novel treatments for PTSD, including using so-called virtual reality technology.

The psychiatric association reported last week that a survey of 191 military members and their spouses found 32 percent said their duty hurt their mental health, and six in 10 believed seeking treatment would damage their careers.

More than 15,000 psychiatrists are attending the professional group’s meeting.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Comments Off on Post-War Suicides May Exceed Combat Deaths, US Says

Editorial Column: Abu Ghraib Whistleblower Blows Whistle on New Torture Film

Editor’s Note: Former Army Sgt. Sam Provance was the only uniformed military intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib who broke the code of silence surrounding the infamous prisoner abuses. He spoke out during the Army’s internal investigation, at a congressional hearing and in press interviews.  For his brave integrity, Provance was punished and pushed out of the U.S. military, clearing the way for the Pentagon to pin the blame for the sadistic treatment of Iraqi detainees on a handful of poorly trained MPs.  Now, history is repeating itself in Errol Morris’s supposedly hard-hitting documentary on the scandal:

April 30, 2008 – Representatives for film director Errol Morris told me during pre-production that “Standard Operating Procedure” would be the very best documentary on the abuses of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib – the one that would tell the whole truth. I had pinned great hope on that. It didn’t turn out that way.
 
My perspective on the Abu Ghraib scandal came from spending from September 2003 to February 2004 at the Iraq prison as a sergeant in Army Intelligence. Working the 8 p.m.-to- 8 a.m. night shift, it was impossible not to notice who was directing the operation. And I shared all this with Morris.
 
But now I’ve seen the film and I’m disappointed. Morris does little to get to the bottom of what happened. He muddies already opaque waters regarding who was actually responsible for the abuse of prisoners.
 
The film focuses on the awful photos, the people in them and those who took them. This perspective plays right into the hands of the cover-up artists. It perpetuates the myth that the abuses are rightfully laid at the feet of those impressionable, but very human, young soldiers.
 
Morris should have been looking up the chain of command; at the civilian and military officials actually responsible for ordering these Military Police Reservists to rough up prisoners.
 
A no-holds-barred documentary? Give me a break.
 
Finally, the Whole Truth!
 
I was first put into contact with the makers of “SOP” while I was still in the Army. From the beginning, I was told this was going to be a huge project with the production support of Sony Pictures Entertainment; and that Morris, who had won an Oscar with his documentary, “The Fog of War,” would be at the helm. 
 
This was to be the breakthrough investigation into what really happened at Abu Ghraib, who was responsible for the abuse and why it was ordered – the project that really got people’s attention, going where previous investigators and media had feared to tread.
 
Call me gullible but, believing this was to be a groundbreaking work, I fully cooperated with Morris. I assisted him in his quest for documents, videos, photos, notes and helped him contact fellow soldiers who were at Abu Ghraib and knew what happened.
 
When I was discharged from the Army in October 2006, I went to Boston for a two-day interview.
 
Morris asked me to sign several contracts before and after the interviews, and I did as he asked without paying much attention to them. I do remember however, that in one contract Morris agreed to pay me one dollar.
 
In any event, I never got the dollar, but was reminded of this last week when I read in the New York Times that others got paychecks for their participation.
 
I have never asked for or taken money for media interviews. To me, that undermines the process and trivializes the importance of the issues of torture and prisoner mistreatment and their meaning for the moral atmosphere in our country as a whole. 
 
When the film was finished, Morris told me he had intended to use some of the footage from my two days of interviews and the materials I provided, but decided in the end to “narrowly focus” on the Military Police. This, of course, is what so many others have done and is in the worst tradition of a Nixon-style “modified, limited hangout.”
 
Chain of Command?
 
Here’s the oddest thing: Even though Morris’s lens is trained on the Military Police, he does find room for a civilian interrogator, Tim Dugan, who worked at Abu Ghraib for CACI, a contractor factory for civilian interrogators. 
 
I witnessed for myself how civilian personnel, like Dugan, corrupted the military. Indeed, they were the genesis of the break from conventional interrogation techniques into what Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at when he spoke of the “dark side” of intelligence.
 
It was they who ordered the Military Police and some of my own unit’s Military Intelligence soldiers to “soften” the detainees for interrogation, and encouraged the behavior depicted in the photographs. I know; I was there. And, of course, I told Errol Morris.
 
So I was surprised, to say the least, to see Morris giving Dugan a place to contend that, essentially, the abuses were all the military’s fault.
 
Odd indeed. Even Maj. Gen. George Fay, whose investigation of Abu Ghraib left much to be desired, reported the pernicious effect civilian interrogators had on the impressionable and inexperienced soldiers.
 
Fay reported, for example that Daniel Johnson, one of Dugan’s CACI interrogator colleagues, whom I knew at Abu Ghraib, was using Spc. Charles Graner as “muscle” for his interrogations.
 
And yet, Morris describes Dugan as “remarkable.” Remarkable, indeed, Errol.
 
Did no one tell you that CACI, Dugan and several of his fellow interrogators were sued by their victims in Abu Ghraib, seeking to hold them accountable for their behavior?
 
In the civil case brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of Abu Ghraib prisoners, the lawsuit implicates Dugan in the abuse.
 
“CACI interrogator Timothy Dugan also tortured plaintiffs and other prisoners,” the lawsuit alleges. “For example, he physically dragged handcuffed plaintiffs and other prisoners along the ground to inflict pain on them. He struck and beat plaintiffs and other prisoners. He bragged to a non-conspirator about scaring a prisoner with threats to such a degree that the prisoner vomited.
 
“When a young non-conspirator directed him to cease the torture and comply [with] Army Field Manual 34-52, Dugan scoffed at his youth and refused to follow the direction.”
 
The lawsuit further alleges that Dugan took part in a CACI cover-up of when a detainee died by going through “the charade of interrogating a prisoner who was already dead as part of the conspiracy’s efforts to conceal a murder.” Dugan is accused, too, of threatening a fellow CACI employee who talked to investigators.
 
CACI has denounced the lawsuit as baseless, and the individual defendants were dismissed out on a technicality. However, on Nov. 6, 2007, U.S. District Court Judge James Robertson in Washington denied CACI’s motion for summary judgment and ordered a jury trial against CACI.
 
A criminal investigation also is pending in the Eastern District of Virginia concerning some of the CACI employees.
 
In “SOP,” Dugan presents himself as a whistleblower who tried to stop the abuses. He claims that he reported to his “section sergeant” that two Army female interrogators were stripping detainees naked as an interrogation technique, and how shocked he was to see this.
 
Dugan claims he got the brush-off; was told not to get involved. So who was this “section sergeant?” And is he/she above the law?
 
Why did Dugan not offer himself as a witness in any of the various investigations? Where has he been if he felt then the way he now says he did? Again, why sport the good-guy badge now?
 
I came away with the impression that Morris was unprepared for the interview and was being taken for a ride.
 
CACI’s Defense
 
For obvious reasons, CACI has gone to extraordinary lengths to separate itself from the horrors of Abu Ghraib, arguing that the military alone was at fault.
 
CACI recently announced the release of a book, Our Good Name: A Company’s Fight To Defend Its Honor And Get The Truth About Abu Ghraib. 
 
CACI contends strongly that its interrogators adhered to the military chain of command, something it has been feverishly trying to establish in the lawsuits against it.
 
And so, the behavior captured in the photos? That was the military’s responsibility, not CACI’s. 
 
That is not what I observed from my ringside seat.
 
I told Morris that the reality was that the civilian contractors paid little heed to the military chain of command, and that they were the ones actually running the show. That didn’t make it into the final version of “SOP.”
 
Even though it is now an established fact that between 70 to 90 percent of detainees at Abu Ghraib were completely innocent, something I learned directly on site, Dugan implies that the harsh interrogation practices applied there were legitimate – except of course for the failings of the military.
 
This myth-making is intended to hold CACI harmless and help it maintain its very lucrative government contracts. CACI International had $1.6 billion in revenues in 2005. Folks have always told me it all has to do with money; I suppose they’re right. 
 
But Congress should be asking some simple questions. It should start by asking why civilian contractors are being employed in connection with the interrogation of persons under detention in wartime, a function which previously has been entirely in the hands of the uniformed military?
 
This could yield some interesting answers. Indeed, evasion of military rules and discipline as well as avoidance of congressional oversight might be at the heart of the answers.
 
Morris takes pride in calling “SOP” a horror movie and – with the mood music and the needless slow-motion reenactments – he makes sure of that.
 
However, “SOP” does little more than humanize some of the “bad apples” (a good thing, I suppose), while gratuitously absolving the civilian interrogators actually responsible for fouling those apples. 
 
But, wait. Abu Ghraib is not primarily about Military Police – or civilian interrogators. It is about the many thousands of wrongfully detained Iraqis – many of them abused, tortured and even killed. It is also about their families. What about their story?
 
Morris has called “SOP” just “the tip of the iceberg,” citing the unused volumes of material he’s collected since production began. But Morris owed his viewers a glimpse of the whole iceberg, not just the small misleading piece that bobbed above the surface.
 
He has announced his next film project: a comedy. Go figure.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Editorial Column: Abu Ghraib Whistleblower Blows Whistle on New Torture Film

Sen. Webb’s GI Bill to be Added to Iraq War Spending Bill

May 6, 2008, Washington, DC – Defying President Bush, House Democrats are preparing to forge ahead with a war spending measure that would include extended unemployment assistance and new educational benefits for returning veterans.

After a meeting Monday evening of House Democratic leaders, Speaker Nancy Pelosi said she hoped to bring a $178 billion measure to the floor this week. What could be a contentious debate on the matter is likely to be held on Thursday, aides said.

Ms. Pelosi, of California, did not disclose details of the proposed bill, which will be presented to rank-and-file Democrats at a closed party session on Tuesday. But Democratic officials, who did not want to be identified since the bill was still being put into final form, said the legislative package would include provisions requiring a significant withdrawal of troops from Iraq by December 2009 and measures that would force Iraq to share more costs of its reconstruction.

Democrats also intend to make veterans eligible for new educational assistance if they have served from three months to three years or more on active duty since Sept. 11, 2001. The aid would be equivalent to a four-year scholarship at a public university for those with three years or more service, with payments prorated for those with less time.

Mr. Bush has steadily insisted he would not approve any legislation that exceeds his spending request for the war, sets any withdrawal deadlines or adds domestic money he opposes like the unemployment benefits. And House Republicans, angry that the measure is not going through formal committee consideration, began on Monday to open procedural attacks on the House floor in protest, forcing extra votes on noncontroversial measures.

“The Democrat leaders of the House and Senate are attempting to jam a 200-plus-billion-dollar spending bill through the Congress with absolutely no oversight or scrutiny by a vast majority of members, senators or their constituents,” Representative Jerry Lewis of California, the senior Republican on the Appropriations Committee, said in a statement on Monday. “Never in my 30 years in Congress has there been such an abuse of the processes and rules of the House.”

Democrats said privately that they expected the provisions setting a withdrawal deadline and putting other conditions on the war money to be eliminated by the Senate before a final House vote later this spring.

The Democratic strategy is to try to hold the underlying measure close to Mr. Bush’s bottom line number — $108 billion in Pentagon money for the current year, $70 billion through the first months of 2009 — and essentially dare him to veto it over added veterans spending and the unemployment aid.

Democrats say that they believe Republicans will be reluctant to oppose the expanded veterans money in an election year and that the cost is relatively small in the first year, though it would expand quickly and significantly in subsequent years. Republicans in both the House and Senate have been assembling alternatives to the Democratic veterans plan, which has some bipartisan support.

Mr. Bush said last week that he was willing to consider more help for veterans but wanted to do it separately from the war financing measure.

The House provisions calling for a withdrawal from Iraq would also include a ban on torture of terrorism detainees, a prohibition on permanent bases in Iraq and new readiness requirements for troops, including more time at home between deployments.

Given the looming election and the stalemate last year over federal spending, many lawmakers see the must-pass war spending bill as the lone spending measure likely to become law this year, increasing the incentive to add money and policy measures to it. Senators of both parties have indicated that they might use the war legislation as a vehicle to push their own priorities.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Sen. Webb’s GI Bill to be Added to Iraq War Spending Bill

May 6: Opening Statement by Chairman Bob Filner for Hearing on Veterans’ Suicides

Opening Statement By Hon. Bob Filner Chairman, and a Representative in Congress from the State of California

Good morning and welcome to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs’ hearing on “The Truth about Veterans’ Suicides.” 

On December 12, 2007, this Committee held a hearing entitled “Stopping Suicides: Mental Health Challenges within the Department of Veterans Affairs.”  Nearly five months later, we are again holding a hearing on the tragic issue of suicide among our veterans and what the VA is doing to address what is clearly an epidemic.  In November of last year, CBS News aired a story entitled “Suicide Epidemic Among Veterans.”  On April 21, 2008, CBS News aired a story “VA Hid Suicide Risk, Internal E-Mails Show.”

The first step in addressing a problem is to understand the scope and extent of the problem.  In the case of the VA and the epidemic of veteran suicides, either the VA has not adequately attempted to determine the scope of the problem, which is an indictment of the VA’s basic competence, or the VA knows the extent of the problem, but has attempted to obfuscate and minimize the problem to veterans, Congress, and the American people, which is an indictment of the leadership of the entire Department.

In December, Dr. Katz, in testimony before this Committee, stressed a low-rate of veteran suicide, stating that “from the beginning of the war through the end of 2005 there were 144 known suicides among these new veterans.”  In responding to the figures used by CBS, Dr. Katz stated that “their number for veteran suicides is not, in fact, an accurate reflection of the rates of suicide.”

Either Dr. Katz knew that the CBS figures were indeed an accurate reflection of the rates of suicide at that hearing or had a sudden epiphany only days later.

In an internal email, Dr. Kussman, on December 15, 2007, referring to a newspaper article, writes that “18 veterans kill themselves every day and this is confirmed by the VA’s own statistics.  Is that true?  Sounds awful but if one is considering 24 million veterans.”  That same day, Dr. Katz responds: “There are about 18 suicides per day among America’s 25 million veterans.  This follows from CDC findings that 20{cd9ac3671b356cd86fdb96f1eda7eb3bb1367f54cff58cc36abbd73c33c82e1d} of suicides are among veterans it is supported by CBS numbers.”

In February of this year Dr. Katz sends an email stating  “Shh! – Our suicide prevention coordinators are identifying about 1000 suicide attempts per month among the veterans we see in our medical facilities.  Is this something we should (carefully) address ourselves in some sort of release before someone stumbles on it?”

There was silence from the VA.

Armen Keteyian, Chief Investigative Reporter for CBS News, characterized the VA’s internal emails as “a paper trail of denial and deceit – a disservice to all veterans and their families – [that] has rightfully been exposed.”

In an April 24, 2008, newspaper article, a VA spokeswoman stated that “there are an estimated 1,000 suicide attempts per month among the 7.8 million veterans treated by Veterans Affairs, she said.”

The VA spokeswoman may have misspoke, or this could be yet another example of the VA’s attempt to hide the true magnitude of the problem.  In the VA’s most recent budget submission, the VA claims it will treat 5.2 million veterans this year, and 5.3 million next year – 2.5 million fewer veterans than the 7.8 million quoted in the newspaper article.

In April, a Dallas Morning News editorial, describing a “recent spike in suicides among psychiatric patients treated at the Dallas VA hospital” stated that “descriptions of how four veterans committed suicide in four months – prompting the psychiatric ward to close – suggest that patients went to conspicuous and time-consuming lengths to end their own lives.  There seemed to be ample time for staffers to stop them had they been doing their jobs better.”

The Rand Corporation, in a recently published study entitled the “Invisible Wounds of War, found that since October 2001, approximately 1.6 million U.S. troops have deployed, and that “upward of 26 percent of returning troops may have mental health conditions.”  The study estimated that approximately 300,000 of those deployed suffer from PTSD or major depression.  Among those with PTSD or major depression, only half had seen a mental health provider or physician to seek help in the past 12 months, and among those who had sought help, “just over half received minimally adequate treatment.”

The study defined minimally adequate exposure to psychotherapy as consisting of at least eight visits with a mental health professional such as a psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor in the past 12 months, with visits averaging at least 30 minutes.  How does VA mental health care treatment stack up against this definition of minimally adequate care?

The Rand study also found that “the VA too faces challenges in providing access to OEF/OIF veterans, many of whom have difficulty securing appointments, particularly in facilities that have been resourced primarily to meet the demands of older veterans. 

Better projections of the amount and type of demand among newer veterans are needed to ensure that the VA has the appropriate resources to meet the potential demand.  New approaches of outreach could make facilities more acceptable to OEF/OIF veterans.”

I think many of us believe that the VA health care system has been pushed to the edge in dealing with the mental health care needs of our veterans.  And, I believe that we are witnessing either an inability to address this problem, or a purposeful attempt to minimize the problems faced by veterans and the VA and sweep the epidemic of veteran suicides, and the mental health care needs of our returning servicemembers, under the rug.

So this morning we are going to attempt to get a better idea of the scope of this epidemic, and what the VA is doing to respond to it.  What specific steps has the VA taken since December, steps not previously planned before December, to get a better idea of the scope of the problem, and what has it done to begin to address the problem? 

Finally, I believe we must also seek real accountability from the VA, and, Mr. Secretary, we look to you to provide that accountability.

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Comments Off on May 6: Opening Statement by Chairman Bob Filner for Hearing on Veterans’ Suicides

Ex-Iraq Commander Accuses Bush Administration of ‘Gross Incompetence’

May 2, 2008 – In a new memoir set to be published May 6, the former commander of US forces in Iraq provides new intimate details of the goings-on at high levels of the Bush Administration in the first year of the Iraq war.

His sharp tongued conclusion: “Hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars were unnecessarily spent, and worse yet, too many of our most precious military resource, our American soldiers, were unnecessarily wounded, maimed, and killed as a result. In my mind, this action by the Bush administration amounts to gross incompetence and dereliction of duty.”

An excerpt from Sanchez’s book, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story, published in TIME, buries the quotation on the third page of the article.

Sanchez commanded the US military in Iraq from 2003-2004. The three-star general was relieved of his commander in 2004 following the Abu Ghraib scandal, and in 2005, was told his career was over and he wouldn’t be promoted to a fourth star.

The primary reason appears to be his involvement in authorizing harsh tactics for the treatment of Iraqi prisoners.

In a memo acquired by the ACLU through a freedom of information act request, Sanchez authorized techniques to be used against prisoners which included “environmental manipulation,” such as heating or cooling a room or using an “unpleasant smell,” isolating prisoners, and disrupting sleep patterns. Sanchez later denied ever authorizing interrogators to “go to the outer limits” and called the ACLU “…a bunch of sensationalist liars, I mean lawyers, that will distort any and all information that they get to draw attention to their positions.”

Six months after he was told he would not receive a promotion — in April 2006 — he says he was called in for a meeting with then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In his book, he writes:

“Ric, it’s been a long time,” Rumsfeld said, greeting me in a friendly manner. “I’m really sorry that your promotion didn’t work out. We just couldn’t make it work politically. Sending a nomination to the Senate would not be good for you, the Army, or the department.”

“I understand, sir,” I replied.
Rumsfeld then went on to offer Sanchez a post in Africa.

In what Sanchez maintains was an effort by Rumsfeld to shrug off blame for mistakes in Iraq’s first year, he says that the Secretary penned a memo which blamed failures on him.

“I stopped reading after I read that last statement, because I knew it was total BS,” he writes. “After a deep breath, I said, “Well, Mr. Secretary, the problem as you’ve stated it is generally accurate, but your memo does not accurately capture the magnitude of the problem. Furthermore, I just can’t believe you didn’t know that Franks’s and McKiernan’s staffs had pulled out and that the orders had been issued to redeploy the forces.”

Starting to get a little worked up,” he adds, “I paused a moment, and then looked Rumsfeld straight in the eye. “Sir, I cannot believe that you didn’t know I was being left in charge in Iraq….”

After the meeting ended, I remember walking out of the Pentagon shaking my head and wondering how in the world Rumsfeld could have expected me to believe him. Everybody knew that CENTCOM had issued orders to drawdown the forces. The Department of Defense had printed public affairs guidance for how the military should answer press queries about the redeployment. There were victory parades being planned. And in mid-May 2003, Rumsfeld himself had sent out some of his famous “snowflake” memorandums to Gen. Franks asking how the general was going to redeploy all the forces in Kuwait. The Secretary knew. Everybody knew.
He goes on to detail a report prepared by the Pentagon’s Joint Warfighting Center. The Pentagon commissioned the report — and it validated Sanchez’s assertions that he was not to blame and that decisions had been made at other levels.

“Say, did you guys ever complete that investigation?” I asked.

“Oh, yes sir. We sure did,” came the reply. “And let me tell you, it was ugly.”

“Ugly?” I asked.

“Yes, sir. Our report validated everything you told us — that Franks issued the orders to discard the original twelve-to-eighteen-month occupation deployment, that the forces were drawing down, that we were walking away from the mission, and that everybody knew about it. And let me tell you, the Secretary did not like that one bit. After we went in to brief him, he just shut us down. ‘This is not going anywhere,’ he said. ‘Oh, and by the way, leave all the copies right here and don’t talk to anybody about it.'”

“You mean he embargoed all the copies of the report?” I asked.

“Yes, sir, he did…’

…It turned out that the investigative team was so thorough, they had actually gone back and looked at the original operational concept that had been prepared by CENTCOM (led by Gen. Franks) before the invasion of Iraq was launched. It was standard procedure to present such a plan, which included such things as: timing for predeployment, deployment, staging for major combat operations, and postdeployment. The concept was briefed up to the highest levels of the U.S. government, including the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President of the United States.

And the investigators were now telling me that the plan called for a Phase IV (after combat action) operation that would last twelve to eighteen months…
“That decision set up the United States for a failed first year in Iraq,” he concludes. “There is no question about it. And I was supposed to believe that neither the Secretary of Defense nor anybody above him knew anything about it? Impossible! Rumsfeld knew about it. Everybody on the NSC knew about it, including Condoleezza Rice, George Tenet, and Colin Powell. Vice President Cheney knew about it. And President Bush knew about it.”

“In the meantime,” he adds, “hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars were unnecessarily spent, and worse yet, too many of our most precious military resource, our American soldiers, were unnecessarily wounded, maimed, and killed as a result. In my mind, this action by the Bush administration amounts to gross incompetence and dereliction of duty.”

Posted in Veterans for Common Sense News | Tagged , | Comments Off on Ex-Iraq Commander Accuses Bush Administration of ‘Gross Incompetence’